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JURISDICTION
Plaintiff/Appellant Lynn B. Astill originally filed
this appeal with the Supreme Court of Utah according to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2 (1996).
of Appeals.

This matter was assigned to the Utah Court

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by

excluding Astill's expert witnesses from testifying about Clark's
speed for the first time in rebuttal when Astill withheld their
testimony until after the defense had rested even though the
speed of Clark's vehicle was an issue since the very beginning of
this litigation.
2.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion at

trial by enforcing its pre-trial exclusion order barring all
witnesses from the courtroom during the testimony of other
witnesses.
3.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

ruling that Astill could not have her employer/chiropractor
present at the independent medical examination conducted by a
neurologist or that Astill could not videotape the examination.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case.

Astill is appealing a jury verdict awarding Plaintiff
no damages after Clark's vehicle impacted Astill's vehicle when
Clark's foot slipped off her brake pedal as she was adjusting her
child's seatbelt while stopped at an intersection.
1

(R. at 636-

41.)

Astill complains of the trial court's ruling that she

should have presented her evidence in chief before rebuttal, the
trial court's enforcement of its pre-trial exclusion order, and
the trial court's refusal to allow her employer/chiropractor to
observe an independent medical examination conducted by a
neurologist.
B.

Course Of The Proceedings.

Trial in this matter was held in the Third District
Court on February 6, 1996 through February 8, 1996.
46.)

(R. at 143-

The jury returned a special verdict finding Clark

negligent, but not a proximate cause of the injuries alleged by
Astill.

(Id.)

Judgment was entered on March 5, 1996.

(Id. )

On March 15, 1996, Astill moved for a new trial.
at 149-50.)

(R.

The trial court heard oral arguments on Plaintiff's

Motion for a New Trial on May 31, 1996 and took the matter under
advisement.

(R. at 278.)

On July 26, 1996, Judge Brian filed a

detailed written Court Ruling denying Astill's motion for a new
trial.

(R. at 279-84.)

Astill filed a Notice of Appeal in this

matter on September 23, 1996.

(R. at 288-89.)

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Astill's claim stems from a rear-end automobile

collision between the parties on or about June 6, 1994.
1-4, 9-11, 242, 279, 636-41.)

(R. at

Neither Clark nor her three-year-

old son were injured in the collision.

(R. at 637.)

No accident

report was filed because the damage was reported to be under

2

(R. at 638-40, 684. ) x

$400.00.

Clark's rented Taurus sustained

a small dent in the front license plate, possibly from hitting
the ball on the Explorer's trailer hitch.

(R. at 638-39, 699-

03.)
2.

On May 24, 1995, approximately nine months before

trial, Clark testified during her deposition that she was
travelling at a low speed when she collided with Astill. (R. at
242, 647.)

Clark testified that as she reached to adjust her

three-year-old's seatbelt while stopped, her foot slipped of the
brake and her Ford Taurus bumped into the rear of Astill's Ford
Explorer.

(R. at 636, 685, 694.)
3.

The Taurus was not available for inspection during

discovery because the rental vehicle was no longer in Clark's
possession.

The Explorer was available for inspection, but it

had been involved in another accident with speeds between 3 5 and
40 miles an hour.
4.

(R. at 684, 702.)

The Court held a Scheduling Conference on

September 14, 1995 at which time the Court ordered Astill to
identify her witnesses by November 15, 1996.
entered thereafter which so stated.
5.

A Court Order was

(R. at 242.)

On October 16, 1995, Clark moved under Rule 3 5 of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to compel an independent
medical examination by a neurologist, Dr. Nord, without the
1

To avoid confusion, please note that the court reporter
inserted 75 pages of a "partial transcript" into the middle of the
Jury Trial Volume III. Thus, when you reach the bottom of record
page 650, you should then refer to record pages 674 to 751 before
continuing to record page 651.
3

presence of Astill's chiropractor and employer, Dr. Wright.
at 3 0-41.)

(R.

Astill objected to the motion to compel and moved to

have Dr. Wright attend the examination, or in the alternative, to
have the examination videotaped.

(R. at 44-48.)

The trial court

granted Clark's motion to compel an examination without the
presence of Astill's chiropractor/employer, but allowed Astill to
be accompanied at the examination by a neurologist of her
choosing.

(R. at 50-51.)
6.

On November 15, 1996, Astill identified her

witnesses, including:
West Valley Auto Body
a.
Plaintiff's husband took her vehicle to this
shop for a damage estimate.
b.
Plaintiff's counsel will provide the name of
this mechanic as soon as possible.
(R. at 242.)
7.

On January 2, 1996, over a month before trial,

Clark formally identified Newell Knight as an expert witness in
Defendant's Designation of Expert Witnesses.

(R. at 242, 279,

732.)
8.

Sometime thereafter, Astill submitted a letter to

Clark's counsel wherein she supplemented her witness list to
include David Lord.
9.

(R. at 57-59, 279.)

Astill failed to take Knight's deposition or to

seek any other discovery regarding Knight's testimony.

(R. at

279, 732.)
10.

At the pre-trial conference, the trial court

entered an exclusion order barring all witnesses from the
4

courtroom during the testimony of other witnesses.

(R. at 280.)

At no time prior to trial did either party request their experts
be present in the courtroom during the direct-examination of the
opposing expert.
11.

(R. at 280.)

On February 6, 1996, during opening statements at

trial, Astill's counsel represented to the jury the accident
involved a substantial impact estimated at 10 to 25 miles per
hour.

(R. at 281, 733.)

Astill's counsel also made an issue of

speed during his direct-examination of Astill.
12.

(R. at 281.)

During Clark's opening statement, her counsel told

the jury a very low-speed impact occurred after Clark's foot
slipped off the brake while she was stopped behind Astill at a
red light.

(R. at 243, 281, 733, 741.)
13.

Astill testified at trial that Clark was

travelling 10 to 15 miles per hour at the time of collision.
at 279.)

(R.

Astill rested her case without having called any

accident reconstructionist or other expert witness.
14.

(R. at 633.)

Although they were available to testify, Astill's

counsel decided to not call any expert witnesses to establish the
speed of the collision during Astill's case in chief, and instead
chose to reserve all expert testimony for rebuttal.
15.

(R. at 279.)

When the defense called Knight to testify,

Astill's counsel requested that Lord be allowed in the courtroom
to analyze Knight's testimony and advise counsel on how to
conduct cross-examination.

(R. at 280, 675.)

The trial court

held Astill's request was in violation of its pre-trial exclusion
5

order, but allowed a recess between direct-examination and crossexamination in which time Astill consulted with Lord on how to
conduct cross-examination.
16.

(R. at 280-81, 675, 709.)

Knight testified at trial that Clark's speed at

the time of collision was three to four miles per hour.
243, 694, 703, 710.)

(R. at

Knight based his conclusions on the

photographs of the vehicle's bumpers, the lack of movement of
Astill's vehicle, the absence of any skid marks and the absence
of any injury to Clark resulting from the collision.

(R. at

243 . )
17.

After his consultation with Lord, Astill's counsel

conducted a "lengthy and well-directed" cross-examination of
Knight.

(R. at 281, 710-30.)

He questioned Knight with respect

to the deformation of the bumper brackets and the "return-to-itsshape" propensity of a Taurus bumper.

(R. at 722-23, 725-27.)

He also tried to impeach Knight's testimony by handing Knight an
impact-absorbing Taurus brace, which he later introduced into
evidence.

(R. at 718-19.)
18.

Sometime before the defense rested its case, one

of Clark's counsel, John E. Hansen, moved for the Court to
exclude Astill from calling her expert witnesses for the first
time in rebuttal.
19.

(R. at 731.)

Before granting Hansen's motion in limine, the

trial court asked Astill's counsel to explain why Astill's expert
witnesses were not called in her case in chief.

(R. at 731-32.)

Astill's counsel explained that he was waiting to call his
6

experts until Clark had "carried [her] burden of proof by showing
[she has] a serious challenge to [Astill's] version of the
facts."

(R. at 732.)
20.

The trial court stated that the accident's impact,

speed and resulting injury were elements of Astill's case in
chief.

(R. at 736-38.)

The trial court informed Astill's

counsel of the following:
[Y]ou have the burden of proof, and in your
case in chief you are well advised to prove
what you intend to prove. In this particular
case, the Court understood that you were
going to prove that this accident was caused
by a 10- to a 15-mile-an-hour impact or 15to 25-mile-an-hour impact, and, because of
that, the plaintiff sustained injury. You
need to prove that.
(R. at 740-41.)
21.

Astill's counsel readily admitted he knew before

trial that Clark was going to challenge Astill's account of the
speed of the accident, and assumed that Knight, "was going to put
in [sic] the speed around three to four miles an hour." (R. at
243, 279-81, 733, 740-42.)

He stated his assumption was

confirmed when he heard Clark's opening statement.

(R. at 243,

281, 733, 741.)
22.

The trial court granted Clark's motion in limine

because Astill "knew or reasonably should have known and
anticipated that the defense was going to challenge the testimony
of the plaintiff" based on the following: (i) photographs of both
vehicles; (ii) the back bumper of Astill's vehicle; (iii) the
absence of skid marks; (iv) the absence of any significant
7

movement of Astill's vehicle after being struck by Clark; and (v)
the lack of any injury to Clark.
23.

(R. at 748-49.)

With respect to the motion in limine, the trial

court made the following findings:
1. The speed of Defendant's vehicle has been
an issue since the beginning of this
litigation and Plaintiff could have and
should have reasonably anticipated
Defendant's evidence before trial and could
have and should have called her expert
witness in her case in chief to meet
Plaintiff's prima facia burden.
2. Plaintiff's expert witnesses should be
and are excluded from testifying in rebuttal
because Plaintiff improperly withheld them
until after the defense rested.
(R. at 244, 748.)
24.

After taking exception to the trial court's

ruling, Astill's counsel stated, "we have no rebuttal."

(R. at

750.)
25.

The jury returned a special verdict finding Clark

negligent, but not a proximate cause of Clark's damages. (R. at
103-04.)

Judgment was entered on March 5, 1996. (R. at 143-46.)
26.

Astill moved for a new trial based on the trial

court's exclusion of his expert witness from the courtroom during
Knight's testimony, the exclusion of his expert witnesses'
testimony in rebuttal, defects in voir dire, and the trial
court's failure to provide the jury with a present value table.
(R. at 149-74.)
27.

After both parties fully briefed the issues, the

trial court took the matter under advisement.
8

(R. at 151-239,

260-78.)

On July 26, 1996, the trial court entered a six-page

court ruling denying Astill's motion for a new trial.

(R. at

279-84.)
28.

The trial court found that "speed was an issue

from the outset" and that Clark was unfairly prejudiced by Astill
"saving such testimony as the last word and not giving the
Defense an opportunity to address it in their case in chief."
(R. at 282.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Having stopped at an intersection, Clark reached to
adjust her son's seatbelt and accidently bumped the rear of the
car in front of her.

A small dent in the license plate of

Clark's rented Taurus was the only noticeable damage.

During the

ensuing litigation, Astill and her counsel made a series of
tactical decisions which yielded certain consequences at trial.
Astill's strategic decisions included the following:
(i) the decision to not depose Clark's accident reconstructionist
before trial; (ii) the decision to not retain a neurologist of
Astill's choosing to attend her independent medical examination;
(iii) the decision to not request permission at the pre-trial
conference for her expert witness to be in the courtroom during
Knight's testimony; (iv) the choice to not prepare in advance for
the cross-examination of Knight; and, most importantly, (v) the
decision to attempt to present key expert testimony for the first
time during rebuttal.
The trial court exercised appropriate discretion in
9

not allowing Astill to present her case in chief in rebuttal.
Astill's counsel readily admitted that he was aware Clark would
present evidence that her low-speed collision could not have
possibly caused the damages claimed by Astill.

Clark had said so

in her deposition, and her counsel openly stated her position
during his opening statement. (R. at 733.)

Astill's counsel even

alleged that he anticipated the exact content of Knight's
testimony.

(R. at 243, 279-81, 733, 740-42.)
Having chosen to wait until after the defense rested to

present both of her expert witnesses, Astill ran the risk the
evidence would be excluded altogether.

Had the trial court

allowed Astill to present her evidence in such an unusual order,
Clark would have been deprived the opportunity to address
Astill's key evidence during her case in chief.

Such "trial by

ambush" should not be permitted.
While Astill claims on appeal she was harmed by the
court's exclusion of Lord during Knight's testimony, she is
actually only stating the consequence of the decisions to not
depose Knight, to not prepare for cross-examination before trial,
and to not request advance permission for Lord's attendance in
light of the trial court's exclusion order.
Having chosen not to retain her own neurologist to
attend the IME, Astill alleges on appeal that she was harmed by
the "adequacy of the examination."

She argues the "direct

confrontation of the credibility" between Dr. Nord, a
neurologist, and Dr. Wright, a chiropractor, could have been
10

avoided if the examination had been monitored.

Astill now

proposes the "unobtrusive" approach of videotaping a party's
medical examination.

Clark respectfully submits that Utah Rule

of Civil Procedure 35 provides adequate guidance on this issue.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED APPROPRIATE DISCRETION IN
EXCLUDING EVIDENCE IN CHIEF WHICH ASTILL IMPROPERLY SAVED FOR
REBUTTAL«
The

trial

court

exercised

its

sound

discretion

in

excluding Astill's rebuttal witnesses after concluding that the
evidence should have been offered during Astill's case in chief.
See Duncan v. Western Refrigeration Co., 354 P.2d 572, 573 (Utah
1960) ("[T]he trial court has considerable latitude in admitting or
excluding such [rebuttal] evidence, which properly should have been
introduced in the case in chief.") . The trial court did not abuse
its discretion by excluding counsel from calling

case-in-chief

expert witnesses for the first time in rebuttal.
A.

Astill Should Have Presented Her Expert Witnesses
During Her Case In Chief.

As the party with the burden of proof, Astill was bound
to present all of her evidence during her "case in chief, before
the close of the proof, and may not add to it by the device of
rebuttal."

75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 373 at 572 (1991) . See Soliz v.

Ammerman, 395 P. 2d 25, 26 (Utah 1964) (" [U] sually the party who has
the affirmative burden of proof is required to produce the first
evidence on an issue, and at that time should produce all his
evidence in chief.") . Rebuttal is not intended to give a party an
opportunity to present evidence that was proper for the case in
11

chief.

75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 374 at 573 (1991) . By withholding

key evidence from their case in chief, a plaintiff can deprive the
defense the opportunity to address the evidence during its case.
Id. at 573.

(R. at 282.)

The trial court has discretion to exclude even "relevant
rebuttal evidence, which might properly have been introduced in the
case in chief."

75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 373 at 573.

(R. at 282.)

The trial court appropriately excluded Astill from putting on her
prima facia case in rebuttal.

See Sirotiak v. H.C. Price Co., 758

P.2d 1271, 1277-78 (Alaska 1988) (" [T]he plaintiff may not ignore
known defense theories or close his or her eyes to evidence that
directly counters plaintiff's prima facia case.").
After

Clark

rested

her

case, the

trial

court

asked

Astill's counsel to explain the reasons why Astill had not called
her expert witnesses during her case in chief.

(R. at 731-32.)

Astill's counsel responded that "[i]t is a matter of the shift of
the burden
carrying

of proof," and

its

"burden

of

spoke of Clark's

proof."

(R. at

responsibility

731-32.)

assertion, however, is a false statement under Utah law.
v. Maas,

846 P.2d

468, 471

(Utah App. 1993)

of

Astill's
See Ames

(noting that the

Supreme Court of Utah recognizes a plaintiff's burden of proof with
respect

to negligence

and proximate

cause).

Astill

bore the

ultimate burden of production and persuasion and is required to
establish prima facia elements, including causation, during her
case in chief.

See Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., Inc., 821 P.2d 458, 462

(Utah App. 1991).
12

Astill's counsel readily admitted that although he failed
to depose Knight, he had nonetheless anticipated the exact content
of his testimony.
following

with

(R. at 733.)
respect

to

The trial court
Astill's

stated the

trial

tactics:

If you knew that [speed] was going to be an
issue
in this case, then
it is your
responsibility to present that in your case in
chief, not present half your case at the
beginning,
and
the other half
at
the
conclusion of the defense case.
(R. at 735.)

The trial court further noted that Astill failed to

comply with the time-honored principle of the orderly presentation
of the evidence:
[T]he Court is of the opinion that you simply
cannot sandwich the defense with testimony
that you have known and anticipated right from
the beginning, and hope to maybe get the last
word in.
(R. at 282, 741.)

See 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 356 at 560 (1991)

("[A]dherence to the appropriate

trial procedure and order of

presenting evidence cannot be perceived as error.").
B.

Evidence Of Causation Should Be Presented In
Plaintiff's Case In Chief To Establish A Prima
Facia Case of Negligence.

Astill's counsel has argued on appeal that the "exact
impact speed was not a necessary factor of her case in chief."
(Brief of Appellant at 19.)

However, the record reveals that

Clark's negligence was never an issue in this case (R. at 652) ; she
admitted in her deposition that her foot slipped off the brake and
she drifted into Astill's vehicle.

(R. at 647, 685, 694.)

The

real issue at trial was whether Clark's bumping fenders with Astill
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created

forces sufficient

to cause Astill's alleged

proximate cause was the controlling issue.
Astill's

counsel

injuries;

(R. at 279.)

chose not to depose

Clark's

expert

witness, Knight, because he knew "he was going to put in [sic] the
speed around three to four miles an hour."

(R. at 733.)

Astill's

counsel also stated at trial that his assumption "was confirmed
when

[he] heard the opening statement."

(R. at 733.)

Fully

realizing that Clark would challenge the issue of causation, Astill
had an affirmative duty to present her entire case, including her
evidence on causation, in her case in chief.
1277-78.

Sirotiak, 758 P. 2d at

See Brief of Appellant at 15, 19 (stating the general

rule that a plaintiff should introduce all of her vital evidence in
chief) .
C.

The Trial Court's Exclusion Of Astill's Rebuttal
Witnesses Was A Case Management Decision Within The
Trial Court's Discretion.

Trial courts have broad discretion in managing the cases
assigned to their courts.

Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R.

Co., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah App. 1992).
573.

In this

case, the

trial

court's

See Duncan, 354 P.2d at
exclusion

of

Astill's

rebuttal witnesses was not an evidentiary decision governed by the
traditional rules of evidence, but rather was a case management
decision under the rules of civil procedure.
295-96.

Berrett, 354 P.2d at

The trial court stated:
It defies reason that any of
[Knight's]
testimony would come as a surprise to the
Plaintiff.
It was known or reasonably could
have been known. It was anticipated. It was
not a surprise. And it is a requirement that
the burden of proof be met showing that the
14

accident, as it was alleged by the Plaintiff,
occurred from a high-speed collision, that is
10 or 15 or 20 miles an hour, that substantial
damage would have been caused, and that
resulting injury could have occurred.
And the trial court finds that it is not
appropriate, when those matters are part of
the Plaintiff's case in chief, and do not come
as a surprise in any way to the Plaintiff,
that it is inappropriate to sandwich the
Defendant's case with the Plaintiff's case on
matters that could and should have been
presented in the case in chief.
(R. at 748-49.)

The trial court acted within its sound discretion

in determining that Astill's rebuttal witnesses should be excluded
because Astill "knew or should have reasonably anticipated" Clark
claimed her vehicle was travelling only four miles an hour.
Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994).

See

See

Wells v. C M .

Mavs Lumber Co., Inc., 754 P.2d 888, 889 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987).
Thus,

the trial court did not bar Astill's

rebuttal

evidence based on its content; rather, it exercised its discretion
in preventing Astill from strategically withholding key evidence in
a failed attempt to have the "last word," after Clark's expert had
already testified.

(R. at 282.)

The paramount issue on appeal is

whether the trial court erred in excluding Astill's experts from
testifying for the first time in rebuttal after having concluded
that Astill should have called them in her case in chief.
D.

Astill Has Not Shown Any Prejudicial Harm Or That A
Different Verdict Would Have Resulted.

Astill has failed to establish the trial court's rulings
constituted either an abuse of discretion preventing a fair trial,
or an error in law.

See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a).
15

The trial court

acted within its sound discretion and determined that Astill's
evidence was not appropriate for rebuttal.

(R. at 281-82.)

The

trial court found that Astill unfairly prejudiced Clark by saving
her key evidence for rebuttal. (R. at 282.)

It is an elementary

notion that a plaintiff must sustain her burden of proof

for

negligence and proximate cause during her case in chief.
Even if this Court were to determine the trial court
erred, Astill has failed to show that any error was "substantial
and prejudicial."

See Utah R. Civ. P. 61; Ashton v. Ashton, 733

P. 2d 147 (Utah 1987) . A new trial is appropriate only where there
is "substantial doubt" that the issues were fairly tried.

Page v.

Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 391 P.2d 290 (Utah 1964).
Astill had a full opportunity to meet her prima facia
burdens

in her case

different

verdict

in chief, and has failed to show that a

would

have

resulted

withhold evidence on causation.
(Utah 1966).
The

absent

the decision

to

Hall v. Blackman, 417 P. 2d 664

(See R. at 281.)
Supreme

Court

of

Utah

has

stated

that

every

reasonable presumption in favor of the validity of a verdict must
be taken as true on appeal.
P.2d

293, 301

(Utah

1982).

Leigh Furn. & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657
See

Sirotiak,

758

P.2d

at

1279

("Nevertheless, we may affirm a judgment on any ground supported by
the record even if it was not relied on by the trial court.").
Astill called no rebuttal witnesses.

After the defense

rested, the jury was dismissed and the parties debated defense
counsel's motion in limine regarding the expert witnesses.
16

After

the trial court directed defense counsel to prepare "very specific
findings" on the motion in limine to clarify the record, Astill's
counsel stated the following:
If the record may show my exception to the
ruling of the Court, with the -- we have no
rebuttal.
(R. at 749.) Astill's counsel's decision to rest at this stage of
the trial is significant for two reasons: he could have recalled
Plaintiff to testify as to speed; or he could have petitioned for
an extraordinary writ.
jury.

Instead, Astill took her chances with the

See Berrett, 830 P.2d at 299 ("Plaintiffs did not petition

for any extraordinary writ and chose instead to take their chances
and proceed to trial.").
E.

Astill Has Failed To Marshall The Evidence.

Astill has failed to marshall the evidence in his Brief
in support of the verdict as is required by appellate courts in
Utah.

By failing to marshall the evidence, Astill has made it very

difficult for the Court to determine whether a different result
would have occurred had the rebuttal experts been permitted to
testify.

See Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander &

Smith Assocs., 881 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah App. 1994) ("We have shown
no reluctance to affirm when the appellant fails adequately to
marshall the evidence.").
"In order to properly discharge the duty of marshalling
the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at
trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists."
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West Vallev City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah
App. 1991) (emphasis in original). Additionally, Astill's Brief is
fraught with factual statements not supported with citations to the
record.

See Steel v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 845 P.2d

960, 962 (Utah App. 1993).
POINT II; THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT WITNESSES
DURING OTHER WITNESSES' TESTIMONY IS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION.
Despite Astill's claims of error, the trial court was
fully within its discretion in excluding all witnesses from the
courtroom.

See Duncan, 354 P.2d at 573; Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-4

(1996); Utah R. Evid. 615.

Having permitted a lengthy recess to

allow Astill's counsel to prepare for cross-examination with Lord,
the trial court found the "outcome of the trial would not have been
altered by Mr. Lord's admission into the courtroom during Mr.
Knight's testimony."

(R. at 281.

See. R. at 280, 675, 709.)

Astill cites State v. Stevens, 797 P,2d 1133 (Utah App. 1990), 2 to
support her contention that the trial court erred by not allowing
Lord to assist counsel with cross-examination.
support

Astill's

contention

that

experts

are

Stevens does not
allowed

in

the

courtroom to "evaluate and modify the testimony of an opposing
expert,"

(Brief of Appellant at 22.)

2

To avoid confusion, please note that State v. Jones,
cited by Appellant on page 22 of her Brief, is actually entitled
State v. Stevens, 797 P.2d 1133 (Utah App. 1990).
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A.

Astill's Cited Authority Does Not Support Her
Position The Trial Court Erred in Excluding Expert
Witness From The Courtroom.

In Stevens, the Court of Appeals of Utah found the trial
court "did not abuse its discretion" in failing to exclude all
witnesses from the courtroom.

Stevens, 797 P. 2d at 1139.

Stevens

involved a neglect petition filed by the state seeking to terminate
a father's parental rights.

During the trial, the court allowed

state Social Services personnel and three expert witnesses to
remain in the courtroom during the other witnesses' testimony.
The court stated that "even if error occurred under Utah
Rule of Evidence 315 in allowing these witnesses to remain in the
courtroom,

[the father]'s claim of unfair prejudice

speculative in this case.
respect was harmless."

is wholly

Therefore, any error occurring in this
Id. at 1139.

Astill attempts to use

Stevens in reverse to support her contention that the trial court
"committed error in not allowing Plaintiff's designated expert to
sit beside, and assist, Plaintiff's counsel during testimony of
Defendant's

key

accident

reconstruction

expert."

(Brief

of

Appellant at 21-22.)
In addition to not supporting Astill's position, Stevens
specifically leaves open the possibility that the juvenile court
erred in allowing expert witnesses to remain in the courtroom to
hear the others' testimony.

Stevens, 797 P.2d at 1138-39.
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Astill
experts

during

concedes
the

in her Brief3 that the exclusion of

testimony

necessarily constitute error."

of

other

witnesses

"does

(Brief of Appellant at 22.)

Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 244 at 466

(1991).

not

See 75

Although an expert's

opinions may be based on evidence presented at trial under certain
circumstances, Astill cites no authority for the proposition that
a court errs as a matter of law by excluding an expert from the
courtroom.

The rules of evidence cited by Astill show that the

exclusion of witnesses is within a trial court's discretion.

See

Utah R. Evid. 615 Sc 703.
Each authority cited by Astill actually supports Clark's
position that the trial court merely exercised its discretion in
excluding all witnesses from the courtroom. Moreover, Astill fails
to cite any reference to the record where counsel argued at trial
that

rebuttal

witness

Long's

to

the

presentation of its cause" under Rule of Evidence 615(1)(c).

See

Stevens, 797 P. 2d at 1139.

presence

"was

essential

Without such support in the record,

Astill has no basis to appeal the trial court's exclusion of her
witnesses.
B.

Any Harm To Astill From The Exclusion Could Have
Been Avoided If Astill's Counsel Had Taken Knight's
Deposition Before Trial.

By his own admission, Astill's counsel

strategically

chose to not depose or otherwise obtain any discovery from Clark's
expert witness, Knight.

(R. at 733.)

3

On appeal, Astill argues

To avoid confusion, please note that although Astill
cites American Jurisprudence 2d, Volume 75, Trial, Section 62 on
page 22 of her Brief, she was actually quoting Section 244.
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that she was harmed by the exclusion of her expert during Knight's
cross-examination because her counsel: (i) did not know there was
only one bumper-support system in a Taurus; and (ii) did not know
to ask Knight whether he had personally inspected the bumpers and
the underside of damaged Taurus vehicles.

(Brief of Appellant at

23-24.) However, before Astill's counsel cross-examined Knight, he
was allowed a recess to consult with Long about Knight's testimony
on direct examination.

(R. at 280, 709.)

Any harm not cured by the court's recess could have been
prevented if Astill's counsel had chosen to deposed Knight before
trial.

Rather than preparing in advance for Knight's testimony,

Astill's counsel chose instead the strategy of a "spur-of-themoment" cross-examination, apparently hoping to be assisted by a
witness he knew had been excluded from the courtroom in a pre-trial
ruling.
As was the case with his choice to withhold key evidence
for rebuttal, Astill's counsel's strategic decision to not depose
Knight "backfired" at trial.
claims

the

trial

court

Having lost at trial, Astill now

abused

its

discretion

or

erred

by

Astill's Contention The Trial Court Barred
Effective Cross-Examination Is Not Supported
Utah Case Law.

An
By

frustrating his trial strategy.
C.

Astill cites Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.,
801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990), to support her claim that by excluding
Lord from the courtroom, the trial court barred her from conducting
an effective cross-examination of Knight.
21

(Brief of Appellant at

22-23.)

However, Whitehead has no relevance to the issues in this

case and does not even involve counsel attempting to have an expert
assist in cross-examination.

Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 924-925.

In Whitehead, the "defendants were repeatedly cut off
during attempts to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts. The numerous
objections of plaintiffs' counsel, many of which were improperly
sustained, prevented defendants from probing the basis of opinions
given by plaintiffs' experts on comparisons they had made in their
direct examination."

The Supreme Court of Utah held that "the

trial court erred in limiting defendants' cross-examination of
plaintiffs' expert witnesses."

Id. at 925.

Whitehead is easily distinguished from the case at hand
where Plaintiff did not even call expert witnesses in her case in
chief.

Astill does not claim that she was limited

in cross-

examination because the trial court sustained too many objections,
or would not allow her to explore the basis of the experts opinions
or to probe comparisons made on direct.

Rather, Astill claims she

was limited in cross-examination because having not deposed Knight,
her counsel was not prepared and she was denied the opportunity of
having her expert assist him with cross-examination.
Astill also cites Whitehead for the proposition that the
cumulative effect of several errors may undermine a jury verdict.
(Brief of Appellant at 34-35.)

A careful reading of Whitehead

reveals that the court's primary concern was whether defendants
were able to

"present to the jury their theory of the case."

Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 928.

Astill does not dispute that she had
22

every opportunity to present her theory of the case in her case in
chief, her dispute is that the trial court prevented her from
presenting her theory of the case in rebuttal.
Although Whitehead may not support Astill's positions, it
supports

Clark's

position

that

"the

proper

scope

of

cross-

examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court and
should not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse."

Id. at 923-24.

POINT III; ASTILL HAS NOT PRESENTED ANY RECORD WITH WHICH THE
COURT MAY REVIEW THE TRIAL COURTS EMPANELING OF THE JURY,
Since Astill has admittedly failed to provide the Court
with any record on the empaneling of the jury, Astill has no issue
to appeal.

In this instance, Astill claims "no record was made of

the questions and responses so that Plaintiff was denied a record
as to whether any of those jurors should have been excused for
cause."

(Brief of Appellant at 25.)
The appellate rules provide "if no report of the evidence

or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made . . . the appellant
may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the
best available means, including recollection.

The statement shall

be served on the appellee, who may serve objections or propose
amendments within 10 days after service."

Utah R. App. P. 11(g).

The appellate rules further provide the statement be provided to
the trial court to be included in the record on appeal.
Under Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Astill has the responsibility to include in the record a transcript
of all evidence relevant to the appeal.
P. 2d 428, 428

(Utah App. 1990) .
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See Jesche v. Willis, 793

Moreover, Astill cannot raise

issues regarding voir dire for the first time on appeal.

Broberg

v. Hess. 782 P.2d 198, 198 (Utah App. 1989).
Since Astill has failed to follow the appellate procedure
outlined in Rule 11, this Court should presume the trial court
acted properly.

See Interiors Contracting, 881 P.2d at 933; Lake

Philgas Serv. v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951, 959 (Utah
App. 1993) .
POINT IV: ASTILL HAS NO ISSUE TO APPEAL WITH RESPECT TO A PRESENT
VALUE DETERMINATION,
Astill has provided no issue for the Court with respect
to a determination of the present value damages for lost wages and
future medical expense. The record indicates that the jury awarded
Astill no damages for lost wages and future medical expenses.
at 144.)

Even if the jury had awarded Astill future

(R.

special

damages, and failed to reduce those damages to their present value,
Astill would have benefitted therefrom.
If a party

is concerned about

"jury guesswork"

with

respect to the present value of future damages, the party can
simply call a witness at trial to explain to the jury the process
by which one dollar would be reduced to its present cash value.
Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 974 at 1012

(1988) .
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See 22 Am. Jur. 2d

Damages § 907 at 930 (1988) . Such a practice has been followed in
Utah for many years.

Jurisdictions are split whether the trial

court is required to give specific instructions of formulas to the
jury for reducing future earnings to their present worth.
Jur. 2d Damages § 998 at 1042 (1988).
24

22 Am.

Astill was not harmed by failing to provide a witness to
instruct the jury on the present value process.
POINT V: ASTILL'S REQUEST FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS IS WITHOUT ANY
BASIS.
One of Clark's counsel, John Hansen, moved for Astill's
rebuttal witnesses to be excluded because Clark's evidence could
have been

"reasonably anticipated" before trial, and therefore

should have been presented in Astill's case in chief.

Attorney

Hansen presented a good faith argument to the trial court that
Astill's rebuttal witnesses should be excluded under the authority
of Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994).
Hansen drew the trial court's attention to the striking
similarities in Turner because the plaintiff failed to depose the
defendant's expert witness before trial, and later attempted to
call rebuttal witnesses concerning issues that should have been
presented in the case in chief.

Such analogy is applicable to the

argument that Astill's rebuttal evidence should be excluded for
failure to anticipate Clark's evidence.

Had Astill's

counsel

deposed Knight, he could have prepared for his case in chief and
prepared for cross-examination with his experts before trial.
Astill

argued

at trial

that

Turner was

inapplicable

because Astill's witnesses were not "surprise" witnesses.
at 734-37.)

(See R.

The trial court determined that it would not allow

Astill to "lay back in the bushes" in an attempt to have the "last
word."

(See R. at 739, 742.)
Astill has further charged Hansen is guilty of misconduct

for making a "deliberate misstatement of law" and is therefore
25

subject to Rule 11 sanctions.

Hansen made a good faith argument

that the 1994 Turner decision created a new standard for rebuttal
witnesses in Utah.
The comments to Rule 3.3, Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct, explain the relevant standard for ethical conduct:
[A] n assertion supporting to be on the
lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by
the lawyer or in a statement in open court,
may properly be made only when the lawyer
knows the assertion is true or believes it to
be true on the basis of reasonably diligent
inquiry.
(Emphasis added.)

Sanctions are not appropriate because Hansen

believed his statement to be true.
Furthermore, Rule 11 sanctions are only appropriate
for signed documents submitted to the trial court in violation of
the rule.

Jesche v. Willis, 811 P. 2d 202 (Utah App. 1991) . As was

the case when Astill's counsel's made his request for sanctions
against Hansen to the trial court and to the Supreme Court of Utah,
Astill's counsel's current request is frivolous and does not merit
further response.

(R. at 165-72.)

POINT VI; THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN REQUIRING ASTILL TO
SUBMIT TO AN INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION BY A NEUROLOGIST
WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF ASTILL#S CHIROPRACTOR/EMPLOYER OR A VIDEO
RECORDING DEVICE.
A.
In

The Trial Court's
Discretion.
appeals

addressing

Ruling
medical

Was

Not

an

examinations

Abuse
the

of

Utah

courts have adhered to an "abuse of discretion" standard of review.
See, e.g. , Stone v. Stone, 431 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah 1967); State v.
Braun, 787 P.2d

1336, 1343

(Utah App. 1990).
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As described in

detail below, the weight of legal and policy considerations in this
case validate the trial judge's order. Dr. Wright is not qualified
to

evaluate

different

Dr.

Nord's

medical

examination

specialty

than

because

Dr.

he

Nord.

represents

Videotaping

a
of

examinations is not affirmatively authorized by the Utah Rules of
Civil

Procedure

privacy.

and poses

a substantial

threat

to examinees'

Taken together, these arguments demonstrate that the

trial judge's order was well within his sound discretion.
B.

Astill's Chiropractor Represents a Different Area
of Medical Expertise and Is Not an Impartial
Observer.

The trial court was correct in not allowing Dr. Wright to
attend Dr. Nord's examination of appellant.
chiropractic

training

differs

Because Dr. Wright's

substantially

from

Dr.

Nord's

education as a neurologist, Dr. Wright is not qualified to evaluate
Dr. Nord's examination techniques.

In medical malpractice cases,

the Utah courts have expressed strong opposition to such testimony
by physicians from different areas of expertise; the same principle
should apply to medical examinations in personal injury cases, as
well.

See, e.g., Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 822 (Utah App.

1988) (" [W]e think it is sound policy to limit expert testimony in
medical malpractice cases to that which is in the doctor's specific
field of practice").
Equally

important,

the

trial

court's

order

did

not

prevent Astill from challenging Dr. Nord's medical conclusions.
Astill's counsel received Dr. Nord's detailed written report, and
cross-examined

Dr.

Nord

before
27

the

jury

regarding

his

qualifications, medical conclusions, and previous activities and
compensation as a defense witness.

In addition, the trial court

permitted Astill to have a neurologist of her choosing attend the
examination as a monitor, although she failed to exercise this
option.4
Finally, Dr. Wright is Astill's employer, and has treated
her

in

the past; he may have

an

interest

otherwise affecting Dr. Nord's evaluation.
Wright's

presence

would

place

Dr.

Nord

in criticizing

or

In any event, Dr.

in

the

uncomfortable

position of examining Astill while being watched by someone who has
already reached a diagnosis.

The trial judge's order helped to

prevent Astill from thrusting "the adversary process itself into
the physician's examining room."

Wood v. Chicago, M. , S.P. & P.R.

Co., 353 N.W.2d 195, 197 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
C.

Videotaping of Physical Examinations Should Not Be
Allowed Because Utah Rules Expressly Provide for
Written Reporting of Physical Examinations and
Because of Substantial Privacy Concerns.

Utah courts have not addressed the issue of a plaintiff's
right to videotape independent medical examinations.

But Rule 35

provides for a written report of such examinations: "If requested
. . ., the party causing the examination to be made shall deliver
to the person examined

. . .

a detailed written report of the

4

For these reasons, Astill's reliance on Justice Ellett's
dissent in Stone v. Stone, 431 P.2d 802 (Utah 1967), is misplaced.
In that case, Justice Ellett claimed the majority's holding
(denying a mental evaluation) prevented the court from hearing "all
of the evidence which a judge would require to make a proper
decision."
Id. at 808. Because Astill could cross-examine Dr.
Nord and choose a neurologist to attend the examination, the trial
court's order did not deprive the court of any relevant evidence.
28

examiner."

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 35(b) (1) . Although Rule

35(a) does allow the court to "specify the time, place, manner,
conditions, and scope of the examination," the California courts
interpreted

a nearly

identical

statute

to bar videotaping

in

examinations.
In Edmiston v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1978) ,
the

court

considered

the

California

statute

on

medical

examinations, which included "time, place, and manner" language
identical to Rule 35(a) of Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure.

The

court found that this provision "deals with conducting a medical
examination -- not the reporting thereof."

Id. at 592.

The court

then declined to allow videotaping of medical examinations, stating
that "Videotaping is not affirmatively authorized in this case and,
. . whether it should be 'is a matter for the Legislature to
determine.'"5

Id. at 593 (quoting Bailey v. Superior Court, 568

P.2d 394, 399 (Cal. 1977)).
revised
remained

Although the California legislature

the statute in the 1980's, the California courts have
resolute

in

their

opposition

5

to

videotaping

medical

It is incorrect to assert that Edmiston allows videotaping
"if the subject shows that the video taping is necessary to protect
the subject an [sic] to assure the integrity of the physician's
report." (Brief of Appellant at 32) . As described above, Edmiston
flatly bars videotaping of independent medical examinations in the
absence of legislative authorization. Moreover, analogizing the
present case to State v. Braun, 787 P.2d 1336 (Utah App. 1990), is
inappropriate.
In Braun, the court denied an examination of a
young sex abuse victim, instead allowing the defendant to critique
a videotape of the exam. But an important difference distinguishes
Braun from the present case: the Braun court had not allowed the
defendant to have a monitor at the examination, while here the
trial court permitted Astill to be accompanied by a neurologist.
29

examinations.

See Ramirez v. MacAdam, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 911, 912

(Ct. App. 1993).
Substantial policy considerations weigh in favor of the
California approach.
personal

and

Medical examinations often involve intensely

private

procedures.

Videotaping

would

require

strangers to be present in the examination room and to watch these
procedures during filming.

Examinees then face a second, more

public, humiliation if these recordings are shown in the courtroom.
Taking

these

medical

factors

into

account, permitting

examinations poses a substantial

threat

videotaping

of

to examinees'

privacy and would have a "chilling effect" on both the plaintiff
and the examining physician.
CONCLUSION
Having chosen an unsuccessful trial strategy in this
matter, Clark now petitions this Court for a reversal of the jury's
verdict.

The trial court ruled within its sound discretion in each

of the issues raised in this appeal.

For the foregoing reasons,

this Court should sustain the jury's verdict.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ 6

day of June, 1997.

SCALLEY Sc READING

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of June, 19 97, I

served upon the following counsel of record for Plaintiff, two true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE by causing
the same to be mailed, postage prepaid to:

Samuel King, Esq.
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SAMUEL KING, No. 1820
DAVID J FRIEL, No. 6225
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (801) 486-3751
Facsimile: (801) 486-3753
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LYNN B. ASTILL,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT

vs.
LEESHA CLARK,
Case No.
Defendant.

Judge: r J U D G E pAT BRIAN

COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF and alleges as follows:
1.

At approximately 7:30 A.M., June 6, 1994, Plaintiff was

the driver of a Ford Explorer being driven East on 4100 South, West
Valley City, Utah.

Plaintiff was stopped at a red light when she

was rear ended by Defendant, who was driving a Ford Taurus.
2.

Prior to being rear ended, Plaintiff glanced in her rear

view mirror and saw Defendant.

Plaintiff thought Defendant would

stop.
3.

Immediately after impact, Plaintiff felt pain in her

lower back, due to the strong impact. Plaintiff also hit her head

o ft o ft o 1

on the head rest behind her.
4.

Defendant was driving a rental car.

She did not have

Rental Car Insurance.
5.

Defendant's insurance is Atlanta Casualty Companies, P.O.

Box 105435, Atlanta, Georgia, 30348-5435.
6.

The

sole proximate

cause

of

the

collision

was

the

Defendant's failure to maintain control of her vehicle, to keep
proper lookout, and driving into Plaintiff's vehicle stopped at a
red light.
7.

As a direct proximate result of the collision, Plaintiff

has suffered injuries, including injury to her head and lower back,
causing her past and future pain, suffering, partial disability,
medical expense, impairment of wage and earning capacity, and other
expenses incident to her injuries, all of which will continue in
the future and may be permanent.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment as follows:
1.

Finding Defendant, Leesha Clark, liable to Plaintiff.

2.

Awarding

Plaintiff

judgment against Defendant Leesha

Clark, for such general and special damages as are justified by the
evidence, her costs, interest on special damages from date of
accident, and such other relief as the Court deems proper•

DATED THIS J^fgr day of

AJlAfftf

1995.

A

WW

David J. Frfiel
Attorney f6r Plaintiff
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3RD DISTRICT COURT / COVER SHEET
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff:

IN THE MATTER OF:

LYNN B. ASTILL

-vs-

I Defendant:
LEESHA CLARK

CIVIL

DOMESTIC
DA

Divorce

Agency

SM

Separate Maintenance

CD_

Condemnation

PA

_ Paternity

CN_

Contract

SA.

_ Cohabitant Abuse

Debt Collection

CS.

_ Custody & Support

AA

Appeal from Administravtive

DC_
EV_
HC_

AJ_

Habeas Corpus (Writ)

LM_

TJ.

Malpractice
Property Damage

PD_
xx

MI

Personal Injury

PR

Property Rights (real)

QT

Quite Title

WD

Wrongful Death

WR

Writs

CV

Civil

JURY DEMAND

_ Transcript of Judgment
_ Foreign Deposition / Foreign
Divorce

PROBATE
AD.

_ Adoption

ES_

_ Estate

GC_
NC_

YES

_ Abstract of Judgment
_ Foreign Judgment

Lien/Mortgage Foreclosure

MP_

PI

JUDGMENTS

Eviction

Guardian/Conservator
_ Name Change

TR_

Trust

OT

Other Probate

NO

UGC^

FILING FEES
CIVIL CASES
**
]
]

"
"

$100.00 (Contract, Personsl Injury, Property, etc)
$50.00 Jury Demand
$ 180.00 Notice Of Appeal
(Counterclaims / Crossclaims / 3rd Party Complaints)
$35.00 - $2,000 or less
$50.00 - $2,000 - $10,000
$80.00 - $10,000 or more

DOMESTIC CASES

~
"

$80.00 Separate Maintainance
$100.00 Paternity
$100.00 Custody & Support
$82.00 Divorce ($2.00 for Vital Statistics Fee)
$60.00 Divorce Counterclaim
$30.00 Petition to Modify or Counterpetition

PROBATE
$100.00 Estates/Guardian Conservator/Name Change/Adoption
$2.00 Vital Statistics Fee (per child on all adoptions)

JUDGMENT
$10.00 Abstract - Transcripts of Judgment
$25.00 Foreign Judgment / Foreign Deposition / Foreign Decree
TO DEPOSIT FUNDS WITH THE COURT - under S57-1-29:
$2,000 or less $25.00
$2,000 and less than $10,000 $60.00
$10,000 or more $80.00
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JOHN EDWARD HANSEN, #4590
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Defendant
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LYNN B. ASTILL,
Plaintiff,

:

ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND

:

vs.

:

Civil No. 950902307PI

LEESHA CLARK,

:

Judge Pat Brian

Defendant.

:

Defendant, by and through her above-named counsel, hereby
answers the Complaint of Plaintiff as follows:

FIRST DEFENSE
The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
Defendant admits, denies and alleges with respect to each
of the numbered paragraphs of Plaintiff's Complaint as follows:
1.

Defendant

admits

the

allegations

contained

paragraph number 1 of Plaintiff's Complaint.
C:\JEH\CLIENTS\CURK.ANS
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in

2.

Defendant is without sufficient information to admit

or deny the allegations contained in paragraph number 2 and for
this reason denies the same.
3.

Defendant

denies

the

allegations

contained

in

contained

in

contained

in

paragraph number 3 of Plaintiff's Complaint.
4.

Defendant

admits

the

allegations

paragraphs numbers 4 and 5 of Plaintiff's Complaint.
5.

Defendant

denies

the

allegations

paragraphs numbers 6 and 7 of Plaintiff's Complaint.
THIRD DEFENSE
As

a

further

and

separate

and

affirmative defense,

Defendant alleges that Plaintiff has failed to reasonably mitigate
her damages, if any.
FOURTH DEFENSE
Defendant denies each and every allegation of Plaintiff's
Complaint not heretofore admitted or denied.

WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that Plaintiff takes nothing
by way of her Complaint.

C:\JEH\CLIEMTS\CLARK.ANS

2
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JURY DEMAND
Defendant hereby demands a jury trial and submits to the
Court the statutory jury fee.
DATED this

>> ^

day of April, 1995.
St READING

EdwardiHansen
orney for Defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the J^

day of April, 1995, I

mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing ANSWER AND JURY
DEMAND to the following:
Samuel King, Esq.
David J. Friel, Esq.
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

C:\JEH\CLIENTS\CLARK.ANS
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ADDENDUM "C

c.-OCT !••> '
P A U L S . FELT (A1055) +v-^ .rjC .'V.-'A^V^VV
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER*'' $ All V&Tj '" " *''
Attorneys for Defendantw ,^)^\Ju>^!
79 South Main Street ° TilVuT^ c-:
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone:
(801) 532-1500
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
OOOoo
MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO
SUBMIT TO A PHYSICAL
EXAMINATION WITHOUT HER OWN
CHIROPRACTOR PRESENT

LYNN B. ASTILL,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 9509023DPI

25t>1

LEESHA CLARK,

Judge Pat Brian
Defendant.

ooOoo
Defendant Leesha Clark, by and through counsel, moves
the Court pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 35(a) and
7(b) for an Order compelling plaintiff Lynn Astill to submit to a
physical examination conducted by Dr. Nathaniel M. Nord, M.D., at
the agreed date, time, and location of October 31, 1995, at 2:30
p.m., at Dr. Nord's office at 370 East South Temple in Salt Lake
City.

Defendants move that the examination be conducted without

the presence of plaintiff's chiropractor and employer, Dr. G.
Richard Wright, D.C.

This motion is made on the basis that the

physical condition of the plaintiff is in controversy, and the
plaintiff insists on having Dr. Wright attend her physical

ocor-o

examination by Dr. Nord# which is not agreeable to the defendant.
Attached hereto and incorporated herein is a memorandum of points
and authorities in support of this motion.
DATED this

7

day of October, 1995.

_J2_

RAY, Q#INNEtf $ NEBEKER

147073/edb

2-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT TO A PHYSICAL

EXAMINATION WITHOUT HER OWN CHIROPRACTOR PRESENT was hand
delivered on this

day of October, 1995 to the following:

Samuel King
David J. Friel
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
John Edward Hansen
SCALLEY & READING
260 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

ADDENDUM "D

PAUL S. FELT (A1055)
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendant
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE
MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO
SUBMIT TO A PHYSICAL
EXAMINATION WITHOUT HER OWN
CHIROPRACTOR PRESENT

LYNN B. ASTILL,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 9509023TTPI

LEESHA CLARK,

Judge Pat Brian

Defendant.

ooOoo
Defendant Leesha Clark, by and through counsel, submits
this memorandum of points and authorities in support of her
motion pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 35(a) and 7(b)
to compel the plaintiff to submit to an independent physical
examination by Dr. Nathaniel M. Nord, M.D., without her own
chiropractor and employer, Dr. G. Richard Wright, D.C., present.
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Lynn Astill, complains of injuries she
allegedly suffered as a result of an automobile accident with the
defendant.
controversy.

Compl. \\

6-7.

Her physical condition is in

Counsel for the defendant scheduled an independent

oh

\j M «> *

medical,examination of the plaintiff by Dr. Nathaniel M. Nord,
M.D., on October 31, 1995 at 2:30 p.m. and notified plaintiff's
counsel of the same.

The plaintiffs have not objected to the

time, place, or defendant's choice of physician to conduct the
examination.
However, in a letter dated September 21, 1995,
plaintiff's counsel said they intend to have plaintiff's
chiropractor (and employer), Dr. G. Richard Wright, attend Dr.
Nord's examination of the plaintiff.1

Defendant's counsel

responded by letter dated October 3, 1995, that this was
unacceptable.

Nevertheless, plaintiff's counsel continues to

insist that Dr. Wright attend the independent medical exam of the
plaintiff by Dr. Nord.

The defendant brings this motion seeking

to compel the plaintiff to submit to the physical examination
without her own medical representative and possible witness at
trial, Dr. Wright, present.
ARGUMENT
Rule 35(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that a court may order a party to submit to a physical

*Dr. Wright's practice is located at the Midvalley Clinic in
Salt Lake City, 4758 South 1950 West, where the plaintiff is
employed as a receptionist/assistant. Pi's. Ans. to Def's. First
Set of Interrog. 11 1, 6. Medical records provided by the
plaintiff show that she has received numerous chiropractic
treatments at the Midvalley Clinic from Dr. Wright and also from
Dr. Keith S. Hansen. She claims $4,450 in past medical expenses
incurred to the Midvalley Clinic. Pi's. Ans. to Def's. First Set
of Interrog. 1 2.
-2-
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examination when the physical condition of the party is in
controversy and good cause is shown.

Good cause is presumed in

personal injury actions, see Schlagenhauf v. Holder. 379 U.S.
104, 119 (1964) (applying the corresponding federal rule), and
plaintiff has not objected to the need for an independent
examination in this case. To defendant's knowledge, the only
dispute is whether the plaintiff may have her chiropractor and
employer, Dr. Wright, present during Dr. Nord's examination.
Rule 35 is silent on the issue, essentially leaving to
the trial court's discretion the details of the medical
examination.

See State ex rel. Hess v. Henry. 393 S.E.2d 666,

669, (W. Va. 1990) (applying comparable state rule); 8A C.
Wright, A. Miller & R. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure §
2234, at 476 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing comparable federal rule).
While Utah courts have not addressed the issue directly, others
persuasively reason that a party subject to a Rule 35 medical
examination must show good cause or exceptional circumstances
before a medical representative or attorney of that party will be
permitted in the examination room.

See, e.g.. State ex rel.

Hess. 393 S.E.2d at 669; Wood v. Chicago. M.. S.P. & P.R. Co..
353 N.W.2d 195, 197 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Mertz v. Bradford. 543
N.Y.S.2d 786 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).2
2

Some other courts, admittedly, have suggested that a party
subject to a Rule 35 medical exam may ordinarily have his or her
own physician present during the examination. See, e.g.. Warrick
-3-
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The plaintiff cannot establish good cause for having
her chiropractor attend Dr. Nord's examination.

See State ex

rel. Hess. 393 S.E.2d at 669 (good cause exists only if "the
truth-finding function of the examination may be threatened
absent the requested presence").

Under the circumstances in the

present case, the truth-finding function of Dr. Nord's
independent medical examination would be threatened far more by
the presence of Dr. Wright than by his absence.

It is commonly

understood that the presence of a medical representative of the
examined party can potentially disrupt a Rule 35 medical
examination, Federal Practice and Procedure, supra. § 2236, at
497, by "shift[ing] the forum of controversy from the courtroom
to the physician's examination room."

Wood. 353 N.W.2d at 197.

That concern is particularly acute here.
Dr. Wright would not be an independent observer.

As

the plaintiff's employer and someone who has provided numerous
treatments to the plaintiff in past months for conditions that
allegedly persist, Dr. Wright may have both personal and
professional interests in criticizing, directing, or otherwise
affecting Dr, Nord's evaluation.

Even if Dr. Wright were to

remain completely silent, his mere presence in the examination

v. Brode. 46 F.R.D. 427 (D. Del. 1969). See generally Annot.,
Right of Party to Have Attorney or Physician Present During
Physical or Mental Examination at Instance of Opposing Party. 84
A.L.R.4th 558 (1991 & Supp.).
-4-
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room would place Dr. Nord in the awkward situation of seeking to
determine the plaintiff's physical condition in the presence of
someone who has already formed an opinion of her physical
condition.

Such awkwardness could inhibit either Dr. Nord or the

plaintiff and prevent Dr. Nord from accomplishing a complete,
objective evaluation of the plaintiff's physical condition.

That

would defeat the truth-finding purpose of an independent medical
evaluation as contemplated by Rule 35.
Furthermore, Dr. Wright is a chiropractor, not a
medical doctor.

Dr. Wright's training and expertise differ

substantially from Dr. Nord's.

Consequently, any advice or

assistance that Dr. Wright might provide may be unhelpful or
unfamiliar to Dr. Nord, and thus heighten the disruption of the
examination.

Even if Dr. Wright simply observed without

interrupting, he may be asked at trial to critique Dr. Nord's
examination if it yields conclusions contrary to his, and Dr.
Wright is not qualified to critique Dr. Nord's examination in
light of the differences in their respective training and
practice areas.
It has been observed that n[t]he most competent and
honorable physicians in the community would predictably be the
most sensitive to such intrusions."

Wood. 353 N.W.2d at 197.

Dr. Nord is a competent and honorable physician.

He has examined

the plaintiff on a previous occasion in relation to a previous

-5-
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automobile accident, and he prepared an extensive, objective,
written report of his findings and conclusions from that previous
examination.

While Dr. Nord's reaction to the prospect of Dr.

Wright observing his examination could not be obtained as of the
filing of this motion, in the event counsel for the defendant
learns that Dr. Nord has objections to or concerns about such
circumstances, counsel will take his testimony by affidavit and
submit it to the Court to supplement this memorandum, and a copy
will be served on plaintiff's counsel.

Defendant's counsel is

proceeding in this expedited fashion in light of the approaching
date of Dr. Nord's scheduled examination of the plaintiff.
Finally, the plaintiff's interest in fairly litigating
the issue of her physical condition is adequately protected
without Dr. Wright attending the examination.

The plaintiff may

obtain a copy of Dr. Nord's detailed written report, Utah R. Civ.
P. 35(b), take Dr. Nord's deposition, cross-examine Dr. Nord at
trial if he testifies, and object to any inadmissible evidence at
trial; she may also have Dr. Wright or any other medical
representative of her choosing testify at trial to relate his or
her own observations of the plaintiff's physical condition.

See

State ex rel. Hess, 393 S.E.2d at 669; Wood. 353 N.W.2d at 197.
This is an adversary proceeding.

The defendant, as

well as the plaintiff, has a right to fairly investigate and
litigate the plaintiff's physical condition, which is in

-6-
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controversy.

The defendant's investigation could be disrupted by

the presence of the plaintiff's chiropractor and employer, Dr.
Wright, in Dr. Nord's examination room.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed herein, the defendant
respectfully requests that this Court grant her motion to compel
a physical examination of the plaintiff without the plaintiff's
chiropractor being present.
DATED this / >

day of October, 1995.
RAY, QUJNNEY & NEBEKER

-7-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO
SUBMIT TO A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION WITHOUT HER OWN CHIROPRACTOR
PRESENT was mailed, postage prepaid, on this

day of

October, 1995 to the following:
Samuel King
David J. Friel
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake city, Utah 84106
John Edward Hansen
SCALLEY Sc READING
260 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

147073/edb
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO
SUBMIT TO A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION WITHOUT HER OWN CHIROPRACTOR
PRESENT was hand delivered on this

of October, 1995 to

the following:
Samuel King
David J, Friel
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
John Edward Hansen
SCALLEY & READING
260 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

%cmi

147073/edb

-8-

ADDENDUM "E

r;j rn
L^i L I 1".'. £.' W'T

SAMUEL KING, No. 1820
DAVID J FRIEL, No. 6225
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (801) 486-3751
Facsimile: (801) 486-3753
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LYNN B. ASTILL,

)
)

REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO COMPEL

Plaintiff,

vs,
LEESHA CLARK,
Case No.
Defendant.
Plaintiff,
this

Rely

in

)

Judge:

950902307 PI

Pat B. Brian

Lynn B. Astill, by and through counsel, submits
response

to

Defendant's

Motion

to

Compel

and

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of the Motion to compel Plaintiff
to submit to a Physical Examination Without Her Own Chiropractor
Present.
ISSUE
IN A PERSONAL INJURY CASE, DOES THE INJURED PERSON HAVE THE
RIGHT

TO

EVALUATION

A

THIRD

PERSON

MONITORING

THE

INDEPENDENT

MEDICAL

PERFORMED BY A DOCTOR RETAINED BY THE DEFENDANT'S

INSURED?
Plaintiff states that the answer is Yes!

000044

Plaintiff's basis is that each party has rights. These rights
are not mutually exclusive. To the contrary, they can be exercised
in harmony.
The right of the Defendant is to have an independent physician
assess the Plaintiff's injury.
The claimant's right is to have the examination monitored.
As the

I ME doctor does not enter

into a doctor/patient

relationship, he does not have a basis to claim confidentiality.
Claimant's need is to be sure that the IME is genuinely
objective, and not slanted against the claimant.

Such "slanting"

occurs frequently in IME's.
That is a fact of life.
Performing numerous IME's

can yield substantial income for

the doctor who gets large numbers of referrals to perform.
economic interest is served by conservative reports.
the insurer money, he gets more referrals.

His

If he saves

If he doesn't save the

insurer money, he doesn't get referrals.
Too frequently, as the Court knows, there are trials within
trials dealing with the objectivity, impartiality, and accuracy of
the IME doctor's report.
The presence of a monitor for the claimant should reduce the
frequency of these trial within trials.

This serves justice and

makes the trial quicker, more focused, and less expensive, all to
the benefit of the proper function of the judicial system.

2
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FACTS
Plaintiff accepts Defendant's introduction as so stated.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiff agrees that Rule 35(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure control the issue at hand.

Plaintiff does not dispute

the fact that the Defendant is entitled to an independent medical
examination of the Plaintiff by a physician of Defendant's choice.
Defendant correctly asserts that Rule 35 and the Utah courts
have remained silent on these issues, essentially leaving the
determination to the trial court's discretion.
Defendant also admits in her memorandum that, "some other
courts, admittedly, have suggested that a party subject to a Rule
35 medical exam may ordinarily have his or her own physician
present during the examination. (Defendant's Memorandum at page 3,
note 2.)
The latest case dealing directly on point with this issue
states that, "Plaintiff, at her expense, may have her personal
physician in attendance during the physical examination . . .

w

Bennett v. White Laboratories, Inc., 841 F.Supp. 1155 (M.D.Fla.
1993) .
The Eighth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals has also adopted
this rationale by stating that, "the manner and conditions of a
court ordered medical examination, as well as the designation of
the person or persons to conduct such an examination are vested in
the sound discretion of the trial court.

Although the examined

party will usually be permitted to have his or her own physician
3
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present."

Sanden v. Mavo Clinic, 495 F.2d 221 (1974),

This is

further enumerated in Moore's Federal Practice at: 4A J. Moore,
Moore's Federal Practice, Section 35.04, at 35-24, 35-25 n.ll, and
at Section 35-29 n.12, it states that, "the cases suggest that
usually the court will permit the examined party to have his
personal physician present."

See Sanden v. Mavo Clinic, 495 F.2d

221 (8th Cir. 1974); Dziwanoski v. Ocean Carriers Corp., 26 F.R.D.
595 (D.Md. 1960); Klein v. Yellow Cab Co..

7 F.R.D. 169 (N.D. Ohio

1945) .
These cases do not mention the "good cause" or "exceptional
circumstance" exceptions pointed out by the Defendant.

Defendant

has cited no cases wherein the courts have absolutely stated that
a person does not have a right to have their attending physician or
a third party present during the IME.
Plaintiff represents to the Court that her attending physician
could

remain

silent,

Defendant's doctor.

thereby

not

causing

an

disruption

Further, Plaintiff represents that both Dr.

Wright and Dr. Nord are experienced professionals.
unlikely

of

that this would be an awkward

situation

It is highly
for either

doctors.
CONCLUSION
Defendant has failed in her burden to prove that a patient's
attending physician cannot attend the IME. Clearly, Plaintiff has
shown that it is imperative that a patient has the right and
ability to demand that their physician attend their examination.

4
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DATED O c t o b e r

iz_.
rf

,

1995

lAMtt. -

DavidJ Fri/eT
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document was faxed on this the Q.H day of October, 1995, to the
following parties:
John Edward Hansen
SCALLEY & READING
Fax No. 531-7968
Paul S. Felt
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Fax No. 532-7543

Dl:Astill.rep
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ADDENDUM "F

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

NOV 1 3 1995

PAUL S. FELT (A1055)
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500

~"

Deputy Oer*

John Edward Hansen (A4590)
SCALLEY & READING
260 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 531-7870
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO
SUBMIT TO A PHYSICAL
EXAMINATION WITHOUT HER OWN
CHIROPRACTOR PRESENT

LYNN B. ASTILL,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil NO. 950902307PI

LEESHA CLARK,

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendant.

ooOoo
Defendant's Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Submit to a
Physical Examination Without Her Own Chiropractor Present was
heard on Monday, October 30, 1995 at the hour of 1:30 p.m. before
the Honorable Pat B. Brian with Samuel King and David Friel
appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, Paul S. Felt of Ray,
Quinney & Nebeker and Wesley D. Hutchins of Scalley & Reading
appearing on behalf of defendant. The court having reviewed the
memoranda of counsel and good cause here appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Defendant's Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Submit to

a Physical Examination Without Her Own Chiropractor Present is
granted and plaintiff is compelled to submit to a physical
examination by Dr. Nathaniel Nord without having any chiropractor
or family member present.

No video taping of the procedure will

be allowed.
2.

Plaintiff may have a neurologist of her choosing

present at her independent medical examination.

If plaintiff

chooses to do so, she must notify defendant's counsel no later
them 10:00 o'clock a.m. on October 31, 1995.
J O'CLOCK

a.m. on occooer 31, l s s a .

DATED t h i s 7/jL

day of

^_ __ 1995.
A/<Wy^dsA^

BY THE COURT:

a^l

/

Patf B. Brian
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
f.

-<£

Samuel King
David Friel
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM "G

PAUL S. FELT (A1055)yh -„RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKERA . "
79 South Main Streefey ~A (
P.O. Box 45385
~^T~H
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
John Edward Hansen (A4590)
SCALLEY & READING
260 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 531-7870
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
LYNN B. ASTILL,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S WITNESS LIST

v.
LEESHA CLARK,
Defendant.

:

Civil No. 950902307PI

:

Judge Pat B. Brian

ooOoo
Defendant Leesha Clark, by and through her attorneys,
hereby designates the following witnesses she may call at the
trial.
1.

Leesha Clark.

Ms. Clark will testify about facts of

the accident and other matters discussed in her deposition.
2.

Dr. Nathaniel Nord.

Dr. Nord will testify about

plaintiff's injuries and medical condition as reflected in his two
independent medical examination reports.

c ••»

\j

'

3.

Newell

Knight.

Mr.

Knight

is

an

accident

reconstruction expert. He will testify about the two motor vehicle
accidents in which plaintiff

was involved and will contrast and

compare them, the resulting forces and injuries.
4.

All plaintiff's medical care providers not called by

plaintiff.
DATED this /<~- day of January, 1996.
RAY,

QULtfNEY y& NEBEKER

F^HrsTF^t
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Defendant's Witness List was mailed, postage prepaid, on
this^^y^f

day of January, 1996 to the following:
Samuel King
David J. Friel
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
John Edward Hansen
SCALLEY & READING
260 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

157391 01/psf
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ADDENDUM "H"

FILED DISTRICT COURT
rnird Judicial District

TB
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
00O00—•--

LYNN B. ASTILL,
SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiff,
V.

Civil No. 950902307PI

LEESHA CLARK,

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendant,

--—00O00-

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions from a
preponderance of the evidence* If you find the evidence
preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer " Y e s . " If
you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot
determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that
the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer
"No."

Also, any damages assessed must be proven by a

preponderance of the evidence*.
1.

Was the defendant, Leesha Clark, negligent as

alleged by plaintiff?
ANSWER:
2.

Yes

No

Was defendant's negligence a proximate cause of

the injuries or aggravation of prior injuries or conditions
sustained by the plaintiff?

01. G 1 0 3

ANSWER:
3.

No

Yes

If you have answered Questions 1 and 2 * A Yes,''

state the amount of special and general damages, if any,
sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries
complained of. If such questions were not answered ^Yes,'' do
not answer this question.

Special Damages:
A. Past Special Damages

$

B. Future special Damages

$

General Damages:

$

TOTAL
DATED this

$

day of

1996.

Foreperson

16X390.01/psf
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ADDENDUM "I

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
ASTILL, LYNN
PLAINTIFF
VS
CLARK, LEESHA

CASE NUMBER 950902307 PI
DATE 02/08/96
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN
COURT REPORTER BRAD YOUNG
COURT CLERK BHA

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
JURY TRIAL
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
P. ATTY. KING, SAMUEL
D. ATTY. HANSEN, JOHN E

THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT FOR THE THIRD DAY OF JURY
TRIAL. THE PLAINTIFF IS PRESENT WITH COUNSEL, SAMUEL KING AND
DAVID FRIEL. THE DEFENDANT IS PRESENT WITH COUNSEL, PAUL FELT
AND JOHN HANSEN. THE JURY IS PRESENT IN THE JURY BOX. LYNN
ASTILL IS RECALLED AND TESTIFIES. THE PLAINTIFF RESTS (11:35 AM)
TESTIFYING FOR DEFENDANT ARE LEESHA CLARK AND NEWELL
KNIGHT. IKE DEFENSE RESTS (3:45 PM) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DENY
REBUTTAL WITNESSES IS GRANTED. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED
VERDICT IS DENIED.
THE COURT GIVES JURY INSTRUCTIONS. BOTH COUNSEL PRESENT
THEIR CLOSING ARGUMENTS. THE JURY RETIRES FOR DELIBERATION AT
6:00 PM. BOTH COUNSEL STATE EXCEPTIONS TO JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON
THE RECORD. THE JURY RETURNS WITH A VERDICT AT 7:25 AM. THE
JURY FINDS DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT, BUT DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE
WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES OR
CONDITION. NO DAMAGES AWARDED.
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ADDENDUM "J

FILED DISTRSCT COURT
Third Judicial District

PAUL S. FELT (A1055)
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendant
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500

MAR ^ 5 1996
Bydeputy Cterk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
LYNN B. ASTILL,

:

Plaintiff,

:

JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT

:

Civil No. 950902307PI
Judge Pat B. Brian

v.
LEESHA CLARK,
Defendant.

:

ooOoo
This action came on regularly for trial on Tuesday,
February 6, 1996, in Salt Lake City, Utah, before the Honorable Pat
B. Brian, Third District Judge, sitting with a jury.

Plaintiff

Lynn B. Astill, appeared by her attorneys, Samuel King and David
Friel of King, Friel & Colton; and Defendant Leesha Clark, appeared
by her attorneys, Paul S. Felt of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker and John
E. Hansen of Scalley & Reading.
After hearing the evidence, the instructions of the
Court, and listening to the arguments of counsel, the jury retired
to consider a Special Verdict and subsequently returned the Special
Verdict as follows:

1.

Was the defendant, Leesha Clark, negligent as

alleged by plaintiff?
ANSWER:
2.
the

injuries

or

Yes

X

No

Was defendant's negligence a proximate cause of
aggravation

of

prior

injuries

or

conditions

sustained by the plaintiff?
ANSWER:
3.

Yes

No

X

If you have answered Questions 1 and 2 "Yes11,

state the amount of special and general damages, if any, sustained
by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries complained
of.

If such questions were not answered "Yes", do not answer this

question.

Special Damages:
A.

Past Special Damages

$

B.

Future Special Damages

$

General Damages:
TOTAL

$
$

DATED this 8th day of February, 1996.

Richard Roethel
Foreperson
The Court having reviewed the Special Verdict and having
found it to be in the proper form, pursuant to the instructions
given to the jury by the Court, it is hereby:
2

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Complaint against
Defendant Leesha Clark is hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon
the merits, no cause of action.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

that

Defendant is awarded her costs in this matter.
DATED this

p

day of Yw4&ry,

1996.

BY THE COURT:

Honorable Pat B.
District Court Judge

3
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Samuel King
David J. Friel
KING, FRIEL & COLTON
Attorneys for Plaintiff

ADDENDUM "K

\l~~)

J(W{l^A_

SAMUEL KING, No. 1820
DAVID J. FRIEL, No. 6225
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (801) 486-3751
Facsimile: (801) 486-3753

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL

LYNN B. ASTILL,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil NO. 950902307PI

LEESHA CLARK,
Defendant.

Judge: Pat B. Brian

Plaintiff moves for new trial and other relief, pursuant to
the reasons stated in her supporting Memorandum.
DATED THIS

J&

day of March, 1996.

Samuel King

QC»U»

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document on. March 2l__,

1996, to:

Paul S. Felt
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
John Edward Hansen
SCALLEY & READING
260 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

•zr
S14:AstiU.not

0 0015 0

ADDENDUM "L

SAMUEL KING, No. 1820
DAVID J. FRIEL, No. 6225
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (801) 486-3751
Facsimile: (801) 486-3753

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LYNN B. ASTILL,
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL AND OTHER RELIEF

vs.
LEESHA CLARK,

Civil No. 950902307PI
Defendant,

Judge: Pat B. Brian

AUTHORITY
This motion is made pursuant to Rule 59(a) (1), (3), (4), (6)
and (7) and Rule 60(b) (1), (2), (3), and (7) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
BASIS OF MOTION
The essence of this motion is a fair trial, nothing more, but
certainly nothing less.
The court is concerned with fair play, and if convinced that
Defendant used vital testimony and tactics that were so wrong and
clearly prejudicial as to deny Plaintiff an even playing field on
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the determinative issue of fact, Plaintiff believes the court will
see to it that Plaintiff receives a fair retrial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Defendant rear-ended Plaintiff.

2.

Accordingly,

trivial.

the negligence

issue between

them

was

Plaintiff was not negligent and Defendant was. The jury

so found.
3.

THE KEY FACTUAL ISSUE WAS WHETHER DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE

WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.
4.

The issue of proximate cause boiled down to whether

Defendant's vehicle struck Plaintiff's at sufficient speed to cause
injury.
5.

PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE:

Plaintiff testified that it was a

hard impact, Defendant traveling at least 15 miles per hour when
she struck Plaintiff.

Plaintiff's evidence was that over $400.00

damage was done to her rear bumper, primarily that the heavy metal
bumper support brackets were both bent at least an inch and had to
be replaced.
6.

Plaintiff drove a Ford Explorer.

Plaintiff had substantial medical testimony supporting

her claim of injury, from Plaintiff herself, her husband, a former
co-worker and her employer, Dr. Richard Wright, who had treated her
for

an

injury

two

years

prior.

Dr. Wright

had

noted

her

2
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substantial convalescence and then her sharply worsened condition
immediately following the subject accident.
Thus Plaintiff carried her burden of proof in her case in
chief - Defendant's negligence, proximately causing damage to her
vehicle and injury to herself.
7.

Defendant's Evidence: Defendant's testimony was in sharp

conflict. She said she had come to a full stop and rolled forward.
While she was distracted and caring for her child she struck
Plaintiff so lightly that it was in her words, "just a bump," and
"just a noise."

Her front bumper showed no visible damage.

She

drove a Ford Taurus.
8.

On this conflict of evidence, Plaintiff had the edge as

both her car was damaged and her injury was verified by several
people.

Something caused this harm and Defendant was the only

known source.
9.

Expert Testimony:

Defendant.
was

an

The only "expert" testimony was from

Newell Knight, Defendant's expert, testified that he

expert

in

automobile

collision

reconstruction.

testimony was on two points - (1) speed and (2) injury.

His
As to

speed, he swore Defendant's vehicle, i.e. a Ford Taurus, would have
shown damage, permanent deformation, to the front bumper if the
impact speed had been over 2 or 3 miles per hour, at most five

3
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miles per hour.

As there was no such damage, Mr. Knight concluded

that the impact speed was less than that.
10.

As to injury, Mr. Knight testified that at a 2 - 3 mile

per hour impact speed, Plaintiff would have suffered no force on
her body stronger than sitting down hard in an upholstered chair,
and would not be injured.
11.

The effect of his testimony was that Plaintiff was less

than candid in her claims of speed, damage, and injuries.
effectively destroyed her credibility.

He

If his testimony were

accepted, Plaintiff had to be lying as the impact speed was too low
to cause the results she claimed.
12. The jury also could reasonably believe that Plaintiff had
been fairly caught in such exaggerations because she called no
expert to rebut him.
13.

The jury clearly accepted Mr. Knight's testimony, as it

found that Defendant was negligent, but that her negligence was not
the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries.
14.

The Court was misled by Defense counsel (Argument, Point

2) into refusing to allow Plaintiff to call her two rebuttal
witnesses.

These witnesses were David Lord (affidavit Ex. 2 ) , an

automobile collision reconstruction expert, and Leonard Hartle, a
mechanic who specializes in Ford Taurus automobiles, doing

4
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mechanical work, but primarily repairing them after collision
(affidavit Ex. 1). These affidavits are incorporated herein.
15.

AT THE TIME THE COURT REFUSED TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF'S

REBUTTAL EXPERTS TO TESTIFY, MR. HARTLE WAS SITTING IN THE HALLWAY
OUTSIDE THE COURT ROOM, HOLDING THE RIGHT HALF OF A FRONT BUMPER OF
A FORD TAURUS ON HIS LAP.
16.

(Ex. 1, Exhibit A)

Mr. Hartle was prepared to testify that Mr. Knight's

testimony was totally false.

He was prepared to testify that the

bumper he had with him, was one he had taken from a Ford Taurus,
where

the

vehicle

was

substantially

damaged

by

a

front

end

collision at over 20 miles per hour, yet the bumper showed no
damage.
17.

The following content is in Mr. Hartle's affidavit.

It

should be in the Court transcript and would have been but for the
error in refusing to allow Mr. Hartle to testify.
Q.

Mr. Hartle what is that?

A.

Half a Ford Taurus bumper.

Q.

Are they all the same?

A.

Yes. The Taurus is a new Ford vehicle and each model has

the same bumper design.
Q.

Is there any deformation?

A.

No.

Q.

Where did you get i t ?
5
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A,

From a Ford Taurus that was totalled in a front end

collision.
Q.

Do you know the impact speed of that vehicle?

A.

Over 20 miles per hour.

Q.

Do you have a photograph of the Taurus from which you

removed the bumper?
A.

Yes, here it is.

Then the bumper and photograph are entered as Exhibits and the
jury examines them.
18.

Mr. Hartle was prepared to testify that the front bumper

on Defendant's Taurus was resigned to collapse on impact, that
additional impact force would go into the shock absorbers, then
into the frame.
configuration.

The bumper would then return to its original
At impacts at major speeds, the bumper would be

destroyed, but at mid ranges of 15 - 25 miles per hour, it would
show no visible damage.
19.

It is difficult to image a more dramatic contradiction of

testimony than that which Mr. Hartle would have produced, directly
contradicting Defendant's testimony.
20.

An actual bumper is worth more than a whole lot of words

about a bumper.

Annexed to Mr. Hartle's affidavit (Ex. 1) are

photographs of a Taurus bumper and of the wrecked Taurus from which
he removed it. The Taurus is a new Ford vehicle. Its front bumper
6
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is the same in each model year.
holding a half bumper.

Exhibit 1. A. shows Mr. Hartle

This bumper shows no damage.

Mr. Hartle

cut the bumper in half so that he would be able to carry it into
the courtroom.

Exhibit 1. B. shows the Taurus from which Mr.

Hartle removed the half bumper. This photograph shows major damage
to the vehicle, and the remaining one-half of its bumper which is
not damaged.
bumper half.

Exhibit 1. C. is a closer view of the remaining
Even at close range it shows no deformation.

As per

his affidavit (Ex. 1 ) , Mr. Hartle's testimony would be that the
front Taurus bumper shows no deformation, yet the vehicle was
totalled by the speed of the impact, a speed in excess of 20 miles
per hour. These prove incontrovertibly that Mr. Knight's testimony
that a Taurus bumper would be deformed at an impact speed over 3
miles per hour is absolute rubbish.
21.

Mr. Lord's testimony would have parallelled Mr. Hartle's

in regard to the resilience of the Taurus front bumper, and that no
damage would occur to the Forerunner at up to 5 miles an hour as
the Taurus bumper "like a pillow" would absorb it, so the damage to
Plaintiff's- heavy bumper braces was caused by am impact speed well
over 5 miles per hour.

As per his affidavit (Ex. 2 ) , Mr. Lord

would also have testified that at 8 - 9 miles per hour impact
normal males can receive real injury from rear-end collisions even
with headrest and seat belts, with less speed required for women or
7
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those with prior injuries.

While Mr. Knight testified that he

personally investigated only 250 accidents, Mr. Lord would have
testified that he had personally investigated thousands, and that
in those he has often seen injuries comparable to Plaintiff's from
speeds comparable to that involved in the subject accident.

(Ex.

2)
22.

Mr.

accidents.

Knight

is

retained

by

Defense

He is a "damage-control specialist".

Defendant's negligence was irrefutable.

in

automobile

In this case,

He was retained for the

sole purpose of giving testimony attacking the element of proximate
cause.

He earned his pay.

low impact speed.

He testified falsely as to an absurdly

He knew, or should have known, as he claims to

be an expert, how wrong his testimony was.
23.

The question is how to make his testimony stand up?

How

Defense dealt with this is covered in Argument Point 2.
24.

That Mr. Knight was wrong is proved by Mr. Hartle's

bumper. Mr. Knight upgraded the weight of his own testimony saying
he "knew" so as to get his testimony in when if he had fully
honored his oath to tell the whole truth, he would have testified
he "assumed without specific data or personal knowledge."

That

though would not lead to his being retained by defense 250 times a
year at $300 to $3,000 each as he admitted in cross.

8
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25.

This time Mr. Knight has been caught flat out. It is too

late to repair the damage done Plaintiff in the first trial. It is
not too late to rectify that in the only way possible - giving her
a retrial in which Mr. Knight's testimony will receive only the
minute weight it deserves.
26.

The probability that the jury verdict would be for

Plaintiff on the issue of causation rather than for Defendant, had
rebuttal testimony been allowed by the Court, or, at the least
Plaintiff's expert been allowed to attend Mr. Knight's testimony to
advise on attacking the foundations of his conclusions, and on
cross-examination, is extremely high.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PREJUDICIAL ERROR
PREJUDICIAL ERROR OCCURRED DURING TRIAL OF THIS CASE, SUCH
BEING RECENTLY DEFINED AS " ...FOR AN ERROR TO REQUIRE REVERSAL, THE
LIKELIHOOD OF A DIFFERENT OUTCOME MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY HIGH TO
UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE IN THE VERDICT."

Harline v. Barker, 284 Utah

Adv. Rep. 10 (2-14-96).
The court erred in ruling that Plaintiff could not call
rebuttal witnesses.

This was due to Defendant's timing tactics.

9
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First though,

let's examine the Court's refusal to allow

Plaintiff's expert in Court while Mr. Knight testified.
If Plaintiff had been allowed to have Mr. Lord or Mr. Hartle
sit in court while Mr. Knight testified, Plaintiff's counsel could
have effectively cross-examined Mr. Knight. This is why an expert
is allowed in the court to listen to the testimony of another
expert particularly when the presence of one expert is needed to
evaluate and modify the testimony of an opposing expert.

State v.

Stevens, 797 P.2d 1133 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Mr. Lord stated in his affidavit that he has never before been
excluded

from

listening

to

an

opposing

expert.

His

court

experience is extensive, including having been qualified in 29
states to testify as shown by his curriculum vitae.
Applied,

the

Court

departed

from

accepted

procedure

in

excluding Mr. Lord.
American Jurisprudence

2d, Volume 75, Trial, Section 62,

Witnesses Within Exclusionary Rule states that "the general rule is
that experts may be allowed to attend the testimony of other
witnesses.1*
Am. Jur. also states that excluding such a witness, "...does
not

necessarily

constitute

error," but

exclusion must be present to avoid error.

justification

for

the

No justification has

been submitted in this case.
10
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Turning now to the Court's ruling excluding Mr. Lord and Mr.
Knight from giving rebuttal testimony, two points should be made at
the start.
First, Defense acknowledged that in the exchange of names of
witnesses, as soon as defense stated it would call Mr. Knight,
Plaintiff promptly gave notice that it would call Mr. Lord and Mr.
Hartle as "rebuttal" witnesses.
Plaintiff's experts were not "surprise" witnesses.
Calling a rebuttal witness is customary.
The general Rule is stated in 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial, Section 145,
Order of Proof:
"While the trial court is invested with wide discretion
in permitting departures from the usual order of proof
when circumstances of the case require, the general rule
is that the party who has the burden of proof is entitled
to open the evidence; he should then introduce all his
evidence in chief, and after his adversary has introduced
all his evidence in chief, the former should be confined
to rebuttal evidence.

Generally speaking, on rebuttal,

he can only give such evidence in reply as tends to
answer new matter introduced by his adversary."
Astill v. Clark fits precisely within the general rule as

s t a t e d in Am.Jur.
11
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Plaintiff

introduced

evidence that she was rear-ended by

Defendant, that while she didn't at first know of damage to her
vehicle nor injury to herself, she learned on the same day that her
Ford Explorer bumper was damaged and that she was in severe pain.
This carried Plaintiff's prima facie burden of proof.
Defendant then put on its case, relying essentially on the
testimony of Mr. Knight that the impact was at such a low speed
that it could not produce injury. Mr. Knight's scientific analysis
of the Ford Taurus bumper was critical to his testimony.

He

testified that it would remain deformed after an impact at a speed
over 2 - 3

miles per hour.

Plaintiff's rebuttal complies precisely with the Am.Jur. quote
of the general rule.

As Mr. Lord states in his affidavit (Ex. 2)

low speed impacts, at speeds over 8 - 9
cause

real

injuries,

and

that

the

miles per hour frequently
Taurus

bumper

would

not

permanently deform, but to the contrary, would absorb an impact up
to five miles an hour without structural damage to either vehicle's
bumper system, so that the damage to the Ford Explorer's bumper
indicated at speed well in excess of the five mile an hour no damage
speed.
Mr. Hartle's testimony would have been even more dramatic by
showing the undamaged bumper he had with him and photographs of the
totalled Taurus from which he took it.
12
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This is precisely rebuttal by definition.
Had this testimony been given, the jury would have understood
that Mr. Knight was just plain wrong.

More than that, they would

have understood that the actual impact speed would have been in the
mid-range testified to by Plaintiff.
With Mr. Knight rebutted, the combination of the evidence as
to Plaintiff's genuine injury occurring on the day of the accident
as presented in her case in chief, the substantial speed with which
she felt Defendant strike her, and the demolishing on rebuttal of
Mr. Knight's testimony, the jury verdict would have probably found
proximate cause on Defendant's part.
That is, there can be no confidence that the jury verdict
would be the same had Plaintiff been allowed either to have her
expert assist in cross-examination of Mr. Knight, or her experts
allowed to rebut him.

This is prejudicial error.

Harline, supra.

ARGUMENT
POINT II
PREJUDICIAL ERROR, CUMULATIVE IN EFFECT, OCCURRED AS FOLLOWS:
1)

THE EXCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT DURING TESTIMONY OF

DEFENDANT'S

EXPERT.

THIS PREVENTED

PLAINTIFF

FROM MAKING AN

EFFECTIVE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT'S EXPERT (NEWELL KNIGHT)
GROSS FACTUAL ERRORS IN HIS TESTIMONY.

(POINT I, SUPRA)

13
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2)

REFUSING TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO CALL REBUTTAL WITNESSES

WHO WOULD HAVE EFFECTIVELY DEMOLISHED MR. KNIGHT'S TESTIMONY,
3)

THE COURT WAS LED

INTO ERROR

IN REFUSING

TO ALLOW

REBUTTAL BY INTENTIONALLY FALSE STATEMENTS OF LAW MADE BY DEFENSE
COUNSEL JAMES E. HANSEN.

SUCH MISCONDUCT JUSTIFIES SETTING ASIDE

THE JURY VERDICT, GRANTING A NEW TRIAL, AND AN AWARD OF FEES,
COSTS, AND SUCH OTHER SANCTIONS THAT THE COURT DEEMS APPROPRIATE.
Defense counsel intentionally misled the Court!
At the conclusion of Defendant's evidence, Plaintiff called
her rebuttal witnesses, Mr. Lord and Mr. Hartle.
Defendant then objected and handed to the Court a copy of the
case Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021(Utah 1994).

(Ex. 3)

Defense counsel argued that a rebuttal witness could not be
called and that Turner so held.

Defense argued Mr. Lord and Mr.

Hartle should have testified in Plaintiff's case in chief (this is
bad law as per Point I).
Under the pressure of the moment, defense counsel having made
the tactical decision not to make the argument until the moment
when Plaintiff commenced her rebuttal case, the Court misread the
decision and agreed with defense counsel's interpretation of it.
In so ruling, the Court was undoubtedly influenced by the fact
that co-defense counsel, James E. Hansen, told the Court that he
had been counsel for the losing party, Turner, in the Turner case.
14
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Actually,

on

reading

the opinion, it

is

clear

that

it

specifically allows the calling of a rebuttal witness. At notes 3
and

4,

and

in

footnotes

2 and

3,

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

specifically cited Utah cases allowing rebuttal witnesses.
Similarly, at the front of the case, the CASE NOTES state:
"2.

Pre-trial Procedure, key 40.

court's authority

It is within trial

to order parties

to disclose all

potential witnesses in advance of trial.
3.

Pre-trial Procedure key, 45.

Trial court does not

abuse its discretion by refusing to allow a party to call
surprise witnesses, absent 'good cause' for failure to
disclose witnesses required by court order or rule."
4.

Pre-trial Procedure key, 45. Whether party will be

allowed to call surprise witness when a party contends
that undisclosed witness is necessary to rebut adverse
party's evidence is determined by whether evidence sought
to be rebutted could reasonably be anticipated before
trial."
Thus, it is clear that Turner holds exactly the opposite of
that which defense counsel argued to the Court. Mr. Hansen was not
an outsider to Turner, giving it a hurried misreading as the Court
did.
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Mr. Hansen was counsel in that case. Exhibit 4 is copies from
the "Brief in Chief" in Turner filed by Mr. Hansen, in the Utah
Supreme Court.
"II.

In it he states:

THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT REBUTTAL

TESTIMONY WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR."
Mr. Hansen then cites cases from Utah and other jurisdictions
that rebuttal witnesses are proper.
Exhibit 5 is a copy of Mr. Hansen's "Reply Brief."

In it he

argues that the trial Court's refusal to permit rebuttal testimony
was prejudicial error. This time, responding to Defendant's brief,
he addresses his argument to the right to call a surprise rebuttal
witness.
Mr. Hansen knew, having lost the case, that the Utah Supreme
Court found no fault in calling a rebuttal witness.

The error he

had committed while representing Turner was that he called his
rebuttal witness as a surprise witness with no advance notice to
the opposing side.

For this he had no excuse acceptable to the

trial or appellate court.
Turney involved Defendant running a stop sign and hitting
Plaintiff.

Defendant claimed early on that she couldn't see the

sign because it was badly placed, obscured by shrubbery, and was
bent so that it did not face approaching traffic.

The Court had

required all witnesses be submitted to opposing counsel.

Mr.

16
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Hansen did not list his rebuttal witness.

Mr. Hansen's rebuttal

witness was a gentleman who lived in the neighborhood where the
accident occurred who was prepared to testify that the sign was
visible. Because Mr. Hansen had known since the time of the filing
of Defendant's answer of the defense position, his error was in not
listing his rebuttal witness on a timely basis.
The Utah Supreme Court found absolutely nothing wrong with his
sequence of evidence.
Mr. Hansen produced evidence that his client was struck by a
vehicle that ran a stop sign.

The Defendant then put on evidence

that they didn't see the stop sign due to its position, obscuring
vegetation and the sign being bent.

Mr. Hansen then wanted to

rebut by a neighbor who said that at the time the accident
occurred, the sign was perfectly visible.
It was Mr. Hansen's not releasing the name of his rebuttal
witness to the other side in time for them to prepare in whatever
means they saw fit, whether by deposition or other means that was
the sole rqftson the witness was excluded.

In sum, Mr. Hansen lost

Turner notvJaacause he had a rebuttal witness, but because he used
him as a surprise witness so he wouldn't have been allowed to call
him in his case in chief either.
This makes Mr. Hansen an expert on the Turner holding.

17
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At trial of Astill v. Clark, Mr. Hansen told the Court in
person, during that argument, that Turner held exactly the opposite
of what it actually held.

He told the Court Turner didn't allow

rebuttal witnesses.
An

attorney

is

an

officer

of

the

Court.

He

may

not

intentionally misquote law to the Court, particularly in a hurried
context where the Court lacks time to research or deliberate and so
tends to rely on counsel's candor.

This, though, was the context

in which he presented his Motion.
This was misconduct on the part of Mr. Hansen.
Mr. Hansen's argument to the Court was never reduced to
writing.

It was though a formal motion, a motion to exclude

rebuttal witnesses.
As such, it comes within the meaning of Rule 11, URCP which
requires that no attorney make a Motion to the Court unless, "...to
the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well-founded in fact and is warranted bv
existing lyf«. .and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, sgpsb as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation."
The purpose of Mr. Hansen's deliberate misstatement of the law
was to deny Plaintiff a fair trial by excluding from the jury
evidence

that would

have destroyed

the effectiveness

of

the
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testimony of his expert Mr. Knight. This is an "improper purpose11
if there ever was one.
Rule 11 then goes on to sanctions:
"If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this Rule, the court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion,
or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
Rule 11 specifically refers to a "signed" Motion. Mr. Hansen
chose to make his Motion verbally.
him.

He had the Turner case with

He could have submitted a written Motion.

tactics, he chose to give a verbal Motion.

As a matter of

Technically this might

evade the reach of Rule 11. Plaintiff submits that the key word is
"Motion" not quotes "signed" or Rule 11 is vitiated.

In support,

of the Rules, focus on character of the misrepresentation, not the
form.
The same rule is restated in the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct.
"a.

Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal:
A lawyer should not knowingly:
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1) make a false statement of material fact or
law to a tribunal."
The Rule is also covered by statute.
"78-51-26 UCA.

Duties of Attorneys and Counselors.

It is the duty of an attorney and counselor:
3) to counsel or maintain no other action,
proceeding or defense than that which appears
to him legal and just, excepting the defense
of a person charged with a public offense;
4) to employ for the purposes of maintaining
the causes confided to him such means only as
are consistent with truth, and never to seek
to mislead the judges by any artifice or false
statement of fact or law.,f
"78-51-31 UCA.

Deceit and Collusion.

An attorney and counselor who is guilty of
deceit or collusion, or who consents thereto,
with intent to deceive a court or judge or a
party to an action or proceeding is liable to
be disbarred, and shall forfeit to the injured
party treble damages to be recovered
similar action."

20
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In this case, there is no doubt that:
1.

When Mr. Hansen made the argument to Judge Brian

that Turner precluded the use of a rebuttal witness, he
knew that the holding in Turner was exactly to the
contrary.
2.

Mr. Hansen made the argument for the purpose of

denying

Plaintiff

a

fair

trial,

specifically

from

allowing her to rebut false testimony given by his
expert.
3.

Mr. Hansen knew that such false argument might well

lead to Plaintiff being denied a rightful verdict, as in
fact occurred.
ARGUMENT
POINT III
THE COURT ALSO ERRED IN INADEQUATE EXAMINATION OF THE JURY, IN
NOT SUBMITTING A PRESENT VALUE TABLE TO THE JURY, AND IN OTHER WAYS
AS SHOWN IN THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT.

THESE ERRORS ARE PRESERVED, BUT

NOT ARGUED HERE, AS POINT II IS DETERMINATIVE.

THEY ARE PRESERVED

IN THE EVENT OF AN APPEAL.
It is up to the trial court to grant or not grant Plaintiff a
new trial.

21
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If the court declines to do so, in addition to the merits of
this case, there are two very important separate issues of law that
will probably be addressed by the appellate court.
1)

These are:

The scope of appropriate examination of jurors.

Plaintiff claims that the Court improperly restricted the
scope

of

examination

of

jurors

as per

the

written

questions Plaintiff had submitted to be asked of the
jurors.
2)

The Utah Jury Instruction book (MUJI) provides that

verdicts shall be reduced to present value.

The book

though gives no elucidation of how this should be done.
Plaintiff proposed that the Court follow the statistical
present value table used by the California courts to
supplement the present value instruction.

Without that

table, the jury has no means of determining how to arrive
at present value.

Plaintiff believes that for guidance

of the trial court, on reversal, that the Utah Appellate
Court »ay well approve submission of a present value
table 0long with the present value instruction.

AFFIDAVITS & TRANSCRIPT
A transcript of the testimony of Newell Knight is necessary.
The court reporter, Brad Young, has advised, due to his press of
22
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other

business, it

will

take

him

some

time

to

submit

that

transcript.
Modified affidavits will be submitted if needed, within ten
days of the time that the Knight testimony transcript is delivered
to Plaintiff.

Unless Defendant denies Mr. Knight testified that

the Taurus bumper would be deformed at an impact speed over three
miles per hour, this matter can move forward to oral argument, by
which

time

Mr.

Young

should

have

the

transcript

ready

for

distribution to counsel and the court.
Plaintiff has also ordered from Mr. Young a transcript of the
in-court argument concerning Plaintiff's right to call rebuttal
witnesses, and of the argument and order excluding Plaintiff's
expert from being in court while Defendant's expert testified.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff returns to her first point.
fair trial.

She is entitled to a

Error of the Court, largely caused by intentional

misconduct of defense counsel, barred her that at trial.
Fair play is the essence of conservatism.

Conservatism rests

on values and, in court, no value is more important than fair play.
Plaintiff having been denied fair play, she prays the Court
enter its order setting aside the jury verdict and directing a new
trial; that Plaintiff recover her court costs and attorney fees
23

000:72

both for the trial and for this motion; that Defendant's costs bill
be vacated, and that the Court enter such other sanctions as it
deems appropriate.
DATED THIS 15 day of March, 1996.

"Samuel King

^~

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document postage prepaid on March
/5 , 1996, to:
Paul S. Felt
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P.O. BOX 45385
Salt Lake city, UT 84145-0385
John Edward Hansen
SCALLEY & READING
260 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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SH:AstiU2.mnt
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SAMUEL KING, No. 1820
DAVID J FRIEL, No. 6225
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (801) 486-3751
Facsimile: (801) 486-3753
Attorneys for Plaintiff
LYNN B. ASTILL
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LYNN B. ASTILL,

AFFIDAVIT OF LEONARD HARDLE

Plaintiff,
VS.

LEESHA CLARK,
Case No.
Defendant.

Judge:

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)ss.
)

950902307 PI

Pat B. Brian

Leonard Hardle, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:
1.

I am an automobile collision repairman and have been for

16 years. I am a resident of Salt Lake County, and am the owner of
an automobile repair shop whose address is 4195 South 500 West,
Murray, Utah.
2.

For several years I have specialized in the repair of

Ford Taurus automobiles.
1
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3.

I have read Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial.

So far as

it states facts relative to a Ford Taurus, and to the testimony
that I was prepared to give at the trial, the motion is accurate,
4.

Annexed to this affidavit are photographs taken at my

business by David J Friel on March 13, 1996.

These photographs

accurately depict the bumper and Taurus automobile I was prepared
to testify about during trial to illustrate my testimony in this
case.

Actually, I brought part of this same bumper to court with

me on February 8, 1996 and I was waiting out in the hall of the
Third District Court ready to be called upon.
Judge Brian refused to allow me to rebut Defendant's
expert, Newel Knight, concerning his erroneous testimony of Ford
Taurus bumpers.
5.

Exhibit A is a photograph of me and half of the bumper

from the vehicle I was prepared to testify concerning.

Exhibit B

is a photograph showing major damage to the vehicle. This vehicle
was totalled.

I have already completed some major repair work to

this pictured vehicle's front end. The front frame of this car was
damaged significantly more than the picture depicts.

Upon close

examination it can be seen that the bumper received only a few
scrapes.
Exhibit C is a close-up photograph of half of the bumper
on the vehicle.

I sawed off the other half of the bumper and took
2
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it to Court with me on February 8th. After the trial was completed
and the Plaintiff lost, I threw the other half of the bumper away.
The section thrown away was in similar condition as the other half.
6.

A comparison of these photographs reveals that the bumper

shows no apparent damage, while the vehicle shows very substantial
damage caused by a front-end collision.
7.

This bumper is essentially identical to the bumper on the

Ford Taurus Defendant was driving, with the support structures in
both vehicles being the same.
8.

Based on my experience, the vehicle and its bumper

identified in these photographs were involved in an impact of at
least 15 miles an hour.
over

50 damaged

My knowledge is based on inspection of

Ford Taurus automobiles.

I understand

the

mechanical function and structure of the bumper and its supporting
units and its ability to withstand impact, and the damages which
different components of the system will show.
9.

In part, the technical statements concerning the Ford

Taurus and its bumper, stated in Plaintiff's Motion, was based on
advice I have given Plaintiff's counsel.

For that reason I am

incorporating the statements of that Motion in this Affidavit.
10.

If Defendant's expert, Mr. Knight, had in fact testified

that a Ford Taurus bumper would remain deformed after a front-end
impact of two or three miles an hour, or even twice that speed, his
3
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testimony was absolutely wrong.

The heavy front portion of the

bumper is designed to "take a heavy hit"

before the energy is

transferred to the energy absorbing shocks in the bumper mounts.
However, it is also designed to return to form after impact. Yet,
to determine the damage to Defendant's Taurus in the subject
accident, a person would have to get underneath the vehicle and
examine the bumper structure, and its energy absorbing shocks and
inner frame structure.

The way to tell if the bumper has been

fully compressed is to look at the energy absorbers.

It will chip

a bit when the bumper has been fully compressed.

This is not

noticeable, appearing only as a thin line, when one knows what to
look for. It is my understanding that absolutely no inspection was
made of the Defendant's vehicle from underneath the car and that
only a visual inspection took place standing in front of the car.
11.

Having examined damage to Plaintiff's Explorer before it

was repaired, and having observed

the damage to its support

brackets that connect the bumper to the frame, I can state with
confidence^that Defendant's vehicle must have been traveling at
approximately ten miles per hour, not the two or three miles per
hour as Defendant's expert testified to.
12.

I have read the Affidavit of David Lord, and agree with

that affidavit and the statements made in relation to Ford Taurus
bumpers and statements made by Defendant's expert witness.
4
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DATED THIS
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day of

•TT'sfy?V£

1996.

Leonard Hardle
Affiant
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SAMUEL KING, No. 1820
DAVID J FRIEL, No. 6225
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (801) 486-3751
Facsimile: (801) 486-3753

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LYNN B. ASTILL,

)

AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID LORD

Plaintiff,
vs.

]

LEESHA CLARK,

|
1

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

Case No.

]

Judge:

950902307 PI

Pat B. Brian

)
)ss.
)

David Lord, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:
1.

I am a former police officer for Salt Lake City assigned

for seven years as a traffic investigator and reconstructionist.
Currently, I now own two businesses in Accident Reconstruction and
Cause Analysis.
2.

My curriculum vitae is attached.

I have read Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial. So far as

it states facts relative to a Ford Taurus, and to the testimony
that I was prepared to give, the Motion is factually accurate.
1
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3.

As the most frequent city driving collision is a "rear-

ender", I investigated 7,000 accidents during my work for Salt Lake
City.

I have investigated several thousands of these types of

rear-end collisions. This has continued on a frequent basis since
I have been self-employed and investigating and reconstructing
about 3,000 more accidents.
4.

It is not uncommon for people to sustain real neck and/or

back injuries in low speed rear end collisions. I am not a medical
doctor.

My observation is based on my dealing with, and personal

knowledge of, people involved in such collisions, and my reading of
material in this field relating statistics on low speed accidents
to injuries caused by them, verifying the many times victims have
told me of their injuries and subsequent medical confirmation of
these injuries.
5.

Reputable studies have shown real injuries occurring to

occupants of the front car in rear end collisions at speeds as low
as eight to nine miles per hour, even though the injured occupant
wore a seat belt and had a head rest. These studies are consistent
with my own observations and experience.
6.

As I understand it, Newell Knight testified that this

subject accident occurred at a speed well under eight to nine miles
per hour, basing this opinion on lack of visible damage to the
Taurus front bumper.

He erred in that testimony.
2
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7.
bumpers

The Taurus is a recent car model. All of them have front
designed

to

absorb

energy

(they

are

called

"energy

absorbing" bumpers), and to absorb up to a five mile per hour
impact without sustaining or imparting any structural damage.

It

is designed to be soft - like hitting a pillow or being hit by a
pillow.
8.

For the impact to deform and displace both of the

Explorer's heavy steel rear bumper supports by at least an inch,
indicates the Taurus struck the Explorer at a speed well in excess
of five miles per hour, as the first five miles per hour would have
produced no structural damage to either vehicle.
examination

Without an

of the Taurus' strong structural bumper parts, a

determination of the actual impact speed of the Taurus cannot be
made.

However, in view of the known damage to the Explorer bumper

supports, it is obvious that the actual impact speed was well over
five miles per hour.
9.

The above is testimony I was prepared to give at trial of

this case.

I was there, waiting outside the Courtroom.

testified in court as an expert witness many times.

I have

This case is

the first time that the court has refused to allow me to attend the
testimony of the opposition expert reconstructionist, and the first
time when notice that I would testify was timely given, that I have
not been allowed to testify as a rebuttal witness.
SKrLord.aff
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)
I

SS

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
David Lord being first duly sworn on his oath, swears he is
the Affiant in the above-entitled action, that he has reviewed the
foregoing document and that he executes the same voluntarily, and
that the same is true and correct to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief.
David Lo£d
SUBSCRIBED TO AND SWORN to before me this

£?

day of March,

1996.
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NOTARY PUBLIC
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David G. Lord 1996
RESUME
1967-Present Director and Owner of Accident
Reconstruction & Cause Analysis, a
consulting company that operates in
thirteen (13) states,
1985-Present Director and programmer for
Computerized Accident Reconstruction, a
company that operates in twenty seven
(27) states and Queensland, Australia.
1966-1972 Salt Lake City Police Department,
Accident Investigation Squad.
Averaging 1000 investigations
annually.

SCHOOLS and STUDY
1961-1964 Utah Tech, Drafting and Pattern design.
1966 Salt Lake City Police Academy.
1968 Northwestern University's Accident Investigation.
1968-Present Accident Reconstruction.
Auto Accident Site Diagraming (in house).
Accident Site Investigation (in house & outside
instructors).
Accident & Forensic Photography (in house & outside
instructors).
Anatomical Interaction During Collision (autopsies).
Vehicular Dynamics.
Vehicular Structure, Design and Collision Analysis.
Controlled Crash Test (30) in conjunction with
training.
Passenger Kinetics.
Human Factors.
Psychology of the Highway User (outside instructors).
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Tire Design and Construction (Goodyear Tire Company).
Road Design and Construction (as it pertains to auto
accidents) Gibbons and Reed Construction and
others.
Forensic Evidence Evaluation.
Surprise Intrusion Response.
Legal Issues of The 1990, admissibility of
accident reconstruction evidence.
The investigation of child restraint and
seatbelt injuries

TEACHING
1967 Guest Instructor Weber College, Accident Investigation.
1967-1972 Basic, Intermediate and Advanced for SLCPD and other
agencies.
1968-Present Peace Officers Standards and Training, all levels of
Accident Investigation and Reconstruction, including thirty
(30) controlled crash tests.
1983-1984 Salt Lake Community College, Advanced Accident
Reconstruction. 6 Credit hours.
1985-Present Computerized Accident Reconstruction, Computerized
Accident Investigations.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Personally investigated 7000 auto accidents and consulted on an
additional 3000 cases.
I was the first person certified to teach any subject at P.O.S.T.,
the State Police Academy.
I have participated in litigation and given expert testimony in
thirteen states over the past 29 years.
I have produced twelve (12) computer graphic accident reenactment.
In 1985 I applied for and was given a copyright on a computer
program that I conceived and designed. My concept is presently
being used by Police Departments, Insurance Companies, Bureau of
Land Management investigators, Attorneys, Civilian Consultants and
Safety Supervisors in 27 states and Queensland, Australia.
-2-
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In April 1990 the United States Department of the Interior gave an
account to representatives of the government of Queensland,
Australia. In it they report, "their civi1ian investigators using
my computer system and safety program over the last four years have
saved the U.S. taxpayers $12,000,000.00" in just the Utah
jurisdiction.
In February 1993 the management team for BLM approved adoption of
my computer system and safety program for all of their 180 offices
in thirteen jurisdictions.
An Accident Reconstructionist that critiques Traffic products for
Law & Order Magazine made the following comments about my computer
system in their April 1990 issue.
It is "user friendly,
aesthetically pleasant, easy to understand, never leaving the user
in the dark and the greatest thing since sliced bread."
I have written two books in conjunction with the computer program,
CHECKLIST / USER MANUAL and the C.A.R. TECHNICAL MANUAL.
I have authored an article for the Australian Police Journal
quarterly magazine titled, COMPUTERIZED ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION.
This paper was printed in December 1991.
I collaborated with Joseph E. Badger, a nationally recognized
accident reconstructionist, on a Law and Order Magazine article
titled, HOW CRITICAL IS CRITICAL SPEED. This paper was published
in the October-November issues of 1991.
I have written opinions that were used in criminal traffic trials
in The Queens Court, Queensland, Australia.
This year, 1995, I was awarded a five year contract by the
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management for my safety
program, it will be used in twelve (12) jurisdictions and 180
offices. I will be providing computer software, pre-programmed
hardware, training in accident investigation, expert witnesses and
case management for the U.S. Attorneys Office.
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Julie Anderson Turner, Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
Amy Nelson, Defendant and Appellee
No. 920195
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
872 P.2d 1021, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 32
March 30, 1994, Filed
Third District,
Frederick

Salt

Lake

County.

The

Honorable

J.

Dennis

COUNSEL
John E. Hansen, Salt Lake City, and John W. Anderson, Tulsa,
Oklahoma, for Turner.
Robert L. Stevens, Salt Lake City, for Nelson.
JUDGES
ZIMMERMAN, Stewart, Howe, Durham, Russon,
AUTHOR:

ZIMMERMAN
^TNJON

ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice :
Plaintiff Julie Anderson Turner appeals from a jury verdict
for defendant Amy Nelson on Turner's negligence claim. Turner
contends that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing
her to call a "rebuttal" witness whom she had not listed on her
pretrial designation of witnesses. She further asserts that the
trial court erroneously allowed Nelson to add a nonparty, Salt Lake
City, to the verdict form in order to have the jury apportion its
fault. We affirm the trial court.
Thisr action arises from an automobile accident. On July 6,
1989, Turner was traveling west on Third Avenue near the Canyon
Road intersection in Salt Lake City. At about the same time, Nelson
was driving north on Canyon Road. Turner contends that Nelson
failed to heed the "Stop Ahead" warning sign and then ran the stop
sign at the intersection of Canyon Road and Third Avenue. Nelson's
vehicle hit Turner's vehicle on the front left quarter-panel.
Turner suffered physical injuries as a result.
Turner served Nelson with a complaint alleging negligence on
March 27, 1991. Nelson answered the complaint and denied any
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negligence. Her answer claimed, among other things, that Turner was
contributorily negligent and that Turner's injuries were caused by
the negligence of unnamed third parties. Soon thereafter, discovery
commenced.
The trial court issued a scheduling order setting February
20, 1992, as the discovery cutoff date. The order required both
parties, by February 14th, to exchange designations of the
witnesses they planned to call at trial. Although Nelson complied
with that order, Turner filed her designation on February 19th,
five days late. On February 26th, Nelson filed a "Motion for
Apportionment of Fault of Salt Lake City" and an accompanying
memorandum. She sought to include Salt Lake City on the verdict
form for apportionment purposes, even though it was not a
defendant. Over Turner's objection, the trial court granted the
motion.
At trial, Turner presented evidence tending to show that
Nelson had been negligent in failing to heed the stop sign.
Conversely, Nelson contended in opening arguments and throughout
trial that Salt Lake City was at fault because it "had negligently
designed" the intersection and because it allegedly had allowed the
stop sign to become obstructed and perhaps bent, making the sign
difficult to see. The jury returned a verdict of no negligence on
the part of Nelson, from which Turner appeals. AX1
Turner's first contention on appeal is that the trial court
abused its discretion by refusing to allow the testimony of her
"rebuttal" witness, Jim Nakling. Turner acknowledges that Nakling
was not listed on her pretrial designation of witnesses. She
asserts, however, that the need for Nakling's rebuttal testimony
became apparent only after trial began, a fact that justified the
admission of his testimony.
Specifically, Turner contends that she was surprised by
defense counsel's statements during his opening remarks that the
sign had been partially obstructed and that Salt Lake City, not
Nelson, was really at fault. On the evening of the first day of
trial, Turner's counsel made an effort to find a witness to testify
that the sign had not been obstructed. That same evening, counsel
found Nakling walking near the accident site. Nakling had lived
near the relevant intersection for the past ten years. He
purportedly!was prepared to testify that he had walked his dog by
the intersection twice a day and the stop sign was not obstructed
at the time of the accident.
On the morning of the second day of trial, Turner moved the
court to allow Nakling's testimony, and Nelson opposed that motion.
The court did not rule on the motion at that time. On the third day
of trial, Turner attempted to call Nakling as a rebuttal witness,
effectively renewing the motion. Turner argued that the testimony
was properly admissible to rebut Nelson's "new" contentions that
the sign was obstructed and perhaps had been replaced with a larger
sign since the accident and that Salt Lake City was actually at
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fault. The court refused to allow the testimony, stating:
I am persuaded that the motion to call the new witness
should be and is denied, and my reasoning is as has been stated by
[Nelson's counsel], but moreover, it has been the essential defense
here that-the sign was obstructed, thereby limiting the Defendant's
opportunity to timely observe it and take appropriate action. That
aspect of Guertz's testimony is not new, and my decision to allow
Salt Lake City on the verdict form for purposes of apportionment of
the responsibility here does not change the essential defense that
the sign was obstructed. . . . It seems to me that allowing the
testimony in at this point in the trial puts Nelson at an unfair
disadvantage, not knowing who this individual is and not having had
the opportunity to cross-examine or at least depose this witness,
while as Mr. Guertz [Nelson's expert] was available and notified in
a timely fashion as far as the opposition was concerned, that he
would be testifying. I am therefore persuaded that it would place
Nelson in an unfair posture to grant this motion and it's denied.
Turner then proffered what Nakling would testify to and sought
a continuance to allow Nelson an opportunity to depose Nakling. The
court denied the request and again refused to allow the testimony.
The issue before us is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to allow Nakling's testimony. We will not
reverse the trial court unless the appellant demonstrates that the
trial court has clearly abused its discretion and thereby affected
the appellant's substantial rights. See Utah R. Evid. 103; State v.
Albretsen, 7\j P.2d 515, 518-1* (Utah 1989); Haroy v. Hardy, 776
P.2d 917, 92* (Utah Ct. App. 1989); accord In re Estate of Gardner,
31 Colo. App. 361, 505 P.2d 50, 52 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); King Pest
Control v. Binger, 379 So. 2d 660, 663 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
As a threshold matter, it is well within a trial court's
authority to order the parties to disclose all potential witnesses
in advance of trial. See Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P. 2d 1307, 1310
(Utah 1993); Hardy, 776 P.2d at 924-25. Such disclosure serves a
number of significant purposes. See, e.g., Kott v. City of Phoenix,
158 Ariz. 415, 763 P.2d 235, 238 (Ariz. 1988). It gives both
parties the opportunity to prepare adequately for trial, including,
among other things, deposing witnesses, investigating witnesses'
testimony, and preparing an effective cross-examination. See, e.g.,
Gardner, 505 P.2d at 52. It also encourages the parties to make a
serious effort to investigate the facts and discover all relevant
witnesses in a timely manner. Finally, it furthers the orderly and
efficient administration of justice by avoiding trial delays which
might otherwise be necessary to accommodate the need to prepare for
a surprise witness.
Given these significant policies, a trial court does not
abuse its discretion by refusing to allow a party to call a
surprise witness absent "good cause" for the failure to disclose
the witness as required by a court order or rule. AX2 See Arnold,
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846 P.2d at 1310; Hardy, 776 P.2d at 925. When the offering party
contends that the undisclosed witness is necessary to rebut the
adverse party's evidence, the issue hinges on whether the evidence
"sought to be rebutted could reasonably have been anticipated prior
to trial." 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial AU 371, at 570 (1991) (emphasis
added); see, e.g., Albretsen, 782 P. 2d at 518; AX3 King Pest
Control, 379 So. 2d at 663.
Turner offered Nakling's testimony for the express purpose
of contradicting Nelson's evidence that the sign was obstructed and
perhaps bent. Turner contends that because Nakling's testimony was
intended to rebut this "new, unforeseen" argument, the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to allow the testimony. Turner's
claim hangs on whether she "could reasonably have anticipated" the
testimony of Nelson and Nelson's witnesses that the sign was
obstructed.
In deciding this issue, the trial court had all of the
evidence before it and was in the best position to determine
whether
Turner
could
reasonably
have
anticipated
the
obstructed-sign testimony. As noted earlier, the trial court
indicated that the testimony regarding the obstructed stop sign was
"not new" and Nelson's "essential defense" had always been that the
sign was obstructed. Although the trial court did not specifically
say that Turner "could reasonably have anticipated" the testimony,
the thrust of the court's ruling is clear — Nelson's evidence was
foreseeable.
As appellant, Turner has the burden of showing that the
trial court erred in determining that the "new testimony" could
have been anticipated. To meet this burden, she must provide this
court with a complete record of all evidence relevant to the
alleged error. Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). AX4 In the absence of a
complete record "we assume that the proceedings at trial were
regular and proper." Bevan v. J.H. Constr. Co., 669 P.2d 442, 443
(Utah 1983); see Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah 1985);
Stephens v. Schwendiman, 688 P.2d 466, 467 (Utah 1984); Sampson v.
Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
In the present case, Turner has failed to provide this court
with the necessary evidence. She has not included in the record or
with her briefs copies of depositions, Nelson's answers to
interrogatories, or other evidence that could support Turner's
claim that Nelson's evidence was new. This court must therefore
assume that the trial court was correct in its statement that
Nelson had asserted all along that the stop sign was obstructed and
the intersection poorly designed and, by implication, that Salt
Lake City was negligent.
Moreover, the record seems to support Nelson's assertion
that Turner knew or should have reasonably anticipated that Nelson
would claim the sign was obstructed. AX5 In fact, the record
suggests that if Turner failed to appreciate the extent of Nelson's
reliance on this defense, it was probably because of Turner's

earlier failure to depose adequately several adverse witnesses.
Nelson presented the evidence of at least three witnesses,
including herself, that the sign was obstructed and the
intersection poorly designed. Nelson testified at trial that she
was unable to see the stop sign until just prior to entering the
intersection because the sign was partially obstructed by foliage.
Nelson also presented the testimony of Mr. Rusk, a witness to the
accident. Rusk testified that at the time of the accident, the stop
sign was bent and partially obscured by the limbs of a nearby tree.
Nelson further introduced the expert testimony of Mr.
Guertz, who before his retirement was a "traffic design expert"
with the Utah Department of Transportation. Guertz testified that
the intersection was designed poorly for a variety of reasons and
that the stop sign might have been replaced or moved since the
accident.
Nelson's counsel had listed Guertz, Rusk, and Nelson on
their designation of witnesses and had made them available for
deposition. Turner made no attempt to depose Guertz or, as far as
we can tell from the record before us, determine through written
interrogatories the content of his testimony. Rusk apparently was
deposed by Nelson, and Turner was properly notified of that
deposition. It is unclear, however, whether Turner's counsel chose
to attend the deposition or examine Rusk. Finally, Nelson was
deposed by Turner and during that deposition reportedly indicated
that the stop sign had been partially obstructed. Once again,
because Turner has not provided as with a complete record, we have
no way of verifying this statement. AX6
Similarly, Turner s argument on appeal that Salt Lake City's
inclusion on the special verdict form created the necessity for
Nakling's rebuttal testimony is unpersuasive. According to Turner,
Nakling would have testified only that the sign was not obstructed,
bent, or replaced since the accident. The trial court indicated
that these were not new issues. In other words, regardless of Salt
Lake City's presence on the special verdict form, the trial court
concluded that it was foreseeable that Nelson would assert the
obstructed-sign defense and, thus, rebuttal evidence would be
necessary.* AX7
Finally, given the ease with which Turner's counsel located
Nakling, there is no merit to the argument that he was unavailable
or undiscoverable, as Turner seems to imply. By Turner's own
admission, Nakling had lived in the area for ten years and walked
by the intersection twice a day. If Turner's counsel could locate
him in one night, counsel easily could have found him in the months
before trial. In summary, there is nothing in the record before us
to indicate that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing
to admit the testimony of the unlisted witness.
We next address whether the trial court misinterpreted the
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Utah Liability Reform Act (the "Act") in granting Nelson's motion
to add a nonparty, Salt Lake City, to the special verdict form. As
noted earlier, several days before trial Nelson filed a "Motion for
Apportionment of Fault" and a supporting memorandum. The court
granted Nelson's motion, adding Salt Lake City to the special
verdict form on the first day of trial.
According to Turner, the statutory scheme and the plain
language of the Act do not permit the apportionment of negligence
to nonparties. See Utah Code Ann. A U A U 78-27-38 to -41. Therefore,
the argument continues, the Act requires Nelson to join the City as
a party before it may be added to the special verdict form. See id.
This would be an issue of first impression in Utah, but we do not
reach it.
Even
assuming,
arguendo,
that
Turner
has
properly
interpreted the Act, the presence of Salt Lake City on the verdict
form was harmless in this case. The jury determined that Nelson was
not negligent. For that reason, the jury never reached the issue of
whether Turner herself or Salt Lake City was negligent, and the
jury never apportioned fault between the parties. Turner simply has
not provided this court with a cogent theory of how Salt Lake
City's inclusion on a portion of the special verdict form that the
jury never reached altered the facts, the presentation of those
facts, or the result in this case. Cf. Beitzel v. City of Coeur
d'Alene, 827 P.2d 1160, 1164-65 (Idaho 1992).
Turner admits that Nelson was free to argue to the jury that
Salt Lake City was at fault, regardless of whether the City was
included on the special verdict form. In fact, it is common trial
practice for a defendant to allege that a third person, named or
unnamed, party or nonparty, is the real culprit. Turner does not
allege that the Act in any wry restricts this practice. Both
parties presumably would have presented the same evidence and made
the same arguments, even if Salt Lake City had not been on the
special verdict form.
Turner's real complaint seems to be that Nelson allegedly
concealed, until right before trial, her obstructed-sign defense.
Turner apparently believes that this subterfuge is highlighted by
the late d*t« of the motion to add Salt Lake City to the special
verdict fodp« Nevertheless, Turner has not alleged or provided
evidence s\Jpjesting that Nelson in any way distorted her answers to
interrogatories, failed to disclose her defense, or otherwise
misrepresented her position prior to trial. Nelson timely listed
all witnesses who testified, made them available for discovery, and
as far as the record we have indicates, truthfully responded to
written interrogatories. It is not unusual or inappropriate for a
party to file a trial-related motion in close proximity to the
trial. In short, if Turner believes that discovery abuses occurred,
that is a separate issue which she should have raised at trial.
The jury determined that Nelson was not legally negligent.
Turner has failed to demonstrate how the City's presence on a
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portion of the special verdict form that was not completed by the
jury prejudiced her case. The error, if any, was harmless. We
affirm the trial court.
WE CONCUR:
I. Daniel Stewart, Associate Chief Justice
Richard C. Howe, Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
Leonard H. Russon, Court of Appeals Judge
Hall, Justice, did not participate herein; Russon, Judge,
sat prior to his appointment to this court.
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notifying zn< -rial court: and Turner or .ar intent to aad
the City to the special verdict form.9
Nelson's delay, whether the result of a tactical
decision or a lack of diligence, should not have been
allowed to prejudice Turner and deny her any recovery for
her injuries.

The interests of justice would best have been

served by the trial court's denial of the motion to amend ta
add the City six days before trial. Girard v. Appleby, 560
P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983).

The trial court clearly abused

its discretion.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT REBUTTAL TESTIMONTThe trial court compounded its error in adding the Cits

the day of trial by subsequently prohibiting Turner from
presenting witness Jim Nakling's ("tfakling") rebuttal
testimony.

Nakling would have directly controverted

Nelson's testimony that the stop sign was obstructed, and
would have nullified or minimized her assault against the

Cf., for example, Colo. Rev. Stat. §- 13-21-111.5 (1992 d »
Supp.), which requires that a party file notice within
ninety (90) days of the filing g£ £&& complaint of her
intent to have the negligence of non-parties considered.
The party must identify the non-party's name and last-knoigj
address, or -the best identification of such nonparty whiij|
is possible under the circumstances, together with a brisa
stataaacLt of the basis for believing such nonparty to be «
faults Failure to designate the nonparty within the
specified time precludes consideration of the nonparty*
alleged negligence. Colorado thus expressly recognizes
potential for abuse by a party • laying behind the log"
discovery has concluded (or the statute of limitations
run) and then seeking to add an "empty chair" to shift
blame to at trial.
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newly-added "ghost" tortfeasor, the City.

Makling's

testimony was clearly proper rebuttal testimony intended to
neet new evidence in the case, and Nelson would have
suffered no demonstrable prejudice from its introduction.
Rebuttal evidence is that which tends to refute, or to
so modify or explain as to nullify or minimize the effect
of, the opponent's evidence. Board of Education of Soutfr
-ganoete School District v. Barton, 617 P.2d 347 (Utah 1980).
Rebuttal is a term of art, denoting evidence introduced by a
plaintiff

to meet new facts brought out in his opponent's

case in chief. Morgan v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos..
606 P.2d 554 (5th. Cir. 1979)(emphasis original); see

also

Soliz v. Ammerman, 395 P.2d 25 (Utah 1964) (Rebuttal evidence
should be confined to proof which answers or explains an
adversary's evidence)^

Rebuttal evidence is designed to

meet facts not raised prior to the defendant' s case in
chief, not facts which could

have been raised* I&. at 555*

Tn Rodriguez v. Qlin Corp.. 780 F.2d 491 (5th. Cir.
1986), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court • s refusal to allow rebuttal testimony in
response to defendant's expert's testimony-

In its

decision, the court discussed the rules and considerations
governing- the admission or denial of rebuttal testimony.
The court held that rebuttal evidence should be allowed
where •new- testimony is presented during defendant's case
tn chief.

The court stated than

-24-
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Logic
id fairness lead us to conclude tnat new
evidence for purposes of rebuttal does not mean 'brand
new." Rather, evidence is new if, under all the facta
and circumstances, the court concludes that the
evidence was not fairly and adequately presented to thetrier of fact before the defendant's case in chief.
Id* at 496.

The court pointed out that a plaintiff only

bears the burden of proving a prima facie

case, and is not

required to "prove the negative" of defendant's facts or
theories:
This rule proceeds from the view that a plaintiff has
the right to adduce whatever evidence is necessary to
establish its prima facie case and is under no
obligation to anticipate and negate in its own case ina
chief any facts or theories that may be raised on
defense.
!£.; accord,

Kaczmarek v. Allied Chemical Corp., 836 F.2d

1055 (7th Cir. 1987).

The court: held that the defendant1

expert's "corrosion fatique entrapment1* testimony was -new
that the plaintiff had no cause or duty to go forward ixt
case in chief and negate that testimony, and that the
district court's exclusion of the plaintiff's proffered
rebuttal testimony was improper and prejudicial. Xi. The:
court revere #

and remanded the cause.

Witness Nakling's proffered testimony was clearly
proper rebuttal

evidence that should have been admitted trfl

the trial court- See Barton. 617 P.2d 347, 349 (Utah 198(1
It wa* offered tcr refute Nelson* s testimony that the stot*
sign, m s obstructed, and to controvert the testimony

af

Nelson's expert, who testified that, due to the obstructs
Nelson could not reasonably have been aware that she neeg
to stop.

Nelson and her expert's testimony was
-25-
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miquestionably "new" evidence which Turner was under no
obligation to anticipate and negate in her case in chief.
pnririauez, 780 F.2d at 496. Moreover, it is undisputed that
the substance of Nakling's testimony had not adequately been
presented to the jury prior to Nelson's case in chief. See
j^.; see also

Everett v. S.H. Parks S Associates, Inc., 697

F.2d 250, 252 (8th Cir. 1983)(plaintiff•s rebuttal evidence
-was not truly relevant until [defendant] presented its
defense"). Turner was thus effectively prevented from
offering any evidence

that the sign was not: obstructed. The

trial court: abused its discretion by prohibiting Nakling
from testifying.
Nelson's obstruction testimony was not the only "new"
bit of evidence faced by Turner at trial. The presence of
the City as a "ghost- tortfeasor, made known to Turner
minutes before

opening

statements,

just

constituted "new"

evidence of monstrous dimensions. The entire thrust of
Nelson's case changed Irom contesting her own negligence to
proving the alleged negligence of Salt Lake City, without
the City present to respond to or defend those allegations.
Turner was required to respond not just to new evidence,
to ney iamm* raised against a nev

but

party.

Moreover, the admission, of Nakling's testimony would
have caused no demonstrable prejudice to Nelson. Turner's
counsel offered to continue the trial or to allow Nelson to
depose Nakling at her convenience in order to prepare crossexamination. See State v. Albretsen. 782 P.2d 515, 519 (Utah
-26-
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1989)(Additions to the witness list should be permitted
where good cause is shown.

"[G]ood cause must certainly be

construed to include . . . evidentiary matters developed
during the presentation of the case of either party, mattera
which require clarification or rebuttal by that party").
Nelson further could not have been prejudiced by the
nature

of Nakling's testimony.

Nelson presented two

witnesses who testified that the sign was obstructed.
Nakling's testimony simply controverted Nelson's witnesses,
and clearly went to the weight, not the admissibility, of
the evidence.

The jury should have been permitted to heai

both sides of the story*
Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the
court's denial of Turner's rebuttal evidence was manifestl
unfair and patently prejudicial, and constituted a clear
abuse of discretion.

The court's ruling should be reversed

and the case should be remanded for a new trial.

For the foregoing* reasons, Turner respectfully request
that the trial court's rulings be reversed, and that the
case be remanded for a new trial consistent with. Utah. Codsi
Ana- §> 78-27-41 and the case law cited herein •
Respectfully submitted,
SCALLET & READING
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Id.
The jury's verdict

is probably the best evidence of the

prejudice caused by the addition of the City the day of trial.
Nelson would seemingly have the Court believe that it was the £it^/
not Nelson, who ran the stop sign and broadsided Turner.
court properly
apportioned

Had the

refused to add the City, the jury would have-

fault

solely

between

Turner

and

Nelson.

it is

indisputable that, under the facts presented at trial, Nelson would,
have borne a substantial percentage, if not the entirety, of the
liability for Turner's damages.

The prejudice to Turner is clears

and unequivocal.
Because the jury below was prevented from reaching the issue
of whether Turner was in any way negligent, the Court should
reverse the trial court and grant Turner a new trial in which the
jury

can

apportion

negligence

between

the plaintiff

and the

tortfeasor who participated in the trial, Turner and Nelson.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT REBUTTAL TESTIMONY WAS
PREJUDICIAL ERROR
_
Nelson's reliance upon the principle of "surprise" as a ground

for refusing Turner's proffered rebuttal evidence is indeed curious
and ironic.

The pot has called the proverbial kettle "black."

Contrary to Nelson's assertions, Turner was not required in
her case in chief to prove that the stop sign was "unobstructed
Turner was re<juired to prove that Nelson ran a stop sign, and that
Nelson's negligence was the proximate cause of Turner's injuries
In Rodriguez v. Qlin Corp.. 780 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1986), the FiftM
Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out that a plaintiff only bears
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harden of proving a prima facie

case, and is not required to

the negative" of defendant's facts or theories:

te

This rule proceeds from the view that a plaintiff has the
right to adduce whatever evidence is necessary to establish
its prima facie case and is under no obligation to anticipate
Eand negate in its own case in chief any facts or theories that
jpay be raised on defense.
Record,

Kaczmarek v. Allied Chemical Corp., 836 F.2d 1055 (7th

11987); Soliz v. Ammerman. 395 P.2d 25 (Utah 1964) (Rebuttal
Ince

is designed

to meet

facts not raised prior to the

idant's case in chief, not facts which could

have been raised) .

*s decision, the court discussed the rules and considerations
rning the admission or denial of rebuttal testimony. The court
that rebuttal evidence should be allowed where "new" testimony
resented during defendant's case in chief.

The court stated

lLogic and fairness lead us to conclude that new evidence for
^purposes of rebuttal does not mean "brand new."
Rather,
^evidence is new if, under all the facts and circumstances, the
court concludes that the evidence was not fairly and
adequately presented to the trier of fact before the
defendant's case in chief.
&t 496.
Witness Nakling's proffered testimony was clearly proper
Hfttal evidence that should have been admitted by the trial
^t.
P

it was offered to refute Nelson's testimony that the stop

was obstructed, and to controvert the testimony of Nelson's

E|*t, who testified that, due to the obstruction, Nelson could
^reasonably have been aware that-she needed to stop. Nelson and
^expert's testimony was unquestionably
gter w a s

uncier

"newH evidence which

no obligation to anticipate and negate in her case

-14-
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in chief. Rodriguez. 780 F.2d at 496.

The fact that Nakling was

not included on pretrial Turner's witness list is irrelevant in the
context of rebuttal.
Moreover, it is undisputed that the substance of Nakling1s
testimony had not adequately been presented to the jury prior to
Nelson's case in chief. See id.; see also

Everett v. S.H. Parks &

Associates, Inc., 697 F.2d 250, 252 (8th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff • s
rebuttal

evidence

"was

not

truly

relevant

until

[defendant]

presented its defense").

Turner was thus effectively prevented

from offering any evidence

that the sign was not obstructed.

The

trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Nakling from
testifying.
Finally, Nelson states in her Brief that
The Rules of Civil Procedure as adopted in Utah and mosTM
states of the United States are intended to provide each party
with full access to the other's case to avoid surprises at
trial.
To allow one side to use a witness that was not
revealed . . . jeopardizes the other party's trial preparation
and should not be permitted.
Nelson's Brief, at 24. We could not have said it better. Had both
parties to this appeal been accorded the fairness embodied in this;
paragraph, this case would not be before the Court.

For th» foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth ii?
Turner's Brief in Chief, Turner respectfully requests that th*
Court reverse and remand this case with instructions to gran*
Turner a new trial as to all issues.
Respectfully submitted,
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Defendant,

by

and

through

his

attorney

of

record,

respectively submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for New Trial and Other Relief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This claim arose over a rear-end auto collision

between Plaintiff and Defendant.
2»

Before trial,'Defendant/formally filed a Designation

of Expert Witnesses identifying Newell Knight on January 2, 1996.
(See Partial Trial Transcript ("Transcript") at 60, attached hereto
and incorporated herein as Exhibit 1).
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3.
Knight,

and

Plaintiff

failed to take the deposition of Mr.

additionally

failed

interrogatories from Mr, Knight.
4.

Plaintiff's

to

obtain

any

answers

to

See Transcript at 60.

counsel

was

aware

that

Defendant's

expert, Newell Knight, would testify that Defendant's vehicle was
traveling about three to four miles per hour at impact.

See

Transcript at 60.
5.

Plaintiff

failed

to

call

any

expert

witnesses

regarding the speed of the collision in her case in chief.
6.

Defendant

moved

to

exclude

Plaintiff's

expert

witnesses from rebuttal because Plaintiff could have reasonably
anticipated Defendant's evidence before trial.
7.

The

Court

granted

Plaintiff's rebuttal witnesses.
8.

Defendant's

motion

to

deny

Transcript at 76.

In granting Defendant's motion, the Court ruled that

such evidence was inappropriate for rebuttal because it could have
/ been reasonably anticipated before trial.

The Court reviewed the

recent case of Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994), in
arriving at its decision.

(See Transcript, Page 75-76).

2
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ARGUMENT
POINT I; THE COURT MADE NO ERROR IN PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF'S
RESERVE WITNESSES FROM REBUTTAL BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO
ORDERLY PRESENT HIS EVIDENCE
The Court appropriately excluded Plaintiff from putting
on her prima facia case in rebuttal. After the defense rested its
case, the Court asked Plaintiff's counsel to explain the reasons
why it had not called its expert witnesses in its case in chief.
Transcript at 58.
matter

Plaintiff's counsel responded that

of the shift of the burden of proof," and

lf

[i]t is a
spoke of

Defendant's responsibility of carrying its "burden of proof."
Transcript at 58-59.

Plaintiff's assertion, however, is a false

statement under Utah law.

Plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of

proof and must establish a prima facia case in a negligence action.
Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., Inc., 821 P.2d 458, 462 (Utah App. 1991).
The burden of proof rested with Plaintiff at all times in the
instant case. Hence, Plaintiff was unable to proffer a legitimate
reason for not calling his expert witnesses during Plaintiff's case
in chief.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that Plaintiff's delay in
withholding his expert witnessess until rebuttal was a poor trial
maneuver.

The Court stated the following:

3

If you knew that [low speed] was going to be
an issue in this case, then it is your
responsibility to present that in your case in
chief, not present half your case at the
beginning, and the other half at the
conclusion of the defense case.
Transcript at 62 (emphasis added).

Plaintiff's counsel readily

admitted that although he failed to depose Mr. Knight, he had
nonetheless

anticipated

the

exact

content

of

his

testimony.

Transcript at 60. Justice requires that counsel be held liable for
the consequences of his trial tactics.

The Court further noted

that Plaintiff failed to comply with the time-honored principle of
the orderly presentation of the evidence:
[T]he Court is of the opinion that you simply
cannot sandwich the defense with testimony
that you have known and anticipated right from
the beginning, and hope to maybe get the last
word in.
Transcript at 69 (emphasis added).

Hence, Plaintiff's rebuttal

evidence was properly excluded.
POINT II; NO GROUNDS EXIST TO WARRANT A NEW TRIAL
Although the trial court has broad discretion to grant or
deny a motion for a new trial, Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch. , 817
P.2d 789 (Utah 1991), the Supreme Court has explained on numerous
occasions that such discretion should only be exercised with great
forbearance.

Bigler v. Mapleton Irrigation Canal Co. , 669 P.2d

434, 436 (Utah 1983) ("A jury verdict must stand unless there is no
competent evidence to support it."); Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d
4
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530, 532 (Utah 1984) ("The power of a trial judge to order a new
trial is to be used only in [] rare cases.").

Thus, the Utah

Supreme Court has clearly explained that a very high standard must
be met before a party should be granted a motion for a new trial.
A trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial
absent a showing of one of the grounds specified in Rule 59, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
1962).

Tanaaro v. Marrero, 373 P.2d 390 (Utah

Plaintiff's Memorandum In Support of Motion for New Trial

or Other Relief ("Memorandum In Support") fails to establish that
the Court's rulings constitute either an abuse of discretion
preventing a fair trial, or an error in law. See Rule 59(a), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court, therefore, has no discretion
to grant a new trial in this case because Plaintiff has failed to
show that at least one of the circumstances in Rule 59(a) is met.
See Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. Ultrasvstems W. Contractors, Inc., 767
P.2d

125 (Utah App. 1988); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84

(Utah App. 1989).
In the instant case, the Court acted within its sound
discretion

and determined

appropriate for /rebuttal.

that

Plaintiff's

evidence

was not

It is an elementary notion that a

Plaintiff must sustain his burden of proof for negligence and
proximate cause during the case in chief.

See Ames v. Ames, 846

P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993) (noting that the Utah Supreme Court
5
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recognizes Plaintiff's burden of proof with regards to negligence
and proximate cause) .

The Court in the instant case was very

specific in its reasoning for exclusion:
It defies reason that any of [Defendant's
expert] testimony would come as a surprise to
the Plaintiff.
It was known or reasonably
could have been known. It was anticipated.
It was not a surprise.
And it is a
requirement that the burden of proof be met
showing that the accident, as it was alleged
by the Plaintiff, occurred from a high-speed
collision, that is 10 or 15 or 20 miles an
hour, that substantial damage would have been
caused, and that resulting injury could have
occurred.
And the Court
finds that
it
is not
appropriate, when those matters are part of
the Plaintiff's case in chief, and do not come
as a surprise in any way to the Plaintiff,
that it is inappropriate to sandwich the
Defendant's case with the Plaintiff's case on
matters that could and should have been
presented in the case in chief.
Transcript at 75-76
within

its

sound

(emphasis added).

discretion

Hence, the Court acted

in determining

that

Plaintiff's

rebuttal witnesses should be excluded because Plaintiff "knew or
should have reasonably anticipated" that Defendant would claim that
her vehicle was travelling only three or four miles an hour.

See

Turner v. Nelson. 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994).
Additionally, Plaintiff has the burden of showing not
only that an error occurred, but that such error was "substantial
and prejudicial."

Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987).
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Plaintiff has failed to show first that an error even occurred, and
second, that such an error was anything more than harmless.
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

See

Indeed, motions for new a

trial should only be granted in situations where the court made an
erroneous finding, or where there is "substantial doubt" that the
issues were fairly tried.
P.2d 290 (Utah 1964).

Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 391

Neither situation is applicable here.

In

the instant action, Plaintiff had a full opportunity to meet her
prima facia burden of production in her case in chief.
Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and Other Relief should
also be denied because it fails to show that a different verdict
would have resulted absent the Court's ruling.
417 P. 2d 664 (Utah 1966).

Hall v. Blackman,

In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has

stated that every reasonable presumption in favor of the validity
of a verdict must be taken as true on appeal. Leigh Furn. & Carpet
Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982).
Lastly, Plaintiff failed to produce a single authority
supporting her notions that the Court committed prejudicial error
in

excluding

examinatioru

her

expert

witnesses

during

Plaintiff's

cross-

Despite Plaintiff's contention about his inability to

effectively cross-examine without them, the transcript reveals that
Plaintiff took a recess in order to consult with his "experts" in
preparation for his cross-examination of Mr. Knight. Transcript at
7

C f. li ? 1 3

37-38.

After the recess, Plaintiff's counsel proceeded to conduct

a very extensive and pointed cross-examination of Mr. Knight,
Plaintiff's contention of prejudicial error simply has no merit.
POINT III: DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY DID NOT VIOLATE ANY ETHICAL
RULES AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS IS WHOLLY
WITHOUT MERIT
One of

Defendant's

counsel, John Hansen, moved

for

Plaintiff's rebuttal witnesses to be excluded because Defendant's
evidence could have been "reasonably anticipated" before trial, and
therefore should have been presented in Plaintiff's case in chief.
Attorney Hansen presented a good faith argument to the Court that
Plaintiff's

rebuttal

witnesses

should

be

excluded

under

the

authority of Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994) ("[T]he
record seems to support [Defendant's] assertion that [Plaintiff]
knew or should have reasonably anticipated that [Defendant] would
claim that the sign was obstructed.").

Furthermore, Mr. Hansen

drew the Court's attention to the fact that striking similarities
existed between the two cases because both Plaintiffs failed to
depose Defendant's expert witness and later attempted to call
rebuttal

witnesses

concerning

issues

that

presented in their respective cases in chief.

should

have

been

Such an analogy is

applicable to the argument that Plaintiff's rebuttal evidence
should be excluded for failure to anticipate Defendant's evidence.

8
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Defendant
inapplicable.
the

Turner

counter-argued

at

trial

that

Turner

was

Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to distinguish

holding

from

the

instant

facts

by

arguing

that

Plaintiff's witnesses should not be excluded because they were not
"surprise" witnesses.
The

Court

See Transcript at 62-64,
disagreed

with

Plaintiff's

analysis

and

determined that it would not allow Plaintiff to "lay back in the
bushes" in an attempt to have the "last word."

See Transcript at

66, 69.
Plaintiff has further charged that Mr. Hansen is guilty
of misconduct for making a "deliberate misstatement of law" and is
therefore subject to Rule 11 sanctions. See Memorandum in Support
at 18.

Plaintiff further contends that "the Court misread the

fTurner 1 decision and agreed with defense counsel's interpretation
of it."

Memorandum in Support at 14.

Plaintiff is incorrect on

both accounts.
First, attorney Hansen made a good faith argument that
the 1994 Turner decision created a new standard for rebuttal
witnesses in Utah.

Plaintiff contends that Mr. Hansen is an

"expert" on Turner and should be sanctioned for his argument.
Memorandum in Support at 17-19.

See

Although Mr. Hansen explained to

the Court that he was on the losing side in Turner, this fact alone
does not place him on a "heightened" level of professional conduct.
9

Plaintiff's ethical charges are extremely serious and ought not be
made merely because one receives an unfavorable verdict at trial.
The comments to Rule 3.3, Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct, explain the relevant standard for ethical conduct:
[A]n assertion supporting to be on the
lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by
the lawyer or in a statement in open court,
may properly be made only when the lawyer
knows the assertion is true or believes it to
be true on the basis of reasonably diligent
inquiry,
(emphasis added).

Mr. Hansen not only believed his statements to

be true when he made them, but he still believes that Turner
supports his argument.

As such, Mr. Hansen is not subject to

discipline for violating the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
Second, Rule 11 sanctions are only appropriate for signed
documents submitted to trie Court in violation of the rule. Jesche
v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah App. 1991).

By the Plaintiff's own

admission, Rule 11 is inapplicable to the instant facts.

See

Memorandum in Support at 19.
Lastly, the partial transcript only reveals that it was
Mr. Hansen agreeing with the Court's opinion on Turner, not the
other way around as Plaintiff has charged.

Transcript at 71 ("Let

me indicate that I think the Court's reading of Turner v. Nelson is
exactly correct.").

10
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, Defendant respectfully
requests that the Court deny Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and
Other Relief.

. C?4*
DATED t h i s

/

d a y of A p r i l , 1 9 9 6 .
SCALirf^i & J A D I N G

Jas

oMi^Edward Hansen
torney for Defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the *7'

day of April, 1996, I

mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and Other Relief to
the following:
Samuel King, Esq.
David J. Friel, Esq.
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

Paul S. Felt
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
79 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 8414 5
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LYNN B. ASTILL,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 950902307 PI
Honorable Pat B. Brian

LEESHA CLARK,

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT

Defendant.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Salt Lake City, Utah
February 8, 1996

BRAD J. YOUNG
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

confidence in your opinions with regard to the speed of those
vehicles?
A.

I have not.
MR. HANSEN:
MR. KING:
THE COURT:

Nothing further.
Nothing further.
Is there any objection to the witness

being excused?
MR. KING:
MR. HANSEN:

Not at all.
No objection.

THE COURT:

You may be excused.

MR. HANSEN:

The defense rests.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

The Court will speak with counsel for a

moment, on the record, out of the presence of the jury.

So the

bailiff will take the jury into the jury room, and there is a
question to be resolved out of the presence of the jury.
(The jury left the courtroom.)
THE COURT:

The record will reflect that the Court is

in session, out of the presence of the jury.

The Court was

notified prior to the defense resting in this case that the
plaintiff intended to call a rebuttal witness to the accident
reconstruction witness called by the defendant.

Explain to the

Court the reasons why the witness that you seek to call now was
not included in your case in chief.
MR. KING:
of proof, your Honor.

It is a matter of the shift of tne burden
We had the burden of proving there was
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1

an accident, and resulting from the accident there was an

2

injury.

3

sufficiently low speed, that the injury would probably not have

4

occurred.

5

how our case went.

6

case on, we may or may not need the expense of a rebuttal

7

witness.

8

Court and of the jury with rebuttal witness until they have

9

carried their burden of proof by showing they have a serious

The defense said they would prove that the impact was

They may not have put on that defense depending on
Depending on how effectively they put their

But we certainly don't need to take the time of the

10

challenge to our version of the facts.

11

the rebuttal witness, and that was what the rebuttal witness is

12

for, and this is the classic use of it.

13

At that point we called

If I could refer to the case they gave the Court of

14

Turner vs. Anderson.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. KING:

The Court has that case.
In my reading of it, the witness was

17

offered as a rebuttal witness.

The problem, and the sole

18

problem in the case was the witness1 name had not been given to

19

the other side in time for them to depose him or find out

20

anything about him.

21

rebutting witness, the Court had no complaint with that.

22

they complained about is that the need to call him could have

23

been anticipated earlier, and the other side given notice

24

earlier.

25

improper rebuttal witness.

The fact that he was offered as a

So inferentislly —

or else —

What

also, he is an

They didn't say that.

They said

59

you knew the issue.
put on.

You knew the rebuttal you were going to

And you didn't give them notice that you had a witness

to prove it.

The function of the rebuttal witness, our burden,

their burden, rebut, inferentially, it was entirely
appropriate.

So this case supports us, in view of the fact

they stipulate, gave full and timely notice that we would call,
possibly, Mr. Lord, a reconstruction expert, and, possibly,
mr. Hardle, who is a Taurus mechanic and repairman.
THE COURT:
MR. KING:

Did you depose Mr. Knight?
I did not, your Honor.

I have dealt with

him in court before.
THE COURT:

Were you aware of what he was going to

testify to?
MR. KING:

That he was going to put in the speed

around three to four n?"**' an hour.
THE COURT:
MR. KING:

When did you Vuow that?
I assumed that he was going to do that,

because it is what he customarily does.

It was confirmed when

I heard the opening statement.
THE COURT:

Prior to the jury being impaneled, what

date, in relation to the 6th of February of 1996, did you know
that Mr. Knight was going to testify for the defense, and when
his testimony would be?
MR. KING:

It would be around the 1st of January,

because our letter to them advised Mr. Lord would be our
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1

rebuttal witness is dated, I think, January 6.

2
3

MR. HANSEN:

designation of expert witnesses and identifying Newell Knight.

4

MR. KING:

5

MR. HANSEN:

6

MR. KING:

That was on January 2 he was formally

We, within four days, gave the response,

if Newell is going to be here, we are going to call Mr. Lord.

9
10

That sounds right.

identified.

7
8

We formally filed on January 2 a

THE COURT:

Is there some reason why you didn't call

him?

11

MR. KING:

Mr. Lord is here.

12

testify as my rebuttal witness.

13

THE COURT:

He is waiting to

Let the Court reason outloud for a moment

14

on the record, and then I will invite both counsel to respond.

15

The Court has been cited by both counsel to the case of Turner

16

vs. Nelson.

17

The holding in that case regarding the calling of rebuttal

18

witnesses centered on whether or not the evidence sought to be

19

rebutted could reasonably have been anticipated prior to trial.

20

If it could, then the witness should be called in the case in

21

chief.

22
23
24
25

It is a Supreme Court case decided March of 1994.

MR. KING:

No, your Honor, it is not what the case

said.
THE COURT:

Just a moment.

you are invited to argue.

Let me reason, and then

If the witness -- if the testimony
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1

that you are seeking to rebut could reasonably have been

2

anticipated before trial, put it in, in your case.

3

that the defense in this case was going to be that the accident

4

was low speed, is nonimpacting, noninjury causing, it is your

5

responsibility, knowing that, to present evidence in your case

6

in chief to establish that it was a high accident, high impact,

7

and injury causing.

8

the defendant's case involves.

9

to be an issue in this case, then it is your responsibility to

If you knew

That's precisely what the sandwiching of
If you knew that that was going

10

present that in your case in chief, not present half of your

11

case at the beginning, and the other half at the conclusion of

12

the defense case.

13

MR. KING:

14

Turner vs. Nelson in detail.

15

THE COURT:

The Court hasn't had a chance to study

That's probably a true statement.

You

16

realize that you gave me this case while the Court was in

17

session, and I have glanced at it as we have ruled on

18

objections and listened to the testimony of the witness.

19

at least the paragraph clearly states that if you could

20

anticipate certain witnesses to -- I mean certain evidence to

21

be presented, then why didn't you present evidence to the

22

contrary in your case in chief?

23

MR. KING:

But

What the case turns on, your Honor, is not

24

whether he was rebuttal witness or a direct witness.

25

case turned on was that he was a surprise witness.

0(
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THE COURT:

No.

It was whether or not he was listed.

That was one of the questions, whether or not he had been
listed as a witness.
4 I

MR. KING:

That was the sole ground for disposition.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. KING:

7

paragraphs 3 and 4.

8

undisclosed witness is necessary to rebut, the issue hinges on

9

whether the evidence sought to be rebutted could have

Not so.

Please take a look at page 1024,
"When the offering party contends that the

10

reasonably been anticipated."

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. KING:

13

That clearly is not so.

That's the Court's point.
That doesn't put him into the case as a

witness in chief.

14

THE COURT:

Read the next paragraph.

The next two

15

paragraphs^, as a matter of fact.

The trial court indicated

16

that the testimony regarding the obstructed stop sign was not

17

new.

18

were contending

The plaintiff had known for weeks and months that they
—

19

MR. KING:

20

THE COURT:

Indeed

—

Just a moment.

I will give you all the

21

time to argue.

22

court said you have known from the get-go that there was going

23

to be a question about whether or not this stop sign was

24 J obstructed.

You give me all the time to argue.

The trial

Nov;, you can't, with that knowledge, wait until

the defense has presented their case, go out the night of

0' '
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1

trial, get a witness, and bring him in and say that the stop

2

sign was not obstructed.

3

an issue all along.

4

have said that you didn't even bother to depose the

5

reconstruction witness, because you knew he was going to

6

testify that the speed of impact was three to four miles an

7

hour.

8

witness' testimony.

9

should properly prepare in your case in chief to deal with it.

You have known that was going to be

In this case, by your own admission, you

You can't claim that that was a surprise segment of this

10

MR. KING:

And if you have known that, then you

There isn't a single reference in this

11

opinion, Nelson vs. "Turner to —

12

should have been in the case in chief or rebuttal.

13

not the issue.

14

side.

15
16

Speed is not a factor.

17

that speed is a big factor.

19

That was

The issue was that he wasn't given to the other

Now, if I know —

18

whether the surprise witness

THE COURT:

I am going to put on my case.

They are going to put on their case
I rebut that by showing --

Speed has been a factor from the outset

in this case.

20

MR. KING:

This is rebuttal by definition, and it is

21

the only place in the orderly sequence of the case it should be

22

put on.

23

put it on.

24
25

I don't have to anticipate their defense until they

THE COURT:

But it is part of the case in chief.

You

are going to show high impact, high speed, and resulting
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injury, you have to prove it.

That's one of the elements of

your case.
MR. KING:

I never had to prove high speed.

prove a collision and an injury.

I had to

At any rate, if you will

please read the case again, it is solely because they didn't
give timely notice until the night of trial that they were
going to call this witness, not that he was a rebuttal witness.
From the defense presented, they could have ar.tirir^tcd they
would have had to call a rebuttal witness, they did not give
notice they were going to call the rebuttal witness until the
start of trial.
witness.

There was no objection to him being a rebuttal

The objection was no notice, as the opinion says, so

he couldn't have been deposed or —

and so forth.

There is not

a word in the opinion calling him as a rebuttal witness was
wrong.

You can anticipate a rebuttal witness is needed if the

other side is going to put on a defense.
is for.

That's what rebuttal

What we have to do, if we know we are going to put a

rebuttal witness in, we have to give them time to prepare.
I try a case against General Motors, and I say the
fuel tank was defective.

Then they bring in a bunch of

witnesses that the fuel tank —
THE COURT:
MR. KING:
approaches to it.

Was not defective?
They come up with new ideas, new

Until they have done that, their battery of

experts, I don't know exactly what to rebut.

What I do know is
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1

I have to rebut, and I give the name of the expert I am going

2

to call to rebut.

3

THE COURT:

What you do know is it is your

4 I responsibility to prove a defective fuel tank.

You know that

5

right from the get-go.

So you have to prove it in your case in

6

chief.

7

defense has presented its case, and then sandwich the defense

8

case in with what should have been presented in your case in

9

chief.

You can't lay back in the bushes and wait until the

That's a time-honored principle of the orderly

10

presentation of the evidence.

11

MR. KING:

Okay.

When I tried a case of that kind,

12

the defense General Motors put in, Ford actually, was the

13

people would have died anyway, because the accident was severe.

14

They didn't worry about whether the tank was adequate or not.

15

When I realized they were coming into this new defense, because

16

of the character of the witnesses they called, and associate

17

counsel who had worked with Ford before said these guys will

18

say these guys would have died anyway, then we put in our

19

rebuttal witnesses.

20

in chief, but we did have to prove it in our rebuttal.

21

Rebuttal is a proper part of trial.

22
23

THE COURT:

We didn't have to prove that in our case

It is if there is some element of

surprise.

24

MR. KING:

25

THE COURT:

It is not the element of surprise.
That is what this opinion says.

oc.rr.1
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1

MR. KING:

It doesn't.

It says the whole problem is

2

that she knew she needed a rebuttal witness, and so she should

3

have told them.

4

trial, she couldn't call the witness.

5

When she didn't tell them until the day of

THE COURT:

Let's read the next paragraph.

The trial

6

court indicated that the testimony regarding the obstructed

7

sign was not new.

8

that had been injected into the trial during the defense of the

9

case.

It wasn't a surprise.

It wasn't something

Everybody knew by the pleadings and by discovery and so

10

on that that was challenged by the defense, that the sign was

11

obstructed.

12

"Therefore, Nelson's essential defense had always been that the

13

sign was obstructed, and although the trial court didn't

14

specifically say that Turner could reasonably have anticipated

15

that testimony, the thrust of the Court's ruling is clear.

16

Nelson's evidencp /TBS foreseeable."

17

that they were going to challenge

18

It was not a new factor.

MR. KING:

And the Court says,

And it is foreseeable here

—

But there is not a line in here that says

19

Nelson wouldn't have been an appropriate rebuttal witness.

20

thing is they didn't give notice of him at all until the third

21

day of trial.

22

ours, they put on theirs, we rebut.

23

respond, rebut.

24
25

The

The proper sequence in the case is we put on

THE COURT:

Just like debate.

Open,

Perhaps the better analogy is you have

the burden of proof, and in your case in chief you are well
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1

advised to prove what you intend to prove.

2

case, the Court understood that you were going to prove that

3

this accident was caused by a 10- to a 15-mile-an-hour impact

4

or 15- to 25-mile-an-hour impact, and, because of that, the

5

plaintiff sustained injury.

6

MR. KING:

In this particular

You need to prove that.

I didn't have —

I didn't care what speed

7

was testified to.

8

and so forth, I said those are approximations.

9

acknowledged that.

10

When she talked about speed and measurements
She

She said it was at least ten miles an hour.

But ten miles was not vital to our case.

11

THE COURT:

It is three times the amount of the

12

anticipated testimony of the defense expert.

13

have known all along he was going to estimate this speed at

14

three to four miles an hour, even if you went at ten miles an

15

hour.

16
17

MR. KING:

20

Supposing they decided not to call

Mr. Knight.

18
19

You said that you

THE COURT:

It would have been a plus for you,

probably.
MR. KING:

Possibly.

But the thing is I don't have

21

to put on testimony that speed is a factor in the injury until

22

they put on testimony that it is not.

23

THE COURT:

I don't think -- this Court has never

24

operated on that basis.

Having tried over 200 jury trials in a

25

criminal arena, it would be highly imprudent for a prosecutor
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to present evidence that somebody was shot, and not put any
evidence in until the gun —

about the gun until rebuttal,

hoping that somebody is going to challenge the shooting.
MR. KING:

I agree with that entirely.

It is this is

a totally different concept.
THE COURT:
MR. KING:

It is, but the principle is the same.
It is not, because in a criminal defense

they don't have to put on a defense at all, and you are
obligated to advise them of everything you have.
THE COURT:
civil defense.

You don't have to put anything on in a

They could have rested at the conclusion of

your case, sent it to the jury, and let the jury do what they
want to.
MR. KING:

They might have come up with 15 other

theories.
THE COURT:

What they might have done and what they

in fact did do are worlds apart, and the Court is of the
opinion that you simply cannot sandwich the defense with
testimony that you have known and anticipated right from the
beginning, and hope to maybe get the last word in.

I don't

know what it is.
MR. KING:

I didn't know what to have Mr. Lord say

until I heard exactly what Mr. Knight said and exactly the
bases that he used.
THE COURT:

I couldn't use Mr. Lord in advance.
Proffer what this witness is going to
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1

testify to.

2

MR. KING:

The essential thing I am going to have

3

Mr. Lord work on is something I couldn't anticipate Mr. Knight

4

would say.

5

striking car was less exposed to harm, or more exposed to harm,

6

than the body of the person in the struck car.

Mr. Knight said that the body of the woman in the

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. KING:

9

Do you want him to testify to that?
I didn't know he was —

Mr. Lord will

testify that when your head moves back a few inches, this can

10

cause substantial damage, based on a tremendous amount of

11

experience he has.

12

THE COURT:

If that's what you are going to call your

13

rebuttal witness for, I will permit you.

14

argument.

15

you couldn't reasonably anticipate that, because the driver of

16

the striking car was leaning into the passenger's seat, and,

17

therefore, was more vulnerable to injury than the driver of the

18

car that was struck, you can call the witness and testify to

19

that.

20

You have won trie

If you are going to call this witness and say that

What else?
MR. KING:

Just on the same line, he said the person

21

in the car struck,

22

when I cover that topic, vulnerability to injury being struck.

23
24
25

eing in the seat, would not be injured.

MR. HANSEN:

So

I think that's going to open the whole

flood gates, if I may respond very briefly.
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

You had no opportunity.
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1

what time you like and respond.

2

MR. HANSEN:

Having been counsel for Plaintiff in

3

Turner vs. Nelson --

4

THE COURT:

Were you on the winning or losing side of

MR. HANSEN:

I was on the side that tried to present

5
6

that?

7

the new witness.

I was on the losing side.

We briefed this

8

before the Supreme Court.

9

positions of the parties and the underlying facts.

So I well know the arguments and the
Let me

10

indicate that I think the Court's reading of Turner vs. Nelson

11

is exactly correct, even though the Court hasn't had a lot of

12

time to look at that case.

13

that are extremely striking here.

14

And there are some similarities

And one is the fact that as the Court has said, the

15

critical issue is whether or not they could reasonably

16

anticipate the issue to be raised at trial.

17

surprise in Turner vs. Nelson, saying there was certain

18

testimony that came out in opening statement, that we didn't

19

anticipate, so we went and found this new witness.

20

Court said, "Wait a minute.

21

was known from the time the complaint was answered, and it was

22

denied, and the time the defendant's deposition was taken."

23

Same thing in this case.

24

deposed, and she says, "This was a rolling accident.

25

not a high-speed collision."

We tried to claim

And the

The issue of obstructed stop sign

May of 1995.

Our defendant is
This was

The dispute was before them.

- r
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They never sent discovery requests to the defendant.
When we identified Newell .Knight, they didn't ask, in formal
discovery, what will Mr. Newell Knight testify to?
asked to take his deposition.

They never

And in that Turner vs. Nelson

case, on page 1025, the Supreme Court chided Plaintiff's
counsel, stating that they did not take the depositions that
they properly should have taken.

In fact, the record suggests,

if Turner failed to appreciate the extent of Nelson's reliance
on this defense, it was probably because of Turner's earlier
failure to depose adequately several witnesses.

Nelson's

counsel had listed certain witnesses on their designation of
witnesses, and had made them available for deposition.

Turner,

the plaintiff, took no attempt to depose the expert or, as far
as we can tell from the record, determine through written
interrogatories the cortc

\ of that testimony.

That's what Plaintiff has done here, and I don't
think they should be allowed to now come in and put on their
prima facie case in rebuttal, when it could have been
reasonably anticipated, and should have been.
THE COURT:

Someplace in law school and thereafter

the Court learned that rebuttal testimony was testimony to
rebut a surprise witness, a surprise element of the case. I
don't know if there is any sound argument to the contrary.

Why

would it be rebuttal if the element of surprise is not there,
if you can anticipate, reasonably anticipate, and in your case

C f. 0 ° ? ?
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know for a certainty that the speed was going to be challenged
in this case, and that the resulting injury was going to be
challenged, why not present that in your case in chief?

I just

can't think of one good reason why.
MR. KING:

Mr. Knight came up —

Mr. Knight is not my

favorite.
THE COURT:
going to say.

Aside from that, you knew what he was

Or if you didn't, you reasonably could

anticipate.
MR. KING:

I made the comment for a reason, and the

reason is that I think Mr. Knight is one of these people, and
this is just my opinion of him, that will say what he has to
say in order to get where he wants to go.
THE COURT:
MR. KING:

You are entitled to your opinion on that.
It makes it impossible for me to

anticipate what Newell is going to say until he has said it,
because I haven't found he bases his testimony on scientific
data, but on what's going to work for a given problem.

I could

not anticipate exactly what he is going to say until he said
it, even though I know the generalities of it.

For example, he

also testified that the bumper would have been deformed if it
had been hit over a few miles an hour, and it would have been
torn.
Now, on the other witness we have, Mr. Hardle, that's
total surprise, is out in the hall with the Taurus bumper
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1

that's not damaged a bit, and it was in a much higher speed

2

impact, which would show that Mr. Knight's testimony on that

3

area" is in error, and that was total surprise we couldn't

4

anticipate.

5

rebuttal.

6

they put on their case, then we rebut their case.

7

not a factor.

8
9

Again, surprise is not the element of purpose of

Purpose of rebuttal is we put on our case in chief,

THE COURT:

Supprise is

Are you saying that everything that they

have testified to in the defense you have the right to rebut?

10

MR. KING:

I wouldn't --

11

THE COURT:. Then where does surrebuttal come in?

12

MR. KING:

13

THE COURT:

On occasion it comes up.
Where does the process start and end?

14

And in this case, if the Court was of the opinion that this

15

witness caught you off guard, that this witness said something

16

that you totally had not expected he was going to say, or that

17

just came out of the blue, the proverbial blue, and stiuck you,

18

a rebuttal witness is appropriate.

19

the Court that you knew exactly he was going to testify to a

20

low-impact collision, very low speed, and, in his opinion,

21

there would not be any significant injury.

22

MR. KING:

Right.

But you have represented to

He did testify in those areas.

23

When he went further and said, had there been any more speed,

24

the Taurus bumper would be permanently deformed, and when he

25

said the position plaintiff was in, in her vehicle, she would
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not be hurt, because she was protected, these were new areas we
didn't anticipate.

Mr. Lord can handle the injury and

Mr. Hardle can handle the bumper.
THE COURT: Anything further?
MR. HANSEN:
THE COURT:

We will submit it.
The Court finds and rules as follows:

The plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known and
anticipated that the defense was going to challenge the
testimony of the plaintiff.

The knowledge is based on the

photographs of both vehicles, the back bumper of the
plaintiff's vehicle, the front bumper of the defendant's
vehicle.

The photograph is based on the absence of skid

marks -- or the findings, rather, are based on the absence of
skid marks, the findings are based on the absence of any
significant movement of the plaintiff's vehicle after the
striking, and the findings are based on the lack of any injury
to the driver of the striking car.
It defies reason that any of that testimony would
ccr.£ £.s a surprise to the plaintiff.
reasonably could have been known.
not a surprise.

It was known or

It was anticipated.

It was

And it is a requirement that the burden of

proof be met showing that the accident, as it was alleged by
the plaintiff, occurred from a high-speed collision, that is 10
or 15 or 20 miles an hour, that substantial damage would have
been caused, and that resulting injury could have occurred.
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1

And the Court finds that it is not appropriate, when those

2

matters are part of the plaintiff!s case in chief, and do not

3

come as a surprise in any way, to the plaintiff, that it is

4

inappropriate to sandwich the defendant's case with the

5

plaintiff's case on matters that could and should have been

6

presented in the case in chief.

7

Therefore, based on the proffers made by Plaintiff's

8

counsel, on what rebuttal witnesses will testify to, if called,

9

the motion to deny those witnesses testifying as rebuttal

10
11

witnesses is granted.
MR. KING:

Your Honor, I understand the ruling in

12

general, but the surprise elements that Mr. Knight said the

13

bumper would deform, that we could not anticipate, and Mr.

14

Hardle is here with the bumper.

15

specific point?

16

where you are in the passenger seat, as the car gains momentum

17

underneath you, it exaggerates the motion to the head, and this

18

makes you very prone to injury.

19

MR. HANSEN:

20
21

May I call him on that

I can call Mr. Lord on the specific point of

I think Plaintiff is trying to reargue

his motion.
THE COURT:

Counsel for the defendant will prepare

22

very specific findings on this motion in limine, and an

23

accompanying order, and at some time in the next two to three

24

weeks submit the findings to opposing counsel for approval as

25

to form, and the findings and the order to the Court for
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1

signature, so the record is clear.

2

challenge the Court's finding, that's why we have an appellate

3

court,

4

MR. KING:

And if somebody wants to

If the record may show my exceptions to

5

the ruling of the Court, with the -- we have no rebuttal.

6

Defendant rested?

7

MR. FELT:

8

THE COURT:

9

Has

Yes,
Yes, the defense rested, and that's when

the Court excused the jury, and then we had the motion in

10 I limine,
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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C E R T I F I C A T E
I, BRAD J. YOUNG, hereby certify that I attended and
reported, as official court reporter, the proceedings in the
above-entitled and numbered matter before the Honorable Pat B.
Brian and that the foregoing is a true and correct transcription
of my stenographic notes thereof.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 29th day of March, 1996.

BRAD J. Y0U&"!
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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ADDENDUM "N"

^ O O I S T S J C T COURT
' w d Judicial District

dPR 1 6 1996
JOHN EDWARD HANSEN, #4 5 90
SCALLEY Sc READING
Attorneys for Defendant
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone*: (801) 531-7870
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LYNN B. ASTILL,

:

Plaintiff,

,

vs.
LEESHA CLARK,

,

Defendant.

FINDINGS OR FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:
:

Civil No. 950902307PI

:

Judge Pat Brian

:

Jury trial in the above-captioned matter was held on
February 6-8, 1996, the Honorable Pat Brian presiding.

David J.

Friel of King, Friel & Colton appeared on behalf of Plaintiff.
Paul S. Felt of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker and John E. Hansen of
Scalley & Reading

appeared on behalf of Defendant.

During the

course of the trial, Defendant objected to the Plaintiff's calling
of two rebuttal witnesses after the close of Defendant's case. The
Court, having rendered its decision after considering each parties'
respective arguments, now makes and enters the following Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

C \JEH\CLIENTS\CLARK FOF

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about June 6, 1994, a rear-end automobile

collision occurred between Plaintiff and Defendant.
2.

Defendant's deposition was taken on May 24, 1995,

during which she testified that she was travelling at a low speed
when she collided with Plaintiff.
3.

The Court held a Scheduling Conference on September

14, 1995 at which time the Court ordered Plaintiff to identify her
witnesses by November

15, 1996.

A Court Order was entered

thereafter v/hich so stated.
4.

On November

15, 1996, Plaintiff

identified

her

witnesses, including:
"6.

West Valley Auto Body
a.

Plaintiff's husband took her vehicle to this
shop for a damage estimate.

b.

Plaintiff's counsel will provide the name of
this mechanic as soon as possible."

6.

On January 2, 1996, over a month before trial,

Defendant formally identified Newell Knight as an expert witness in
Defendant's Designation of Expert Witnesses.
7.

Plaintiff failed to take Mr. Knight's deposition or

to obtain any other form of discovery from Mr. Knight, including
Answers to Interrogatories.
C \JEH\CLIENTS\CLARK.FOF
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8.

Plaintiff

thereafter

submitted

a

letter

to

Defendant's counsel wherein she supplemented her witness list to
include "David Lord either as a direct or rebuttal witness."
9.

At trial, Plaintiff

failed to call any expert

witnesses during her case in chief to establish the speed of the
collision between Plaintiff and Defendant.
10.

Defendant's expert, Mr. Knight, testified at trial

that the Defendant's speed at the time of collision was three to
four miles per hour.

Mr. Knight based his conclusions on the

photographs of the vehicle's bumpers, the lack of movement of
Plaintiff's vehicle, the absence of any skid marks and the absence
of any injury to Defendant resulting from the collision.
11.
attempted

to

After
call

the defense
expert

rested

witnesses

its

David

case, Plaintiff
Lord

(accident

reconstructionist) and Mr. Hardle (a mechanic) to testify for the
first time in rebuttal.
12.

Plaintiff's counsel knew before trial that the

defense was going to challenge Plaintiff's account of speed of the
accident and assumed that Defendant's expert, Newell Knight, "was
going to put the speed around three to four miles an hour."
Partial

Trial

Transcript

at

68.

This

was

confirmed

Plaintiff's counsel heard Defendant's opening statement.

C:\JEH\CLIENTS\CLARK.FOF
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The speed of Defendant's vehicle has been an issue

since the beginning of this litigation and Plaintiff could have and
should have reasonably anticipated Defendant's evidence before
trial and could have and should have called her expert witness in
her case in chief to meet Plaintiff's prima facia burden.
2.

Plaintiff's expert witnesses

should be and are

excluded from testifying in rebuttal because Plaintiff improperly
withheld them until after the defense rested.
DATED this

\

v

day of April, 1996
BY THE COURT:

-r
^ 7 — ^ (/
Honorable Pat Bri
District Court Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

April, 1996, I

mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law to the following:
Samuel King, Esq.
David J. Friel, Esq.
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Paul S. Felt, Esq.
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
79 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
C \JEH\CLIENTS\CLARK FOP
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John Edward Hansen, Esq.
Scalley & Reading
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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ADDENDUM "O

SAMUEL KING, No. 1820
DAVID FRIEL, No. 6225
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (801) 486-3751
Facsimile: (801) 486-3753

.xj

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LYNN B. ASTILL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LEESHA CLARK,
Defendant.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

PLAINTIFF'S REPL^ TO DEFENDANT'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION

Case No. 950902307PI
Judge: Pat Brian

OVERVIEW
Justice Zimmerman recently said lawyers are expected to play
hardball, but could not play lowball.
Trial counsel fight hard to win.

Iz is their nature.

If the

fight is not clean, as well as hard, what happens to justice?
law draws the line - counsel may fight like rutting bulls.

The

What they

may not do is intentionally mislead the Court.
Plaintiff claimed defense crossed the line at trial.

What

Defendant's Memorandum proves, by omission, is the accuracy of
Plaintiff's claim.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

Defendant has not stated facts or law differing with those

submitted by Plaintiff in her New Trial Motion except Defendant says
Mr. Knight testified the impact speed did not exceed 3 - 4
and Plaintiff had said 2 - 3

m.p.h.

m.p.h.,

Plaintiff accepts that

modification.
2.

Accordingly, those facts alleged by Plaintiff are admitted.

(Rule 8(d) U.R.C.P.)
3.

As stated in Plaintiff's New Trial Motion, and supported by

the affidavits of her two experts, Mr. Hardle and Mr. Lord, the front
bumper of a Ford Taurus does not deform, even at impact speeds of 15
to 20 miles per hour.

Mr. Hardle had with him at Court an undamaged

Taurus bumper that he had personally removed from a car he was
repairing, where the impact speed was over 15 miles an hour, and that
bumper was undamaged.
4.

Thus, as a factual matter, Defendant having full opportunity

to do so, has presented no evidence to this Court to back up Mr.
Knight's key testimony that the Taurus bumper would have deformed at
3-4

m.p.h.

2
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1,
THE COURT MADE TWO ERRONEOUS RULINGS OF LAW. IN DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION IT HAS SUBMITTED NOT ONE CASE IN SUPPORT OF EITHER OF
THOSE RULINGS.

ACCORDINGLY THE LAW CITED BY PLAINTIFF ON THOSE TWO

POINTS IS CONCEDED BY DEFENDANT TO BE ACCURATELY STATED LAW.
The two points of law are these:
1.

AS A MATTER OF LAW A PARTY MAY HAVE THEIR EXPERT ATTEND

THE TESTIMONY OF THE OTHER PARTY'S EXPERT.
The

Court

erred

by

granting

Defendant's

Motion

to

exclude

Plaintiff's experts during Mr. Knight's testimony.
This

error

denied

Plaintiff

examination of Mr. Knight.

the

right

of

effective

cross-

It also denied Plaintiff the right to have

her experts adequately prepared to give appropriate rebuttal testimony.
It is for reasons like these that Mr. Lord states in his affidavit
(Plaintiff's New Trial Motion, Ex. 2) that in all the 29 years that he
has been testifying as an expert witness in Court, that this is the
first time he has ever been excluded from listening to the testimony of
the opposing expert.
The Court was led into this error by legally inaccurate argument
of defense counsel.

This was an important argument.

Defense counsel

should not have made it unless, pursuant to Rule 11 U.R.C.P., they had

3
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a good-faith and objective belief that they were citing accurate law to
the Court.
Annexed is Utah's most recent opinion dealing with an attorney's
duty to objectively and accurately submit valid law to the Court. The
case is Giffen v. R.W.L., 286 Utah Adv. Rep. 29. (3-14-96).
In Giffen, Mr. Giffen, a licensed Utah lawyer appealed the trial
court's order of Rule 11 sanctions against him, including an order that
he pay all the fees and costs to a natural father for fighting and
succeeding in getting an order of adoption of the man's child set
aside.

The child was 16 months old, born and raised in California

until brought to Utah for adoption by a Utah family.

Mr. Giffen had

failed to comply with the Interstate Compact of Placement of Children
and he failed to obtain a preplacement adoptive study, as required by
Utah law.
In his defense, Mr. Giffen argued that because of time constraints
he hadn't had the opportunity to realize that he had to comply with
those legal requirements.
The Court of Appeals affirmed fees, including the appeal, because
Mr. Giffen, is a lawyer, had a duty to know appropriate law before he
proceeded.
Defense in Astill violated Rule 11 when they submitted

the

exclusion of experts argument to the Court at trial. Defense continues

4

to violate "Rule 11 now by not admitting that it's argument was wrong.
They have that professional duty of candor to the Court.
, 2 . A PARTY MAY CALL REBUTTAL WITNESSES TO COUNTER DEFENSES
RAISED BY DEFENDANT AT TRIAL.

THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT REQUIRED TO

ANTICIPATE THOSE DEFENSES AND MEET THEM IN HER CASE IN CHIEF.
In her New Trial Motion, Plaintiff cited Utah and general law, all
in conformity, that it is proper, and the right of a Plaintiff, to wait
until Defendant has put on it's exact defenses, and then rebut them.
THERE IS NOT A SINGLE CASE CITED BY DEFENDANT THAT SUPPORTS THE
ARGUMENT DEFENDANT MADE TO THE COURT AT TRIAL THAT SUCH REBUTTAL
WITNESSES MUST BE CALLED AS PART OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN CHIEF.
Having
Defendant

submitted

no

law, pursuant

to Rule

8

concedes that the law cited by Plaintiff

(d) U.R.C.P.,
on point is

accurate.
What Defendant has done in it's Memorandum in Opposition is to
continue to misquote the Turner v. Nelson case (Plaintiff's New Trial
Motion, Ex. 3).
Defense argued at trial, when Plaintiff started to call rebuttal
witnesses, that Turner barred the use of rebuttal if defenses might
have been anticipated.

Defendant argued to the Court that Turner held

such witnesses had to be called in the Plaintiff's case in chief.
—

There is no line in Turner so holding.

5
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The sole reason in Turner that Plaintiff could not use a rebuttal
witness, was that the witness was a surprise witness.
The holding in Turner is just absolutely clear. It entirely fails
to support the argument Defendant made at trial, and renews now in it's
Memorandum in Opposition that Turner requires rebuttal witnesses be
called as part of a case in chief if a defense can be anticipated.
There isn't a word in Turner that says that.

There isn't a word

in it that says calling a rebuttal witness after defense has rested is
not proper.
Defense counsel having been trial counsel at Turner submitted Utah
case law on the Turner appeal that calling rebuttal witnesses was
proper.
Defense counsel now seems to state that the law he submitted to
the Utah Supreme Court was false, by now arguing exactly the opposite
of what he argued to the Supreme Court.
Portions of Defendant's brief and reply on point in Turner are
exhibits 4 and 5 in Plaintiff's New Trial Motion.
Mr. Hansen's argument in Turner was (1)
call a rebuttal witness.

Utah law allowed him to

With that a given rule of law, he asked (2)

to be excused in calling a surprise witness on the basis that he
himself was surprised and didn't know he needed him until the trial
commenced. The Court agreed with (1) he could call a rebuttal witness.

6
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It disagreed with (2) Mr. Hansen had no basis for calling a surprise
witness.
Which way does Mr. Hansen want it?
Did he mislead the Utah Supreme Court in briefing that he had a
basic right to call a rebuttal witness or does he now mislead this
Court by saying that Astill has no similar right?
POINT 2.
THAT DEFENSE CONTINUES TO MISLEAD THE COURT AS TO THE PROPER
INTERPRETATION OF TURNER CONTRARY TO IT'S PLAIN HOLDING, AND DEFENSE
CITING NO OTHER UTAH CASE IN SUPPORT, INDICATES DEFENSE STILL HOPES TO
CONFUSE OR MISLEAD THE COURT.

THIS REQUIRES SANCTIONS,

In Giffen the attorney got hit with all fees of the natural father
even though the lawyer could argue that time pressure kept him from
adequately researching.
Here, Mr. Hansen has had the opportunity to reflect and to
reanalyze.
Notwithstanding thai: he continues to argue that Plaintiff has to
call in her case in chief all witnesses dealing with possible defenses
that might or might not be raised by the Defendant at trial.
As defense counsel has submitted no citation in support, the
defense position is much weaker than in Giffen, so the justification
for sanctions is greater.

7
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POINT 3.
PLAINTIFF HAS GROUNDS FOR NEW TRIAL PURSUANT TO RULE 50 U.R.C.P.
Defendant also argues in it's Memorandum

in Opposition

that

Plaintiff has failed to state a basis for new trial under Rule 59
U.R.C.P.
In her original Motion, Plaintiff cited Rule 59 and the specific
sections of it violated.
It is sufficient to cite Rule 59.

"New trials:

amendments of

judgment. (7) error in law."
R. 59 (1) also applies: "...irregularity in the proceedings by
the... adverse party... by which either party was prevented from having
a fair trial."
This applies because the Court was misled intentionally as to law
by defense.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial should be granted.
Defendant and her counsel should be required to pay all of
Plaintiff's fees and costs for trial and for arguing and briefing this
matter on New Trial Motion.
DATED this I£ day of April, 1996.

Jjrn^^j
Samuel King
Attorney for Plaintiff

OOOH

CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE
I hereby certify that on the 19 day of April, 1996, I faxed,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing "Plaintiff's Reply to
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition" to the following parties:
John Edward Hansen
SCALLEY & READING
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Facsimile No. 801-531-7968
Paul S. Felt
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Facsimile No. 801-532-7543
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Samuel King
Attorney for Plaintiff
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Halliday, Jr., to obtain the mother's consent in
Third District Court. That case was assigned to
Judge Homer Wilkinson.
When Mr. Halliday and the mother arrived in
INTHE
Third District Court on July 29, 1993, Judge
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Wilkinson was out of town and Judge Glenn
Iwasaki agreed to hear the matter. During the
In the matter of the adoption of R.N.L., a hearing, the court became concerned about the
voluntariness of the mother's consent. The
minor child.
mother stated that she thought the adoption was
"a temporary custody thing/ which she was
John A. GIFFEN,
doing because she was homeless and thought it
Appellant,
would be best for her child. She also stated that
she wanted the Hankses to pay for counseling
R.W.L.,
and therapy for her. Judge Iwasaki refused to
Appellee. m
take the consent until there could be further
communication between the birth parents and the
No. 940658-CA
Hankses, concluding that "there was no way we
FILED: March 14, 1996
can do this today."
Mr. Halliday then spoke with the mother in
Fifth District, Washington County
the hall and they decided to go ahead with the
The Honorable James L. Shumate
consent. They proceeded to the courtroom of
Judge John Rokich, who agreed to hear the
ATTORNEYS:
matter in view of Judge Wilkinson's absence.
John A. Giffen, St. George, Appellant Pro Se
Without knowledge of the hearing before Judge
James L Watts, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Iwasaki, Judge Rokich took the, mother's,
consent. '^•;-•-'i^ «>. y ' *%-".'•%* ••' jj^ v ^r*-'^
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Greenwood.
In early August, R.W.L.?the child's natural4
father, contacted Mr., Giffen and told him that*
This opinion is subject to revision before > he * would not'consent to the adoption, phe^
i j pqblicarion in the Pacific Reporter.
- child's father retained attorney James Watt to
seek a dismissal of the adoption petition. ^The^
T
*i!&
other's motion to terminate the adoption ^was?
BENCH, Judge? ^ V ^ *%3S
;?^
• John A. Giffen, an attorney, appeals the trial filed m early September, along with a jnotion
court's imposition of sanctions against him for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of thejptah;
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Rules of Civil Procedure. A hearing on both
Procedure. The trial court sanctioned Mr. Giffen motions was set for September 8,1993, in Fifth
forfilingan amr ' ' petition for adoption on District Court. Because Mr. Giffen had not
behalf of his ci*w X, the Hankses. The trial received proper notice of. that hearing, it was"
conn found thai Mr. Giffen was deficient in rescheduled for September 27,1993. , $MM
failing to make reasonable inquiry into existing
On September 21 j 1993, Mr. Giffen riled an
f
law andforpleading information in the amended amended adoption petition with only one changed
petition that was not well grounded in fact- We Rather than alleging that the natural father
affirm.
would consent to the "adoption, the amended
petition averred that an action would be initiated
to terminate the natural other's parentalrights.?
FACTS
If MrT Giffen was contacted by an individual in Mrr Giffen made arrangements with an attorney
nm on behalf of a pregnant mother wher in jCalifornia to file an action to terminatejthe j
[to place her unborn childforadoption^ Kpatural father's parental rights^based^upon^
ultimately selected the' Hankses air ~~......^.> j ^ actioa wajfiledin QuUfbrnia,
^idoptive parents and they agreed to provide:
Septonbet2Af19n.mm¥l
^^-^juppott for, the ^inodxer durmg h IJ *
~ i September Ztsmgir
~
*^-ral fatherV m o t i o n ^
^_
y^The mother caine"to; Utah in Ji
09W40She>- was ^ accompanied Vby * h e £
and motionforsanctions. Witnesses'A«I <
^•ixteen-month-old child, R*N.Ii When the both sides testified and several affidavita^were1
f mother miscarried, Mr. Giffen informed her that' considered|4br the ^limited purpoW^of,
Idie ^financial support would cease unless the determining whether sanctions were warranted
[would aliow the Hankses to adopt R.N.L. Thev against Mr. Giffen.l |tfhe courT ordered the
| mother agreed and RJ^.L^began living with the petition for adoption dismissed and imposed
sanctions upon Mr. Giffen for the natural
:•; J i Mr; Giffenfiledan adoption petition on behalf father's costs and attorney fees incurred after
% t f the Hanloes/m Fifth District C^^pleadmf September8,1993.*H*" - 1 ^ ^ ; •/ ' - ^ ':i^"that"the natural parents would Jonsent to the ^ Mr.; Giffen^ subsequently filed a motion
VT <fadoption of R.N.L. Because the natural mother pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
was temporarily residing in Salt Lake City, Mr.' Procedure 'alleging that irregularity in the
Giffen arranged for a Salt Lake attorney, Pan! proceedings or abuse of discretion prevented a
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
286 Utah Adv. Rep. 29

CONCLUSION
rort erred in concluding that section
3) applies only to areas outside
cities and towns. Outdoor
3 prohibited in any location zoned
nary purpose of allowing outdoor
Because Kunz and UDOT have
conflicting evidence regarding
3 primary purpose behind its zoning
. land, we reverse the grant of
lgment and remand for a trial on

'

286 Utah Adv. Ret). 29
Cite as

, the trial court cannot order UDOT
permits. Without the permits, the
re illegal, and the trial court is
diction to change the signs' legal
rant the further relief requested by
declaratory action. See Utah Code
-8 (1992) ('Further relief based on
'judgment or decree may be granted
sary or proper. The application
J be by petition to a court having
to grant the relief.* (emphasis

i . ,''-••'

Giffen v. R.W. L.

Codo»Co
Provo. Utah

Code+Co
Provo. Utah

i

30

Guien r. R.W.L.
286 Utah Adv. Rep. 29

fair trial. After a hearing, the trial court upheld
the sanctions previously imposed, but denied
additional sanctions. On appeal, Mr. Giffen
argues that the trial court'ijorder imposing Rule
11 sanctions against him?wa^ improper, and
alternatively, the amoun^pffsanctions was
excessive..,

Code*€o
Prove Utah

adoption; and failed to make a reasonable
inquiry as to whether the natural father's
parental rights were terminable.
The trial court found that Mr. Giffen failed to
obtain a preplacement adoptive stady for the
adoption prior to the child's placement with the
adoptive parents, as required by Utah Code
Ann. 578-30-3-5 (Supp. 1993). Mr. Giffen
admitted at the evidentiary hearing that he had
-"' STANDARD OF REVIEW; _
When reviewing Rule 11 determinations, "we not obtained the preplacement study because of
review the trial court's findings of fact under a time constraints. Section 78-30-3.5 also provides
clearly erroneous standard . .4- and the trial that the court may authorize temporary
court's determination of the type and amount of placement of a child in the potential adoptive
sanction to be imposed under an abuse of home pending the completion of the adoptive
discretion standard.".? Schoney v. Memorial study. However, Mr. Giffen failed to comply
Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah App- with this requirement as welL A reasonable
1993). We review the trial court's conclusion inquiry of the applicable statute by Mr. Giffen
that Rule 11 was violated under a correction of would have revealed the necessity of the
error standard. Id. We grant a measure of preplacement study or temporary placement
discretion to the trial court's application of the order.
Utah law requires the adoption petition to
legal principle to the facts. See State v. Pena,
indicate whether the child was born in another
869 P.2d 932, 938-39 (Utah 1994).
state, and if so, the petition must state that the
requirements of the Interstate Compact on
ANALYSIS
Placement of Children have been met. Utah
L Rule II Sanctions
Code Ann. §78-30-15.1 (1995). The purpose of
Rule 11 provides, in pertinent part:
the Interstate Compact is to inform state
The signature of an attorney or party
authorities of the proposed adoption so they can
constitutes a certification by him that he has
protect the child's interest by ascertaining and
read the pleading, motion, or other paper;
evaluating the circumstances of the proposed
that to the best of his knowledge,
placement. Utah Code Ann^ §62A-4a-701
information, and belief formed after
(1993). While both petitions stated die child was
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in ;
fact and is warranted by existing law or a ^ born in Sacramento, California, neither petition
good faith argument for the extension, * mentioned the Interstate Compact or compliance
modification, or reversal of existing law, ^ therewith. Mr. Giffen made no effort to comply
and that it is not interposed for any •• with the Interstate Compact. Again, a reasonable
improper purpose, such as to harass or to ; inquiry of the appropriate statutes would have
revealed that compliance with the Interstate
cause unnecessary delay or needless increay^
Compact was required.
in the cost of litigation. . . . If a pleading,
motion or other paper is signed in violation
The trial judge also held that Mr. Giffen was
of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon
in violation of F*' - 11 for proceeding with the
its own initiative, shall impose upon the
adoption aft^ 1« 1 cw or should have known
person who signed it, a represented party,
that the natuu mother's consent was flawed.
or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
Mr. Giffen did not directly take part in the
include an order to pay to the other party or
hearings held in Salt Lake City before Judges
parties the amount of the reasonable
Iwasaki and Rokich. However, the evidence
expenses incurred because of the filing of
supports the court's conclusion that Mr. Giffen
the pleading, motion, or other paper,
knew of alleged deficiencies in the mother's
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
consent when ho filed the amended petition.
Utah R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added).
The record contains an affidavit of the natural
The determination of whetfesffconduct violates mother. She asserted that following her
Rule 11 is made on an o b j e ^ k basis. Taylor v. miscarriage, Mr. Giffen told her the Hankses
Estate of Taylor, 770 P*2dlMfl71 (Utah App. would no longer pay her living expenses. He
1989). The trial juds^pSK^mstant case also told her that she would have to repay the
articulated several reasons imSSpking Role 11 travel, living, and medical expenses already
sanctions against Mr^Gifle^Tfir trial court expended, and that she would be "out on the
found Mr. Giffen deficient in failing to make street" unless she agreed to let the Hankses
reasonable inquiry into existing law, and also, adopt R.N.L. She asserted that she only
for making allegations in the amended petition consented to the adoption because of financial
that were not well grounded in fact. Specifically, pressure and duress from Mr. Giffen. She also
the trial court found that Mr. Giffen failed to stated that subsequent to giving her consent, she
obtain a preplacement adoptive study; failed to requested that Mr. Giffen terminate the adoption
comply with the Interstate Compact on the proceedings and return the child to her.
Placement of Children; knew or should have However, she stated Mr. Giffen refused to do so
known the natural mother's consent was flawed; when requested.
knew the natural father would not consent to the
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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SAG:

The mother's affidavit was dato
1993, and the mailing certificate
indicates that a copy was mail*
on that same day. Therefore, M
prior- to filing the amend*
September 21, 1993; that the t
her consent was given under ft
and dtutss, and that she want*
proceeding terminated." Nevett
amended petition, Mr. Giffen r
the natural mother would ©
adoption. His pleading was the:
grounded in fact as required by Finally, the trial court also 1
Giffen knew the natural father rat
to the adoption, and also that >
failed to make reasonable inquir
the-" natural father's''parental
terminable. However, we nee
whether the trial court could sane
for lack of reasonable inquiry as
of the natural father in view of tl
and pleading heretofore mention*
' In Taylor, sanctions against at
upheld after the attorney errooec
a will to probate with oo&yfom
attached the-wrong document ^
Taylor, 770 P 3d at 170-71: Thes
opposing counsel to incur coats <
preparing, and arguing a mock*
well as a motion for Rnle^ll s
ednit held that the" attorney/" —
that die will, bearing'
invalid. Thus,
^_
compensate the opposing paitj^
defend the flawed action. IdJt**J
Similarly, the natural father in
forced U retain connsel to chalkt
against an adoption that Mr. Gift
should have known was defectiv
11 sanctions were appropriate.
n . Sanction Amoun
"Rule 11 gives trial courts gr
tailor the sanction to fit the requi
particular case.' Taylor, 770
Because Mr. Giffen failed to coi
requirements of a valid adoption a
knew of the natural mother's chi
consent, we see no abuse of dis
trial court's order awarding the nat
costs and attorney fees incurred af
8,1993. See Schoney v. Memorial
863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah App- 1 9 *
abuse of discretion awarding cost
fees when sanctions were warrant
CONCLUSIONWe therefore affirm the sanctkx
the trial court and award the nati
costs and attorney fees incurred o
remand the case to the" trial
determination of the amount of t
appeal.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
WE CONCUR:
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d failed to make a reasonable
o whether the natural father's
s were terminable,
uit found that Mr. Giffen failed to
placement adoptive study for the
r to the child*! placement with the
jnts^ar required by Utah Code
-£&(Supp.il993). Mr. Giffen
WMevidentiaxy hearing that he had
^^replacement study because of
its^Section 78-30-3 J also provides
luit^may. authorize temporary
a*child in the potential adoptive
$ the completion of the adoptive
'er, Mr. Giffen failed to comply
luirement as well. A reasonable
» applicable statute by Mr. Giffen
'revealed the necessity of the
.study 'or temporary placement

The mother's affidavit was dated September 2, v Judith M. Billings, Judge 1993, and the mailing certificate attached thereto
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
indicates that a copy was mailed to Mr. Giffen
on that same day. Therefore, Mr. Giffen knew,
prior to filing the amended petition on 1. Although unclear from the trial transcript, the
September 21, 1993, that the mother claimed parties agreed at oral argument before this court that
her consent was given under financial pressure the affidavits of the natural mother tad others were
and duress, and that she- wanted the adoption admitted into evidence for the limited purpose of
proceeding terminated.' Nevertheless, in the determining whether sanction! were warranted against
#.' amended petition, Mr. Giffen represented that Mr. Giffen. i• .«.-._
v the? natural mother would consent to the
; adoption. His pleading was therefore not well
grounded in fact as required by Rule 11.
- •' Finally, the trial court also found that Mr.
•*" .286 Utah Adr. Rep. 31
Giffen knew the natural father refused to consent
to the adoption, and also that Mr. Giffen had
IN THE SUPREME COURT
failed to make reasonable inquiry as to whether
•:
;
,
OF,THE STATE OF UTJ
the r natural father's parental rights were
\ terminable. However, we need not address
•: * whether the trial court could sanction Mr. Giffen SAG INC^a Utah?*
equires the adoption petition to
;; for lack of reasonable inquiry as to the interests %: Plaintiff and Ap]
ler the child was born in another
V - of the natural father in view of the errors of law
o, the petition must state that the
and pleading heretofore mentioned^ >' f >^*f^
INIERMOUNTASi
oft the Interstate Compact on
, ' ' In Taylor, sanctions against an attorney, were
.Children have been meC Utah r'.'l v upheld after the attorney erroneously submitted legal v^or^ai
8-30.15.1 (1995). The purpose of %
a. will to probate with only^onesignature "and* created pursuant to
1&| *| attached*
Tendani and
f Compact f is to inform 'state ^ ; F:^
the^pmmg do<nimemV to/a* pleading^
the proposed adoption so they can|\ ^ \ m Taylor, 770 P.2d at 170-7IVTheie errors caused,
M V interest by ascertaining and ^ 1 V ^opposing counsel to incurcosts of researching^
3 circumstances of the proposed *&
v pieparmg, and argumg a'nx)tion to dismiss as FILED: March
-,« & t 4.., \
Jtah-Code Ann. }62A-4a-701
- v well as a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. This <&»**•.
both petitions stated the child was
jp:- court held that the attorney should have known Third District, Salt Lake County
nento, California, neither petition
;v ' that the will, bearing only cm signature, was The Honorable Tyrone Medley
Interstate Compact or compliance
invalid. Thus, sanction*' were appropriate to
. Giffen made no effort to comply
-"-•.
compensate the opposing party for having to ATTORNEYS:
tate Compact. Again, a reasonable
Kea Chamberlain, K. L. Mclff, Richfield, for
defend the flawed action. hL
appropriate statutes would have
plaintiff''
Similarly, the natural father in this case w&
compliance with the Interstate
forced to retain counsel to challenge and defend Ronald L. Rencher, Mark Dykes, Salt Lake
required.
City, for defendant
against an adoption that Mr. Giffen reasonably
should have known was defective. Thus, Rule
Ige also held that Mr. Giffen was
11 sanctions were appropriate.
• Rule 11 for proceeding with the .
he knew or should have known
This opinion is subject to revision before
IL Sanction Amount
si mother's consent was flawed,
publication in the Pacific Reporter,
^ "Rule 11 gives trial courts great leeway to
id not directly take part in
"tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of the STEWART, Associate Chief Justice: ,
in Salt Lake City before ~
particular case." Taylor, 770 P.2d at 171.
SAG Incorporated appeals a district court
RolriclL. However,, the*"e;
•use Mr. Giffen failed to comply with the order dismissing with prejudice its claims for
suit's conclusion that Mr,
^requirements of a valid adoption and because he relief. SAGV complaint alleged three claims
;ed deficiencies in the
tbiew^of the natural mother's challenge to her against Intennountain Power Agency (IPA) that
lie filed the amended
jbcbnjent^we see no abuse of discretion in- the arose out of a contract wherein SAG agreed to
ontains an affidavit of me
Jfrial court's order awarding the natural father his sell to IPA water rights appurtenant to land SAG
\ asserted C that i following*
ir.: Giffen told her the Hankies
coats and attorney fees incurred after September owned near Delta, Utah. The district court
jer pay her living expenses. He
8,1993. See Schoneyv. Memorial Estates, Inc., dismissed SAG's first and third claims, one
hat she would have to repay the
863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah App. 1993) (holding no sounding in contract and the other in tent, on
and medical expenses already
abuse of discretion awarding costs and attorney statute of limitations grounds; and on
cross-motions for summary judgment the court
that she would be "out on the
fees when sanctions were warranted).
ruled that SAO had entered into an accord and
she agreed to let the Hankses
satisfaction and released the second claim for
She asserted that she only
•
-. • CONCLUSION
he adoption because of financial
We therefore affirm the sanctions imposed by relief. We affirm. *
uress from Mr. Giffen. She also
the trial court and award the natural father his
sequent to giving her consent, she
costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal. We
I. BACKGROUND 0 0 ? 7 1
Vfr. Giffen terminate the adoption
remand the case to the' trial court for a
Prior to 1980, SAG owned 228 acres' irf
md return the child to her.
determination of the amount of the award on Millard County, Utah, that included a well used
stated Mr. Giffen refused to do so
for irrigation purposes and a water right that
appeal.
i.
allowed the use of 5 cubic feet per second from
Russell W. Bench, Judge
April to October of each year, up to a maximum
WE CONCUR:
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
. . . . .

ft

.••

- * *

•»*•

- . - ! . - .

•

'

ADDENDUM "P

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUKTY', STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
ASTILL, LYNN
PLAINTIFF
VS
CLARK, LEESHA

CASE NUMBER 950902307 PI
DATE 05/31/96
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN
COURT REPORTER BRAD YOUNG
COURT CLERK BHA

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:

MOTION HEARING

P. ATTY. KING, SAMUEL
D. ATTY. HANSEN, JOHN E

• THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT FOR HEARING RE: PLF'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. COUNSEL PRESENT FOR PLF ARE SAMUEL KING
AND DAVID FRIEL. COUNSEL PRESENT FOR DEF ARE JOHN HANSEN AND
PAUL FELT. THE COURT HEARS ARGUMENT FROM COUNSEL. THE COURT
TAKES THIS*MATTER®UNDER-SADVISEMENT AND WILL RENDER A DECISION ONOR BEFORE "JULY • l,-~£996»
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ADDENDUM "Q

P'UOD,STR fCTco

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

'J(/£ £ g

^

Byj
'PtfyC

Lynn Astill,
Plaintiff,

COURT RULING
CASE NO: 950902307 Pi

vs.
Judge Pat B. Brian
Leesha Clark,
Defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff was rear-ended by Defendant. As a negligence issue, proximate cause was the
controlling matter. On January 2nd Defendant filed a designation of expert witnesses which
identified Newell Knight as a defense expert. Plaintiffs counsel, having had previous experience
with Mr. Knight, chose not to depose him and assumed that Mr. Knight would put Defendant's
speed at from three to four miles per hour. That assumption was confirmed in Defendant's
opening statement on around February 7th. Plaintiff notified Defendant on around January 6th
that they would call David Lord as an expert rebuttal witness.
At trial, Plaintiff testified that she was struck by Defendant and presented evidence that
her health sharply worsened after the accident. Plaintiff further testified that the Defendant was
traveling at around 10 to 15 miles per hour at the time of the collision. Mr. Lord was prepared to
testify that the damage done to Plaintiffs Ford Explorer was the result of an impact of well over
five miles per hour. Mr. Lord was also prepared to testify that such impact is sufficient to cause
injury. Plaintiff chose to save Mr. Lord's expert testimony for rebuttal.

(I i.

ft:;:«

During Mr. Knight's direct-examination, Plaintiff requested that Mr. Lord be allowed in
the courtroom to analyze Mr. Knight's testimony and advise Plaintiffs counsel on how to
conduct the cross-examination. The Court held this in violation of the exclusion order but
allowed a recess in between direct- and cross-examinations in which time Plaintiff consulted Mr.
Knight about how to conduct the cross-examination. At the close of Defendant's case-in-chief,
the Court took up the issue of Mr. Lord's rebuttal testimony. The Court held that Mr. Lord's
testimony was proper case-in-chief evidence and should have been presented in Plaintiffs casein-chief The Court disallowed Mr. Lord's rebuttal testimony.
BASIS OF MOTION
Plaintiff moves for new trial. The basis of the motion is: 1) "the exclusion of Plaintiff s
expert during testimony of defendant's expert," 2) "refusing to allow plaintiff to call rebuttal
witnesses who would have effectively demolished Mr. Knight's testimony," and 3) "the court
was led into error in refusing to allow rebuttal by intentionally false statements of law made by
defense counsel James E. Hansen," (Plaintiffs New Trial Motion, 13-14). Plaintiff claims that
the errors were prejudicial in nature and the trial outcome would likely have been different if not
for these errors. Motion denied.
COURT FINDINGS
As with the first allegation of error, the exclusion of Mr. Lord during Mr. Knight's
testimony, an exclusion order was issued by the Court at the pre-trial conference. At no time
before the trial did either party request the presence of their experts in the courtroom during the
direct-examination of opposing expert testimony. Furthermore, the Court recessed after Mr.
Knight's direct-examination and before his cross-examination. The recess provided Plaintiff
2
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with ample time to discuss Mr. Knight's testimony with Mr. Lord. The cross-examination of Mr.
Knight was lengthy and well directed. The outcome of the trial would not have been altered by
Mr. Lord's admission into the courtroom during Mr. Knight's testimony.
Plaintiff also alleges as error the Court's refusal to allow Mr. Lord as a rebuttal witness to
Mr. Knight's testimony placing the speed of the accident at from three to five miles per hour.
Plaintiff knew as early as January 2nd that the Defense was to call Mr. Knight as an exnert
witness. Plaintiff assumed that Mr. Knight was to place the speed of the accident at around three
to five miles per hour, and that assumption was confirmed during the opening statement made by
the Defense. Plaintiffs counsel also represented to the jury in opening statement that there was a
substantial impact estimated at from 10 to 25 miles per hour. The Plaintiff testified in directexamination that, in her estimation, the Defendant was traveling at least 10 miles per hour at the
time of impact. Plaintiffs counsel made an issue of speed in both their opening statement and
direct-examination of the Plaintiff
The Court held that "the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known and anticipated
that the defense was going to challenge the testimony of the plaintiff." The Court also held that
as an issue of fact, it was Plaintiffs burden of proof to show "that the accident, as it was alleged
by the plaintiff, occurred from a high-speed collision, that is 10 or 15 or 20 miles an hour, that
substantial damage would have been caused, and that resulting injury could have occurred."
The Utah Supreme Court has defined rebuttal evidence as to "refute, or to so modify or
explain, as to nullify or minimize the effect of the opponent's evidence," Board of Education of
South Sanpete School District v. Barton. 617 P.2d 347, 349 (1980). It is well established in
common law that rebuttal evidence is relevant only by virtue of evidence introduced by the
3
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adverse party and is not mainly to support the case-in-chief. Wells v. CM. Mays Lumber Co..
Inc.. 754 P.2d 888, 889 (Okl.App. 1987). Evidence which was proper or should have been
introduced in chief should not be introduced on rebuttal. 88 C.J.S. Trial § 102, 215; 75 Am.Jur.
Trial § 374, 573.
The dangers of saving proper case-in-chief evidence is illustrated in 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial
§373, 573, Evidence in chief on rebuttal:
'The danger of tactically saving evidence in chief for rebuttal is that an appropriate
objection will bar it altogether. For example, defense counsel may object on the ground
that the question goes beyond the proper scope of rebuttal and allows the plaintiff to
withhold part of its case in chief depriving the defense of the opportunity to address the
evidence in its case in chief. Even relevant rebuttal evidence, which might properly have
been introduced in the case in chief, may be excluded where its probative balance is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or unfair and harmful
surprise."
Speed was an issue from the outset. Plaintiff had burden of going forward with evidence
that not only was Plaintiff hit by the Defendant, but that such impact was of sufficient speed to
cause the damages claimed by the Plaintiff. Mr. Lord's expert testimony was not presented
during Plaintiffs case-in-chief, but was instead reserved for rebuttal. The result was to unfairly
prejudice the Defense by saving such testimony as the last word and not giving the Defense an
opportunity to address it in their case-in-chief.

I
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Therefore, plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial is denied.
Dated this ^)£

day of July, 1996.

sz.^6

/>

PAT B. BRIAN
J
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Court Ruling,
postage prepaid, to the following, this ^Qj^U day of July, 1996.
Samuel King
Attorney for Plaintiff
2120 South 1300 East, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
John Edward Hansen
SCALLEY & READING
Attorney for Defendant
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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FILED DfSTRfCT COURT
Third Judicial District

AUG 2 2 1996
JOHN EDWARD HANSEN, #4590
SCALLEY Sc READING
Attorneys for Defendant
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LYNN B. ASTILL,

:

ORDER ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
AND OTHER RELIEF

:

Civil No. 950902307PI

Plaintiff,
vs.
LEESHA CLARK,

'.::

Defendant.

Judge Pat Brian

:

Plaintiff Lynn B. Astill's motion for a new trial and
other relief came for hearing before the Court on May 31, 1996.
Plaintiff Lynn B. Astill was represented by Samuel King of King,
Friel, Colton & Hardy.

Defendant Leesha Clark was represented by

John Hansen of Scalley & Reading and Paul Felt of Ray, Quinney &
Nebeker.

The

Court, having

reviewed

and considered

all

the

evidence, the corresponding memoranduma of points and authorities
submitted by the parties, having heard the oral arguments of
counsel, having taken the matter under advisement and being duly
advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefor, it is
hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial and Other
Relief is hereby denied.

DATED this

6K<^\

day of August, 1996.

BY THE COURT

00028C

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the /Sl"lh

day of August, 1996,

I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Order on Motion
for New Trial and Other Relief to the following:
Samuel King, Esq.
David J. Friel, Esq.
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

Kohov^

K]CUJC

Paul S. Felt
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
79 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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SAMUEL KING, No. 1820
DAVID J. FRIEL, No. 6225
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Q.

You still mark 80-percent improvement, right?

A.

Some of the —

one of the symptoms, or generally,

yes, but not the flare-up.
Q.

Then the last one, right —

2/7/95, that's, what, the

day before the trial; is that right?
A.

Yes.
MR. KING:

I think we are in f96.

MR. FELT:

We are.

I apologize.

I thought these

were in order.

And they are.

For some reason, we have just

this one here.

We have already looked at February.

I have no

further questions.
MR. KING:
THE COURT:

Nothing further.
You may step down.

Call your next witness.
MR. KING:

The plaintiff rests her case, your Honor.

MR. FELT:

May we approach the bench, your Honor?

THE COURT:

Yes.

(An off-the-record discussion at the bench.)
MR. FELT:

The defendant calls Leesha Clark to the

stand.
THE COURT:

Step forward and be sworn, please.
LEESHA CLARK,

called as a witness by and on behalf of the defendant, being
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
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DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. FELT:
Q.

Will you tell the jury your name?

1

A.

Leesha Clark.

J

Q.

Can you really speak loudly?

1

A.

Leesha Clark.

1

Q.

A little nervous?

1

A.

Yes.

Q.

What is your address?

J

A.

2390 West Surrey Road, Bennion, Utah, 84118.

J

Q.

How old are you?

J

A.

29.

Q.

Are you married?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you have children?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What are the names and ages?

A.

I have two children.

1

1

I

I have a daughter, Laticia, who

is eleven ; and I have a son, Tyler, who is four.
Q.

Are you employed?

A.

Yes.

Q.

By whom?

A.

Wenco & Pozzi Windows.

Q.

What do you do for that company?

A.

I am an office manager.
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Q.

Let's just get right to the point and talk about the

day of this accident.

That's June 6, 1994.

You were involved

in an automobile accident with the plaintiff, Mrs. Astill?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

What car were you driving on that day?

A.

I was driving a Ford Taurus that I had rented.

Q.

Why had you needed a rental car?

A.

I was in a previous accident on 1-215, and it had

totaled my car —

actually, not totaled it, but I needed a

rental car.
Q.

Was that accident your fault?

A.

No.

Q.

Where were you going at the time of the accident?

A.

I was on my way to work, but I had to drop off my son

to day care on the way.
Q.

Were you late?

A.

No.

Q.

Why don't you just take —

as I understand, you are

going east on 4100 South, right?

of —

A.

Yes.

Q.

Take it from there, as you approach that intersection

what is it, 4800 West?
A.

Right.

Q.

Let's take it from the time you approach that

intersection.

I am stopped at 4800 West and 4100 South.

What color is the light as you approach?
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A.

It is red.

Q.

Do you see any cars in front of you?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Take it from that point, and tell me what happened.

A.

Well, it is a red light, so I stopped behind this

The Explorer was in front of me.

other car, and I hear my son click off his seat belt, or undo
his seat belt.
Q.

How old is he?

A.

He was three then.

He is four now.

normal car, that we are used to driving.

This isn't our

And so I reatched over

to click it back into place, and my foot slipped off the brake,
and I just felt a bump, and so I got up, and I noticed I hit
the lady in front of me.
Q.

Let's take it, stop there.

What position were you in

when you felt this bump?
A.

I was trying to put the seat belt on my son, so I was

like way reaching around him, while I am trying to keep my foot
on the brake.
Q.

Had you been conscious that your car was moving

forward?
A.

I was at a stop.

when I hear the noise.

We were at the stop light.

That's

So I just reached over to put it back

into place.
Q.

When you came to a stop behind the Explorer, how far

were you behind?
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1

A.

2

behind a car.

3

a quarter of a car length, a few feet.

4

normal.

5

Q.

6
7
8

I don't know, just a normal distance you would stop
I am not really good at judging distance.
I don't know.

accelerator, make the car go forward?
A.

No.

I just felt a bump, and I sat up, and I knew

that I had bumped into the lady in front of me.
Q.

Describe what that bump felt like to you.

10

A.

Just a bump.

It was just a bump.

11

noise, and I sat up and went —

12

used to driving it.

13

talk to her.

14

happened.

16

Q.

I went, oh, no.

Q.

Did it affect your body?

Was it severe enough to

jostle you or anything?
A.

No, not at all, just enough that I noticed that I had

21

bumped into her.

22

not an impact.

25

Did this bump knock

you or your son?

18

24

She asked me what

We will get to that in a minute.

No.

23

I am not

I got out of the car to

Actually, we both got out.

A.

20

It was just a

this isn't my car.

17

19

Just

When your foot slipped off the brake, did it hit the

9

15

Maybe

Q.

You would feel that.

I mean, I felt a bump,

Did you move your car before you talked to the

defendant?
A.

No.
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1
2

Q.

Was your car in a position, two cars, where traffic

could move around?

3

A.

Yes, because there is a turning lane on the left-hand

4

side and the right-hand side.

5

all.

6

there was enough room for traffic to go around us.

7

only out there a few minutes.

8
9

We weren't —

Q.

We didn't move our vehicles at

we weren't in the intersection at all.

And

And we were

So you got out, the defendant came back to your car,

and you get out before you talk to her?

10

A.

I don't remember who actually got out of their

11

vehicles first.

12

the middle, where I had bumped into her, and that's where she

13

just asked me what happened, and I explained to her I was

14

trying to put on my little boy's seat belt, and my foot had

15

slipped off the brake.

16

was any damages on the vehicle.

17

car."

18

not used to driving this car, and she didn't notice any damage,

19

and I said, "I don't think there is any damage."

20
21

And I said, "This is not my

Did you see any damage to the front bumper of the

Taurus you were driving?
A.

No, nothing at all.

But there wasn't —

there wasn't

anything to see.

24
25

And so we were trying to see if there

So, yo\\ know, and we are looking around, because I am

Q.

22
23

I just remember that we ended up meeting at

Q.

You can see that this Explorer has a trailer hitch on

it?
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A.

Right.

Q.

Did the trailer hitch dent the bumper of the Taurus?

A.

Not that I noticed.

I noticed when I got to work

that. I had a little ding in the license plate.

But before

that, no, I didn't notice it.
Q.

Even after you checked it again at work, the only

damage you saw was a ding in the license plate?
A.

Yeah, like from the ball of her thing, it just made

an indent around the little plate of the license, or at the top
of the license.
Q.

When you took this car back to the rent-a-car

company, did you tell them about this incident?
A.

Yes.
MR. KING:
THE COURT:

I object to hearsay.
She is not relating what was said, what

someone eise sa id, merely what she stated.
Q.

Overruled.

Did they come ov»t and look at the bumper of the

Taurus?
A.

When you take back the vehicle, that's the first

thing they do is walk around the vehicle.
MR. KING:

Excuse me.

I want hearsay excluded, if

she is going to give a narrative answer, just be instructed.
THE COURT:

The objection is sustained.

question-and-answer basis.

Go on a

And anything someone out of court

said to her is hearsay.
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Q.

I am not going to ask that.

I am just asking, did

the person from Enterprise Rent-a-Car inspect the car?
A.

Yes.

Q.

When you took it back?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you tell them where on the car this accident had

happened?
A.

Yeah, I had to show him, yes.

Q.

And did he then examine that area specifically?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And were you charged any sum for damage to that car?

A.

No, not anything at all.
THE COURT:

Is this a good place to take our break,

Counsel?
MR. FELT:
THE COURT:
MR. FELT:
THE COURT:

I am almost done, your Honor.
Are you?
I really cm.
Go ahead.

Q.

Why didn't you call the police?

A.

Because, from what I understood, there were no

damages to either vehicle, so we —

that was not even discussed

at all.
Q.

How long were you at the scene?

A.

Five minutes maximum.

We both had to go to work, and

it was more of kind of, I am sorry, got in the car, maybe some
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phone numbers, and went on our way.
Q.

Did you tell the plaintiff that it was a rented car

at that time?
A,

Yeah, because she was —

damages to my car.

she asked me if I had any

I said, "This isn't my car."

Q.

Did you tell her what company?

A.

No, not at that time.

That was

—

We just exchanged phone

numbers and addresses and things like that.
Q.

Did she ask you?

A.

No.

Q.

Did there come a time later on that day when you

talked to her?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Was that a phone conversation?

A.

Actually, it was with my husband, and then I returned

the phone call to her at work,
Q.

I am just getting when you talked to her at work.

A.

Yes.

Q.

What time of day was that?

A.

Probably late afternoon sometime.

Q.

Tell me what was said, and by whom, in that

conversation between you and Mrs. Astill.
A.

She previously asked my husband where we rented the

car, and my husband didnft know, because I took care of all of
that.

So he had given me that information, and I just relayed
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1

it on to her, and told her where I had rented it from, and that

2

was all, and that was the end of the conversation.

3

Q.

Short conversation?

4

A..

Yes.

5

Q.

Was there another conversation?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Did the plaintiff call back?

8

A.

Yeah, later that evening, at my house.

9

Q.

Just you and she on the phone?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

What was said by whom in that second phone

12

conversation?

13

A.

She proceeded to tell me how much damage she had to

14

her vehicle, that the bumper was dented, that the doors

15

wouldn!t open, that something was wrong with the back end of

16

it, and so I asked her, if we had all tftis damage, how come we

17

didn't call the police?

18

said —

And she didn't say anything.

She

she told me you could have up to so many dollars worth

19 I of damages before you call the police, or something, and the
20
21
22

conversation ended there.
Q.

Did you ever refuse to tell her what company you

rented it from?

23

A.

Oh, no.

Why would I?

24

Q.

Did you have another conversation with her?

25

A.

Yeah.

345

Q.

Same night?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What happened?

Tell me what was said by whom in that

third conversation.
A.

She had called again to explain to me that now her

back was hurting, and that she was going to seek medical
attention the next day.

And again I said, if we had all these

damages and you were hurt this bad, why didn't we call the
cops?

I didn't understand.

And then she started just to tell

me all of these rules and stuff that you can and can't do.
just said okay.

I didn't know what else to tell her.

understand, she was going to go to the doctor.

I

I said I

I didn't know

what else to tell her.
Q.

Did you have any further information to give her?

A.

No.

We had already exchanged all the information

that we had.
Q.

Did she call back another time?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Another time?

A.

Yes.

She called back to —

just to explain to me all

these rules, and all this stuff that I was supposed to do, all
of the damages on her vehicle, how long before she could seek
medical attention.
you."

And I said, "I don't know what else to tell

She was telling me all these rules and regulations that

I was supposed to follow.

I just said, "I don't have any more
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to tell you.'1
Q.

On this fourth conversation the same night, did you

say anything else to her?
A.

No.

any more."

I just said, "That's all.

I cannot talk to you

I didn't know what she wanted.

everything.

She knew

What was I supposed to tell her?

MR. FELT:
THE COURT:

That's all, your Honor.
All right.

We will take the noon recess.

Ladies and gentlemen, during the recess, remember the
admonition given previously.

Do not discuss the case among

yourselves, do not permit anyone to discuss the case in your
presence, do not form nor express an opinion in the case until
it has been submitted to you for your deliberation and your
decision.

We will be in recess until 1:30.

that we may start promptly at 1:30.

Return at 1:25 so

It is still our intention

to have the case submitted to the jury mid afternoon or
slightly later.

The Court will be in recess until 1:30.

Counsel, the Court has another matter to attend to.
Maybe I can meet with you just a little before 1:30, and we
will take a look at the jury instructions and verdict forms.
(A lunch recess was taken.)
THE COURT:

The record will reflect the presence of

the jury, counsel, and the parties.

Are you ready to proceed

with cross-examination?
MR. KING:

Thank you, your Honor.
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THE COURT:
sworn.

Step forward.

You have been previously

And you may conduct your cross-examination.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. KING:
Q.

When the accident happened, were you in a hurry?

A.

Just on my way to work.

Q.

I understand your son, Tyler, is four now?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So he was, I guess, just barely three when the

accident happened?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you had him in a seat belt, not in a car seat?

A.

Yes, he was in his seat belt.

Q.

He undid his seat belt?

A.

I just heard it unclick.

|

MR. FELT:

You have to speak up.

Q.

He undid the seat belt?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Why wasn't he in a car seat?

A.

That wasn't our normal car that I was used to

driving, and the car seat that I have was in my car from the
previous accident.

That wasn't something that I normally did.

Q.

But you had this rental car for three weeks?

A.

Yes.

He was just used to sitting on the side with

the seat belt over him.
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Q.

In regard to the accident itself, I tried to write

down what you said, and you said you just felt a bump.
just a noise.

It was

Are those the terms you used this morning to

describe the severity of the impact?
A.

Just a bump.

two years.

It was just a bump.

and rolled into her.
Q.

I really —

I mean, it has been almost

I let my foot off the brake,

I don't know how more to explain it.

Later in the day, while you were at work, Mrs. Astill

called to say that she had talked to her husband, there was
damage to the bumper, and she wanted to have the name of the
rental company, didn't she?
A.

No.

She previously had called my husband, and my

husband called me at work to tell me that she had called, and
asked for information, where I got the rent-a-car.

And he

didn't know that information, said I had to call her.
Q.

Then you called her?

A.

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q.

But you didn't give her the information on the rental

A.

Yeah, I would have had it, I am pretty sure.

car?

comes, it is in the glove box.
from.

It just

I know that's where I got it

They just give you a pink receipt or whatever.

So,

yeah, I did give her the information.
Q.

You said that she made a number of calls to you?

A.

Yes.

Once I got home, she did.
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Q.

The other calls were at home?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Directing your attention to your deposition, do you

recall that I took your deposition?
A.

Yes.

Q.

That was May 29 —

A.

I am not sure the exact date.

May 24 of last year?

MR. KING:

I would ask Mrs. Clark's deposition be

MR. PELT:

No objection.

published.

THE COURT:

Granted.

Q.

Do you have a copy of it in front of you?

A.

No.
MR. FELT:

Your Honor, may I approach the witness and

give her a copy?
THE COURT:
Q,

Yes.

Directing your attention to page 21 of your

deposition, Mrs. Clark, I will read the questions I asked you
before.

You were under oath, weren't you, when you gave your

deposition?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

And you do have to give a verbal answer for the

reporter.
A.

Yes.

Q.

We will start on line 21 of page 21.

I will read the
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questions, and if you will read your answers.
the name of the rental car company?"

"Did she ask you

Please read your answer.

It starts on line 22.
A.

"Yes, she did, when she called my husband, and I

returned her phone call.
Q.

"What did she tell you about that?"

Correction,

"What did you tell her about that?"
A.

"I canft remember if I had the papers in front of me,

or if I told her I would call her back.

I am not sure."

Q.

Read what you said.

A.

"I canft remember if I had papers in front of me, or

if I told her I would call her back.
remember.

I am not sure.

I can't

I know, eventually, she ended up getting it through

one of her phone calls."
Q.

"The other phone calls were the ones later in the

night when you were saying she was giving you all these rules?"
A.

"Yes."

Q.

"What she was trying to find out was the name of the

rental car company?"
A.

That's not true, because I gave it to her in the

phone call.

There would be no reason for me not to give it to

her.
Q.

Excuse me.

You just read your deposition May of last

year, when you said, "I told her I had to get back with her.
am not sure.

I can't remember.

I know, eventually, she ended
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I

1

up getting it through one of those phone calls."

2

A.

She did.

She got it through a phone call.

3

Q.

You testified earlier today you gave her that

4

information when you called her in the afternoon, so she had no

5

reason to make the calls in the evening.

6

A.

Well, those were —

those phone calls she made in the

7

evening were about how much damage was to her vehicle, and how

8

she hurt, and, what am I supposed to do?

9
10
11

Q.

Your reaction was to tell her she was trying to rip

you off, wasnft it?
A.

Eventually, by about the fourth phone call, yeah, I

12

was just tired.

13

called me so many times

14

Q.

15
16

A.

I didn't know what to tell her.

She had

—

Isn't that

—

THE COURT:

Let her finish her answer.

She just called me so many times that I told her I

17

don't kn^ what more I can answer to her, because she knew

18

everything.

19

what more to say to her.

20
21

Q.

She knew how the system worked.

I didn't know

Isn't the phone call in which you told her the name

of your rental car company the last call she made?

22

A.

No, that is not true.

23

Q.

Going to the answer you just read

24

A.

It wasn't the last phone call.

25

Q.

Excuse me.

—

I get to finish my question, too.

In the
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answer, you said somewhere, "I know, eventually, she ended up
getting it through one of those phone calls."
A.

Right.

She did.

She got it through the first phone

call.
Q.

Well, but that's not what you testified to here.
MR. FELT:
THE COURT:

Q.

He is arguing with the witness.
The question has been asked and answered,

Okay, we will go on.

One last question.

You have

seen the bumper brackets on the Explorer that have been marked
in evidence, haven't you?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Can you explain how an impact so slight that it was

just a noise could produce that much damage?
MR. FELT:
THE COURT:
MR. FELT:

I object to that.
Sustained.
She has no foundation to be giving

accident reconstruction opinions.
MR. KING:
THE COURT:
MR. FELT:
THE COURT:

Nothing further.
Anything on redirect?
I have no questions.
You may step down.

Call your next witness.
(See transcript entitled "Partial Transcript.")
MR. KING:

I would like to make a motion for a

directed verdict.
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THE COURT:

You may.

And the Court understood that

the defense had requested at the time the plaintiff rested that
they wanted to put some motions on the record, and the Court
indicated it would defer to both counsel until a convenient
time when the jury was not present for you to do that.

So go

ahead.
MR. HANSEN:

For the record, I guess we should have

our motion for directed verdict on the record first.
feel the need to argue it.
THE COURT:

We don't

We would submit it to the Court.

The defendant has made a motion,for a

directed verdict, and the Court understood that that motion was
properly made at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, and
then reserved until now to be put on the record; is that
correct?
MR. HANSEN:
THE COURT:

That's our understanding, your Honor.
Give the Court one good reason why it

should grant the directed verdict.
MR. HANSEN:

I think that the evidence of any injury

coming from this accident is just so weak that I don't think
any reasonable mind could so find.
THE COURT:

That objection goes to the weight the

trier of fact will give the testimony in this case, and not to
the question of admissibility.

And the motion for directed

verdict is denied.
Counsel?
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1

MR. KING:

There is no evidence in the record to

2

support any finding of negligence on the part of Plaintiff, so

3

I would move a directed verdict that the jury be instructed she

4

was not negligent.

5

defendant failed to keep her vehicle under proper control,

6

proper lookout, as you would.

7

plaintiff's vehicle, without any legal cause.

8

jury should be instructed that the issues of liability have

9

been decided, but the question of proximate cause and damages

10

The only evidence on the record is that the

She drove into the back of the
Accordingly, the

is for them.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. FELT:

What is your response to that?
Our response is we have never contended

13

the plaintiff was negligent in this case.

14

prepared at the outset of this case does not have the

15

plaintiff's negligence on it.

16

proper matter to be submitted to the Court.

17

it to be submitted to the Court.

18

was in the car in front, and she wasn't negligent.

19 I

THE COURT:

The verdict form we

We agree that that is not a
We never intended

As to the —

she wasn't.

She

And the Court believes counsel for the

20

defendant has made a persuasive point, that it is not a

21

question about whether or not there was a collision, and there

22

is not a question about who caused the collision.

23

is, what resulted from the collision?

24
25

MR. FELT:

Right.

The question

And the question as to whether

Defendant is negligent, I think the jury is entitled to rule
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whether a foot slipping off the brake is negligence.

So I

think that is a matter properly submitted to the jury.
THE COURT:
MR. FELT:
THE COURT:

Anything further?
No.
You may each argue your positions to the

jury in that regard, and the Court, based on the defense
counsel's representation that the verdict form will clearly
provide for the fact that there is no allegation of negligence
by the plaintiff, will resolve
MR. KING:

—

May I advise the jury in their answer to

the complaint they denied negligence, and claimed she was
negligent?
THE COURT:

They may have made a thousand assertions

at the time the defense —

the answer was offered, but at least

today, in front of this trier of fact, they have not asserted
any negligence by the plaintiff,

And they have stipulated to

that on the record, and that is not an isr;
MR. KING:
go to the jury.

in the case.

I would certainly like a break before we

I know the jury wants to get to work.

THE COURT:

I think the jury is probably a little

antsy.
MR. KING:
THE COURT:
instructions.

We have to get the instructions covered.
Let's take a brief break, review the

What I am going to do, if counsel agree, is try

and structure a timetable that we can all live with.

If I
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commence instructing the jury in 20 minutes from now, will it
take the Court longer than 20 minutes to instruct?
MR. FELT:
THE COURT:

No.
Will counsel for the plaintiff give an

estimate of how much time is going to be taken for closing
argument and rebuttal argument, combined?
MR. KING:
THE COURT:
MR. KING:
THE COURT:

15 and 10.
So no longer than 30 minutes, total?
Yes.
What is the time estimate of counsel for

the defendant for their closing argument?
MR. FELT:
THE COURT:

15, 20 minutes, maybe less.
I want both of you to take a deep breath,

and think about what you just told the Court, and take a look
at the clocks on the wall, and understand that's what we will
live by.

We will start jury instructions at 20 to the hour.

will meet with you immediately.

I

I will have the bailiff tell

the jury that they can expect us to be back in session in 20
minutes.
5:00.

We will start Plaintiff's closing argument at around

You will take whatever time you want, knowing that you

do not have more than 30 minutes, total, to address the jury.
And you can discipline yourself any way you want on that.

And

Counsel has indicated that you will not take more than 20
minutes?
MR. FELT:

I believe that to be correct.
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1

THE COURT:

I will hold both of you to that.

And

2

that means that we will have this case to the jury no later

3

than a quarter to six.

4

MR. KING:

What next?

If we are going to take a

5

break now, then we are going to go straight through.

6

work on the instructions.

7

break.

8
9
10

THE COURT:

I also want to get a ten-minute

We will take a look at the instructions,

and then you can have a ten-minute break.

Then I am going to

instruct the bailiff and the clerk to order up some pizza.

11
12

I want to

MR. KING:

I have moved the introduction of

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. FELT:

Letfs hear from the defendant.
I object to that, your Honor.

15

simply hearsay.

16

for a party to write down testimony, and then submit it in

17

written form, if it is not something that would otherwise pass

18

the hearsay muster.

19

It is not a business record.

It is

THE COURT:

20 J testimony.

It is not proper

It is illustrative of the plaintiffs

It will come in.

21

(Court was in recess.)

22

THE COURT:

The record will reflect the presence of

23

the jury, counsel and the parties.

Ladies and gentlemen of the

24

jury, the Court has resolved a number of matters, legal in

25

nature, between counsel, in your absence.

We are now ready to
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proceed.

Plaintiff has rested.

The defendant has rested.

We

have reviewed the jury instructions and verdict forms, the
exhibits, and a number of other matters that did not require
the presence of the jury.

We are now ready to proceed.

Court will instruct you on the law.

The

After the Court has read

the law, counsel for the plaintiff will argue, counsel for the
defendant will argue, and counsel for the plaintiff has the
right of rebuttal.

It is our anticipation that we will have

the case to you by about a quarter to six.

We have ordered

some pizza, and something for you to drink, and you can eat and
deliberate simultaneously.
If the Court gives you instructions that are read
faster than you think you can understand them, don't worry,
because I am going to take all the instructions in this case,
staple them together, and send them in the jury room, so you
can refer to the law at your leisure.

So don't worry if the

Court reads the jury instructions faster than you think you are
comprehending them.

And then at the conclusion of the

argument, we will send the verdict forms, the jury instructions
and all of the exhibits into the jury room for you.
(Jury instructions were given.)
THE COURT:

Counsel will address the jury, and then

at the conclusion of closing argument, Defense's closing
argument, and rebuttal argument, the jury will be sworn, and
you will retire to the jury room to commence deliberations, and
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we will have a light dinner served about 45 minutes.
Counsel, you may proceed with your closing argument.
And you are invited to put the podium any place you like in the
courtroom for purposes of your argument.
MR. KING:

Before I commence, your Honor, I have no

idea that the jury will want or not want calculators.

Let me

give some to the bailiff, just in case.
THE COURT:

If they make that request, the Court will

certainly instruct the bailiff to do that.
(Closing argument by Mr. King.)
THE COURT:

Thank you, Counsel.

Closing argument?
MR. FELT:

Thank you, your Honor.

If it please the

Court, Counsel, ladies and gentlemen of the jury.

When I first

spoke to you in opening statement, I told you that there were
some questions that, if you kept those questions in mind, that
this evidence would fit in better and you would kind of see
where we were going.
The first question I told you to look at, that we
were going to have answered, is, how did this accident happen?
Which version of this accident is more believable?

And the

beauty of the jury system is none of the instructions the judge
read to you tells you to leave your common sense outside the
jury deliberation door.
with you.

You get to take that common sense in

You get to use your common sense.

I sometimes refer
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MR. HANSEN:
MR. KING:

The defense calls Newell Knight.
Your Honor, at this time I will advise the

Court that our rebuttal expert, Mr. Lord, is going to come into
the courtroom, as is customary.
THE COURT:
MR. HANSEN:
THE COURT:

Any objection?
Yes, we object.
We will discuss it at the bar.

(An off-the-record discussion at the bench.)
THE COURT:

The Court may be required, within the

next 30 minutes, to interrupt the proceedings briefly to take
care of a matter thatfs being handled telephonically out of
another state.

When the call comes in we will take a brief

break, and the Court will address those issues.
NEWELL KNIGHT,
called as a witness by and on behalf of the defendant, being
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. HANSEN:
Q.

Mr. Knight, please state your full name for the

record.
A.

My name is Newell Knight.

Q.

Where do you reside?

A.

Salt Lake City, Utah.

Q.

Are you employed?

A.

I am.

or on:

Q.

What is the nature of your employment?

A.

I am self-employed.

I am an accident investigator,

accident reconstructionist•
Q.

How long have you been involved in the business of

accident investigation and accident reconstruction?
A.

Probably about 40 years.

I was a policeman starting

in 1952, and then I retired in 1985, so I started doing this
more than 40 years ago.
Q.

Would you please explain to the jury how you got

involved in accident investigation and reconstruction.A.

Sure.

I started as a dispatcher in 1952, and worked

full time doing that down in Provo.

I worked part time for

Utah County as a deputy sheriff and part time for Springville
City as a police officer, doing what you did in those days.

In

1955 I went full time for the sheriff!s department in Provo,
stayed there until 1958.

In 1958 I went back to the highway

patrol, this time as a trooper, and was assigned on tL
working out of Utah County.

/oad,

I completed training at Camp

Williams Police Academy, and then started teaching there part
time in the early 1960fs.

In 1965 I was given a scholarship by

the Automotive Safety Foundation to go back to Northwestern
University's one-year-long course called the traffic police
administration training program.

I was in an option or a

specialty called traffic training, how traffic is investigated,
why it is investigated, and then how you teach those subjects.
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Q.

How long were you back at Northwestern?

A.

One academic year.

That was September through June

of 1966.
Q.

Does Northwestern University have any special

significance with regards to the field of accident
reconstruction?
A.

Yes.

It is the elite place in the world today, still

is Northwestern University.
about 60 years.

They have been in business for

And it is the —

it is the place to go for the

traffic training material.
Q.

What did you do after completing that year program at

Northwestern?
A.

I was reassigned back to Utah, but this time

transferred into Salt Lake, and worked out of the training
division from 1966 to 1977.

I taught at the police academy.

I

taught for Weber State College in credit courses, in accident
investigation and vehicle traffic law in.

1977 I was

transferred out as a zone commander for the highway patrol,
stayed out about a year, went back to the administration at
this time as the administrative officer, was there for three
years, had a change of administration, went back to the field
for two years, went back to headquarters in 1985, and then
!

—

83, and then I retired in 1985.
Q.

What have you been doing?

You say you retired.

Was

that from the Utah Highway Patrol?

$ rf n7 *

A.

I did.

Q.

What have you been doing since retiring in '85?

A.

Well, besides enjoying myself, I have my own business

which is the accident reconstruction that I do now.

And I had

had that business from the 1960fs all the time I worked for the
State.
Q.

Approximately how much of your time do you spend in

this reconstruction business?
you say —
A.

spend some time

Is this just a small time when

—

I don't work always 40 hours a week, but I spend

considerable time, just because of my work load, in doing
reconstruction around the western states.
Q.

At the present time are you a member of any

professional associations?
A.

I am.

I am a member of the International Association

of Accident Reconstruction Specialists, the Southwest and the
Washington Association of Technical Accident Investigators,
and, of course, Northwestern Alumni Association, through the
traffic institute.
Q.

Do you attend any continuing training programs or

seminars?
A.

I do.

Q.

What kinds of programs are those?

A.

I attend at least twice yearly, dealing with courses

put on by the Southwest Association or Northwestern University
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or the Institute of Police Technology Management.

Last year I

took training in low-speed collisions, medium-speed collisions,
the use of microprocessors in accident reconstruction, which
just means crunching numbers into a computer.
Q.

Mr. Knight, I may have gotten us a little bit ahead

of ourselves.

Would you explain to the jury what is meant by

the term accident reconstruction.
A.

Yes.

Reconstruction is putting together parts of an

accident, in usable form.
designs puzzles.

It is much like the person who

That person has intricate knowledge -that

someone else may not have.

An investigator measures length of

skid marks, distances cars go, all of these things.

A

reconstructionist then uses that data to say, "But what if?"
If this had occurred, what were the speeds?
occurred, what is the speeds?

If this had

So it is the person who helps

the trier of fact, the jury or the judge or the attorneys get
some usable information from 11,e data that we have.
Q.

In accident reconstruction are you trying to

determine how or why an accident occurred?
A.

Oh, yes, sure, the how and the why, of course, comes

as part of that.

We know where it happened, when it happened,

but we move to another level and say, why did it happen?
did we have these things happen?
body?

Where did the cars go?

Why

What was the motion on the

Did they go the proper places?

And all of those related things.
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Q.

Is accident reconstruction based on any particular

science?
A.

Oh, yes.

It is based upon physics, because it deals

with movement and distance and time.

The basis for accident

reconstruction is physics and mathematics, obviously.
Q.

Now, over your years, how many years?

A.

Well, I have had my own business for 30 years, so

and I have been doing it for —

—

I started 44 years ago in June,

so I have been doing it a long time.
Q.

Would you have some kind of estimate as to how many

cases or accidents you investigated or evaluated?
A.

Well, investigated, I only did about 250 on the road.

But evaluated, I have looked at thousands and thousands,
because that's part of the teaching process, as well as my own
consulting work.
Q.

What types of cases have you looked at?

A.

All the way from no impact to very high impact, of

closing speeds near or exceeding 100 miles an hour.

So it is

all the way from the "fender bender" up to the most serious
I
that you can get.
THE COURT:

Counsel, is anyone going to be offended

if we take that brief break that the Court anticipated?
have the long-distance call in now.

We

Give us an opportunity to

briefly address the concerns of the caller, and we will be back
and take whatever time either side requires to proceed with
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this witness.
Ladies and gentlemen, the Court is going to take a
brief recess on a matter unrelated to this case.
recess remember the admonition of the Court.

During the

Do not discuss

the case among yourselves, do not permit anyone to discuss the
case in your presence, do not form nor express an opinion in
the case until it has been submitted to you for your
deliberation and your decision.

We are going to take a very

brief recess.
(Court was in recess.)
THE COURT:

The Court is back in session.

The record

will reflect the presence of the jury, counsel and the parties.
You may proceed with your examination of the witness.
Q. (By Mr. Hansen)

Mr. Knight, I was asking you about

some of your experience in investigating automobile accidents.
Let me ask, do you have experience in reconstructing or
evaluating automobile accidents involving speeds of 35 to 40
miles per hour?
A.

I do.

Q.

Do you have —

what experience do you have with

regards to accidents involving speeds of 15 to 25 miles per
hour?
A.

Well, I have experience, because, one, I have

investigated them; and, two, we have staged them, in which we
have cars that —

in an inline crash, that we stage and have

8
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1

the bullet car hit the target vehicle, or the side of the car.

2

Q.

When you say "we," we stage them?

3

A.

"We" meaning the association and others who do this

4

routinely.

The McMinnis Engineering did it for us at the last

5

session in Phoenix.

6

that does it.

And when I say "we," it is the association

7

Q.

What is the purpose of these

8

A.

A couple.

9

—

One is to see what the dynamics is of the

body, where the body moves, why the body moves.

The other is

10

for injury causation.

11

mathematical models that we have meet true-life experience.

12

Q.

Also, then we want to see if the

Have you had experience in reconstructing or

13

evaluating accidents at lower speeds, say three to five miles

14

per hour?

15

A.

I have.

16

Q.

How would you characterize the speed of three-to-five

17

miles-per-hour impact versus 15 to 25 miles per hour?

18
19

MR. KING:
Q.

Excuse me.

Terminology.

In regard to what?

Is there some kind of terms we could

20 I use make it less awkward if I am talking about a three-to-five
21
22
23

mile-per-hour impact?
A.

Sure.

Low-speed or walk-speed impacts are low.

You

are running into the medium range when you get about 25.

24

Q.

Low speed is what?

25 J

A.

Three to five.

Someplace.

It is a gray area.

You
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get an overlap.

About 25 you start to get in the medium.

Over

35, depending on the type, then it can be high injury causing.
Q.

For our purposes today, if we are talking about a

three-to-five-mile-per hour impact, could we use the term low
speed?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What about 15 to 25 miles per hour?

A.

Well, you can't compare one with the other.

Q.

Is there a term we could use?

A.

Call that a medium speed.

Q.

With regards to your experience, have you had

experience, or what experience have you had in investigating or
reconstructing accidents where there is little or no apparent
damage to the vehicles?
A.

I have looked at hundreds of those, where you have

little or no damage, or no reported damage, but reported
injury, and I have looked at, well, many hundreds of those over
the years, and I have staged those and helped stage those.
Q.

Are there certain documents that you normally review

and look at when reconstructing or evaluating an accident?
A.

There is.

Q.

What kind of documents do you normally look at?

A.

One of the documents you look at if it has been

prepared is the state accident report.
Q.

Is that the report filled out by the investigating

10
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1

officer?

2

A.

3

report out.

4

report out, because that's where the break-off level is now.

5
6
7

Yes.

If it meets a certain criteria, they fill that

If it is under $400 damage, they don't fill the

MR. KING:
Q.

That's not relevant.

Do you investigate accidents where there is no

accident report?

8

A.

Oh, yes.

9

Q.

Have you done that before this case?

10

A.

Oh, yes, many, many times.

11

Q.

I think we may have interrupted you.

12
13

What other

documents do you tend to look at?
A.

Well, I look at the depositions that are usually

14

taken.

15

photographs of the damage, and look for what was not damaged.

16

I look at exemplar vehicles.

17

data, dealing with tea'.- of human subjects in like crashes.

18

And I look then at the data created dealing with the federal

19

bumper standards of vehicles.

20

all the way from the federal rules, through the data that's

21

created, through the data that you get from photographs, and

22

then the depositions and all of that related material.

23

Q.

I look at any repair orders that were done.

I look at

And I also look at published

So I look at all kinds of data,

Let's talk about this case.

Have you reviewed an

24

investigating officer's report for this accident involving our

25

client, Mrs. Clark, and Mrs. Astill?

11
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1 I

A.

I did not.

2 1

Q.

Did you attempt to obtain an accident report?

3 1

A.

I did.

4

I went to West Valley City and requested it,

and none was on file.

5|

Q.

Do you know why there was no accident report?

6 I

A.

Reported to be under $400 damage, and that's the

7
8 I
9

break-off level of which you file a report.
Q.

Have you reviewed any accident reports involving the

plaintiff?

10 I

A.

I have.

11

Q.

Would the other report be the 1992 accident?

12

A.

I did.

13

Q.

What about deposition testimony?

14

deposition -—

15

A.

I read the deposition of Astill and Clark, both.

16

Q.

Have you had an opportunity to review the photographs

Have you read the

17

which have been put on a board, marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit

18

No. 4?

19

A.

I have.

20

Q.

Are you familiar with the types of vehicles that were

21

involved in this accident?

22 I

A.

I am.

23

Q.

And this accident we are talking about, the 1994

24
25

accident involving the parties?
A.

Yes.

12
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Q.

What vehicles were involved in that accident?

A.

One was a 1991 Ford Explorer, and the other one was a

1994 I think it was Ford Taurus.
Q.

What familiarity do you have with these types of

vehicles?
A.

Well, I own a new Explorer, or my wife does, and I

own a '93 Ford Taurus.
Q.

Have you taken photographs of Tauruses and Explorers?

A.

I did.

Q.

Let me show you three photographs which have been

I photographed my vehicles.

marked as Defendant's Exhibit Y, Z and AA, and ask you if you
can identify those photographs?
A.

I can.

These are photographs that I took of my

vehicle parked up against, virtually touching the Ford
Explorer, and then a profile shot.
Q.

We should indicate that's photograph AA?

A.

That's AA.

Y is the front of my '93 Ford Taurus.

And Z is the back of the Explorer
MR. HANSEN:

I would move for the admission of

Exhibits Y, Z and AA.
THE COURT:
MR. KING:
THE COURT:
Q.

Any objection?
No.
They are received.

Mr. Knight, are you familiar with the bumpers that

are on the Ford Taurus and the Ford Explorer?

13
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1 I

A.

I am.

2

Q.

Can you tell the jury anything about the composition,

3

the make-up of these bumpers?

4

A.

Yes.

The Ford Taurus bumper is a plastic cover that

5

covers what we call an egg shell, and an egg shell is a series

6

of plastic boxes and foam cover over it, and that's what gives

7

it the body.

8

could stand it up, and it would fall down, because it is soft.

9

Behind that you have this backing material of almost like a

The actual cover itself is very limber.

You

10

styrofoam, and behind it you have virtually an egg crate, and

11

then, of course, that's eventually mounted onto something that

12

goes onto the car.

13

vehicle back, you get the plastic cover, then you go into the

14

styrofoam

15
16

Q.

—
Would it help to show that on Exhibit AA?

A.

18

Sure.
MR. HANSEN:

Would the witness be allowed to step

down?

20

THE COURT:

Step right into the well, and invite

21

counsel to stand wherever they need to be to see the

22

presentation of the witness to the jury.

23
24
25

Would that

help you to describe this?

1'

19

But from moving from the front of the

Q.

Would you be able to use that photograph to help

describe, show what you are describing?
A.

I could.

I would probably have to stand about in the

14
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1
2
3
4

middle, I guess.
Q.

You were starting to explain about what that bumper

is made out of as you move away from the car.
A.

Maybe I will have to do it twice.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. KING:

7

A.

Are counsel able to see the presentation?
Yes, your Honor.

You have the plastic cover, and then behind that

8

plastic cover you have like styrofoam that sits behind it, and

9

then behind it we have called the egg crate or the egg shell,

10

and that's little pieces of square plastic, and then behind it,

11

it hooks onto a piece of metal and eventually onto the car.

12

moving backwards, if you do damage, you —

13

can cut this plastic, then you go to the styrofoam, then you

14

break this little egg shell stuff, and eventually, if the

15

impact is hard enough, you get clear back into the motor, but

16

this is the stuff that you see that looks i-ke ^etal, but is

17

actually plastic.

18

inches before you ever get into metal on it.

19

comparison to the bumper of the Ford, this is actually metal,

20

it is about an eighth of an inch thick.

first of all, you

You have to go maybe two and a half, three
That in

21

Q.

You are pointing to the Ford Explorer now?

22

A.

That's correct.

23

Q.

How thick is the metal?

24
25

The Ford Explorer

—

Is it solid, a solid sheet

of metal?
A.

It is a formed piece of metal, and it is probably

15
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So

1

about an eighth of an inch thick, and it is formed so that you

2

get the pretty lines that you have in here, and it is just what

3

you see, a piece of chromed metal.

4

party where the ball hooks on, and it is another piece, plate

5

that bolts onto the bottom of it, two separate pieces.

6

it then you move into some mounting brackets.

7

brackets then attach to the frame of the Explorer.

8

two different types, really, is what you have.

9
10

Q.

Then you have a bottom

Behind

The mounting
So you have

Are you familiar with the brackets that attach the

bumper of the Explorer to the vehicle?

11 I

A.

I am.

12

Q.

Let me ask this.

A vehicle such as the Taurus that

13

you have described, would you be able to say, from your

14

experience in accident reconstruction, what damage one would

15

expect to see from a Ford Taurus involved in a 15- to 25-mile-

16

per-hour impact?

17

A.

In a rear-end collision?

18

Q.

Front-end.

19

A.

Sorry about that.

20
21
22
23

vehicle.
Q.
Explorer.
A.

The damage

—

That's a bullet against a target

Sure, I could describe that.
Let's say you have a Taurus running into a stopped
What damage would you expect to see?
The first damage you expect to see is to the Ford

24

Taurus, because the Ford Taurus is the weakest part.

When the

25

Taurus hits, everything is plastic, will start to fold, and it
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1

will fold proportionate to speed.

When that folding stops,

2

then you start to move further back into the engine.

3

miles an hour you would expect to see compaction of the bumper

4

to where it is deformed and pushed in, and this type of crash

5

you would expect to come up, over the top, actually cut the

6

bumper, because of the lip that comes out on the Explorer, and

7

then you would expect to see penetration clear into the engine

8

compartment, past the radiator.

9

breaks first breaks, and there is nothing between the front of

At 25

First of all, everything that

10

the car and the radiator but air, once you get past the front

11

piece of plastic.

12

engine compartment through the radiator, and that's where the

13

force goes.

14

So as that folds, then you get back into the

Then that force then can start to do something to the

15

Ford Explorer, because the phenomena is that which has the

16

least strength breaks first, which it should.

17

to reach equilibrium, all of the soft parts have started to

18

fold, then we start to go to the next strongest thing, and that

19

would be the bumper against the radiator of the car.

20

Eventually, if you push the radiator back far enough, then you

21

can start doing this damage as you move forward.

22

Q.

Now, if we start

Let me see if I can speed this up just a little bit.

23

Based on your experience and expertise in accident

24

reconstruction, would it be consistent with your experience and

25

expertise to have a 15- to 25-mile-per-hour impact by a Ford

17
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Taurus without showing any kind of significant damage?
A.

No, not in a case like this.

Q.

Let me ask, Mr. Knight, did you evaluate this

accident?
A,

I did.

Q.

Would you tell us the process that you went through

or that you go through in investigating —

in evaluating this

kind of an accident?
A.

Could I put it on the board?
THE COURT:

It might be faster.

Mark whatever he is going to write on as

Defendant's next in order, and he is invited to step into the
well and use it.
Q.

Mr. Knight, what do you do, or what did you do in

evaluating this type of an accident?
A.

The process I used was quite simple.

all, looked at the damage and Ipck of damage.

I, first of
I looked at the

damage that E could see and the lack of damage, because that
puts it into perspective of what I would expect.

Though I

didn't actually draw these little Volkswagens, I mentally said,
if I have a collision of this magnitude, what happens?

If I

have a high-speed accident, then I am going to see damage
against the weakest parts showing most visual damage, and the
strongest parts showing the least.
Q.

Are you referencing one as the Taurus and the other

as the Explorer?
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A.

Yeah.

We are moving in this direction.

The left

most Volkswagen here is the Taurus and this is the Explorer.
Q.

Do you mind putting a "T" below it?

A.

I will put "Explorer over here."

The next thing I

did is look and say, what was the report of distances of
movement?

The distance of the reported movement was one foot

on the part of the Explorer.

Then what I did is I said I have

got a bracket now, and see what happens.
Q.

Are you talking about movement post impact?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

The one foot?

A.

That's the one foot that the plaintiff said that the

vehicle may have moved.

I looked at 15 miles an hour, and

said, at 15 miles per hour, that equals 22 feet per second, so
for every second that that car travels —
second hand, but I guess it is there —

I can hardly see that

for every second, which

is one thousand one, I have to account for 22 feet, because
that's how far that vehicle moves at 15 miles an hour is 22
feet.
Q.

Is there a general equation that the jurors could use

to convert miles per hour to feet per second?
A.

Yes•

Q.

What is that, roughly?

A.

It is one and a half times the number.

So if you

take the speed of 15, plus one half the speed, which is seven,
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1

that's 22 feet per second-

2

other words, just the speed plus one half the speed.

3

looked and said if, in fact, I am going 15 miles an hour, I

4

have to account for 22 feet of movement in one second.

5

I do that?

6

movement.

7

Q.

20 miles an hour would be 30.

In

So I

How can

I either do it through damage or I do it through

Mr. Knight, let me make sure I understand what you

8

are saying.

9

moving at 15 miles per hour, that immediately before impact it

10

Are you saying, then, that if the Taurus was

is traveling 22 feet per second?

11

A.

Absolutely.

12

Q.

If it is traveling 15 miles per hour?

13

A.

In one second it moves 22 feet.

14

Q.

Now, you are explaining how you try to account for

15
16

that movement?
A.

Well, the next thing I did, really, at the beginning,

17

I said, what's the objective material that we have?

18

is like saying, well, this room is hot, you can argue all day.

19

What is the actual temperature?

20

objective.

21

there was virtually no damage at impact.

74 degrees.

Objective

That becomes

The objective data we have from the photographs is
Now, I say virtually

22 I no damage.
23

The second thing we know that is objective, although

24

it was just by statement, is that there was one foot of skid

25

mark.

Now, putting that in balance, the driver said I am

20

oacco?

1

stopped.

2

car moves forward with the acceleration of an idling car.

3

looked at that and said, okay, what's that going to be if, for

4

example, I am going at three miles per hour?

5

half feet per second.

6
7

Q.

A.

12

So I

That's four and a

Mr. Knight, why are you considering a speed of three

Well, because the bumper standard on this Taurus is a

three-mile-per-hour bumper.

10
11

And the velocity of the

miles per hour?

8
9

My foot comes off the brake.

Q.

What do —

the jury and I may not be familiar with

bumper standards.
A.

The federal government has said a bumper has to have

13

a standard of "X" number of miles per hour before you really

14

get distortion and damage back into the vehicle.

15

standard they put on it.

16

I know it has to be low, because there is so little damage done

17

in the actual collision, and a reported one foot of movement.

18

One foot of movement might account for about three miles an

19

hour.

That's the

The other reason I used it is because

But I took all of these things, and then said, okay, if

20 I I am going 15 miles an hour, now I look to see what happens to
21

the participants.

22

MR. KING:

Excuse me, your Honor.

It took me a

23

moment to think this through.

24

about a federal standard, the question is, what is the

25

specification of the Ford Taurus for its bumper?

The testimony of the witness
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1
2

THE COURT:

He is objecting to a foundational

question, and he is permitted to ask that isolated question.

3

MR. KING:

I would ask that the answer be stricken on

4

the three miles per hour.

5

model Taurus involved in the accident designed to handle?

6

THE COURT:

The question is, what speed is the

The motion is denied.

I thought you

7

wanted to have a point of clarification on what the federal

8

standard was.

9

examination.

10

Q.

I am sorry.

11

A,

I think you said, then what did I do?

12

Q.

Let me ask this.

Overruled.

You may inquire into that on cross-

I am distracted.
Was that it?

You are indicating that you

13

reviewed the testimony where Mrs. Clark said that she was

14

stopped, and her foot slipped off the brake.

15

A,

Yes.

16

Q.

In accident reconstruction, are there formulas where

17

you can calculate what speeds would be involved in a vehicle

18

going from a stopped position traveling a few feet with normal

19

acceleration?

20

A.

Sure.

That's a basic movement formula.

21

Q.

Have you looked at those calculations?

22 I

A.

I did.

23

Q.

Would you be able to give the jury any understanding

24

as to what types of speeds might be involved if, in fact, the

25

accident occurred as Mrs. Clark is indicating?

22
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A.
find it.

Sure.

I ran a chart now I put away, and I have to

But the chart I used for normal acceleration, and the

normal acceleration meaning that a person would step on the
gas, as if he were going to go with "normal acceleration."
I said, what would the speed be at the end of —

And

well, this is

the closest, is 5.43 feet, and the speed will be 4.94 miles an
hour.
Q.

That would be if a person were pressing the

accelerator?
A.

That's with a normal acceleration rate.

If we take

the rolling acceleration, which would be about .05, if we went
five feet, the speed would be about 2.7 miles an hour.
MR. KING:

Lack of foundation, your Honor.

The

testimony of Mrs. Clark in her deposition was she was five
feet, ten feet • r more back.

Five feet is misleading.

It

doesn't respond to her testimony.
THE COURT:

That's a matter for cross-examination.

Overruled.
Q.

So, Mr. Knight, you have indicated that if we were to

apply a rolling acceleration of .05, and you were to do that
over five feet, the miles per hour would be about 2.7 miles per
hour?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Let's go to Mr. King's statement about ten feet.

A.

The closest I have is 9.86 feet, and that would be
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3.85 miles an hour.
Q.

So if one were to assume the facts as Miss Clark has

indicated, what would you indicate would be a range that you
would expect that vehicle to be traveling?
A.

Well, if we use that five feet or ten feet, someplace

between two and three quarter miles an hour and 3.8 miles an
hour.
Q.

Would you mind indicating that on your chart here?

h.

Sure.

Q.

Speed rolling from a stop.

A.

I have indicated five feet at 2.7 miles per hour, and

ten feet, 3.85 miles per hour, both of those from a rolling
from a stop.
Q.

Mr. Knight, I apologize.

I did interrupt you.

You

were explaining what process you go through in evaluating this
accident.
A.

What did you do next?
The next thing I looked at was, what happened to the

participants? during this crash?

We have a woman who is sitting

in the back, has a steering wheel in front of her.

We have a

driver who is virtually the same, sitting in front, steering
wheel in front of her.

But then I looked to see what would

happen to the bullet vehicle, thatfs the defendant, because her
testimony was, and the plaintiff was, that she was turned,
adjusting a child, so she is in no position to protect herself.
I looked at it

—
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Q.

What would the laws of physics indicate would happen

to a person sitting in that position, if they then rear-ended a
vehicle stopped in front of them?
A.

She is going to go forward.

Q.

Is that based on the laws of physics?

A.

Sure.

That's Newton's equal and opposite.

That's

why we have damage on both vehicles, because we have forces
going in both directions.

But that back driver, who is unaware

that the crash is coming, is sitting in a turned position, and
if she goes into a crash at the range of 15 miles an hour
unprotected, with the side, then you look to see what her
injuries were, because that's objective of what happens to her.
We can't control that.

She can't control it.

She is looking

away.
The next thing I looked at was to see what happens to
the lead driver.

The lead driver, if the car moves, and moves

proportionately, we want to see what the <-li&nge of velocity is
in that direction.
Q.

And this driver then

—

When you say, "change of velocity," you are talking

accident reconstruction terms, can we call that speed?
A.

For this case let's call it speed.

zero, how fast did she get hit to?

She is going from

That's change of velocity.

If the car gets hit, the first thing is we get the crush.

I

look to see what the reported injuries are of the people, I
look to see what the damages are of the people, for the damage
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of the car, and then those movements.

If you put it in the

range of 15 miles an hour, you just can't make it work, because
there is certain things we can't control, and that's the amount
of damage that goes to the vehicle, and how far the car moves.
So all of these things, when you put them in balance, you can't
account for 22 feet.

But you can account for in the range of

about three miles an hour, because we know there was a
touching, we know there was an imprint of the ball into the
bumper, and we know there was supposed to be a shifting of that
bumper on the brackets of the Explorer.
Q.

Let me ask you now, after doing this evaluation, did

you reach certain conclusions about this accident?
A.

I did.

Q.

Did you reach any conclusions regarding the speeds

involved by the Taurus vehicle?
A.

I did.

Q.

What was your conclusion?
MR. KING:

dire the witness?

I will object, your Honor.

May I voir

I don't think there is an adequate

foundation.
THE COURT:
MR. KING:

Wherein is it lacking?
I don't know, he is making so many

assumptions, he is assuming there is no deformation of the
Taurus bumper at the outset.

He is assuming there is virtually

no damage to the struck vehicle.

He is assuming the
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defendant's statement is correct.

He is assuming there is only

five or ten feet she moved forward, instead of maybe not having
stopped.
one foot.

He is assuming the vehicle struck moved forward only
These are all subjects.

For example, he stated that

the federal standard is three miles an hour, and the bumper
will deform.

It is a standard that's higher than three, if you

run into a wall, not into another vehicle.
THE COURT:
Overruled.
Q.

Those are matters for cross-examination.

You may proceed.
If you want to take the stand again, Mr. Knight, we

can move the chart out of your way.
What opinions, then, did you form with regards to the
speed of the Taurus?
A.

Based on one other analysis that I made of this, I

can give you what I did, there is one other thing that I looked
at with this.
Q.

What else did you look at?

A.

I looked at the imprinting and the, damage pattern

between the two vehicles, because the Taurus has a torpedo
nose, and it also hit a very sharp object, is sharp in terms of
width and height and everything.

The Taurus hits a bumper

—

hits a trailer hitch that has a ball on it.
Q.

Is that significant?

A.

Absolutely.

Q.

The ball on the trailer hitch?

27

{\ fl A *yft&

A.

Well, it is significant because of the type of

accident that you have and the damage that we have here.
Q.

Explain how it is significant.

A.

In actual crash tests, what you do with the Taurus,

and any other car, is you run it into a barrier, and that
barrier is a great, big piece of concrete that can't move.
When you run it in, that whole front of the car folds
proportionately.

You can predict that the right front fender

will fold back the same distance as the left front fender,
because they are hitting.

Now, if we change that, and turn the

barrier that we hit pointed and run it in at the same speed,
what you will see, you will see a magnitude much greater.
Q.

Can you show us on this drawing, or —

I am wondering

if this picture would help?
A.

It is easier to do it on another page.
MR. HANSEN:

paper off.

If I may, I would like to take this

I move for the admission of Exhibit BB.

MR. KING:
foundation.

I object, your Honor.

There is inadequate

I would ask at least it be withheld until I have

concluded my cross.
THE COURT:

The motion is sustained.

The Court will

not rule on its admissibility until after cross-examination.
Mark the next one as Plaintiff's next in order.
Q.

Would you be able to explain to the jury what you are

describing here, Mr. Knight, on Exhibit CC?
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A.

Let me write, and then I will move.

do it right here.
a barrier.

Maybe they can

In actual crash testing, you run a car into

And if we run that car into a barrier

fi f!

X

speed, we

say this much damage occurs at "X" speed, and it is visual.
You see that.

And that damage is spread across the whole

distance, kind of like taking an ax, you slam an ax against a
piece of wood from the side, you don't see much.

If we change

this now, and in this particular case we have a Taurus that has
a tapered nose, if we were to bring something in that is much
sharper, if we ran this into this barrier again at "X" speed,
whatever "X" is, the visual thing that you will see on this car
will be much greater, because of the point, than you do across
the whole thing, just because it is centered, and that velocity
centers into a particular place•
In the case that you have here, we have exactly the
same phenomena, except what it hit was the ball.

But that ball j

hits the front, so whatever you see, all of that force was
centered on one place, so the visual that's there would be much
greater than the visual if we had retarded the whole front, as
you see up here.
Q.

Mr. Knight, are you familiar with the testimony I

think of the two drivers, that there may have been a small dent
in the license plate of the Taurus, that would line up with the
ball?
A.

I am.

29

09070?

1

Q.

2

hour impact?

3

A.

4
5

Could that denting account for a 15- to 25-mile-per-

No, not that alone.

Nothing in this case accounts

for a 15- to 25-mile-an-hour impact.
Q.

Let me just ask one other question that may be a

6

little bit of a sidetrack.

7

amount of forces that would have been involved in this accident

8

as compared to the plaintiff's 1992 accident, a vehicle

9

traveling 35 to 40 miles per hour?

10
11
12

A.

Would you be able to compare the

Oh, you can compare it, sure.

What is the

comparison, you mean?
Q.

Can you give the jury some assistance in the

13

difference of the collision or the forces involved in those

14

types of collisions?

15

A.

Well, the magnitude is much greater, obviously, the

16

lower the speed, the less potential you have for injury.

35

17

miles an hour takes 58 feet to skid to a stop.

18

account for 58 feet, if we have a left-turning car, we have to

19

account for all of that speed.

20

quickly.

21

may go to zero velocity in as little as five feet, and that

22

will give you a deceleration rate that's extremely high, and

23

that's what causes injury.

24

feet, you would have an acceleration or deceleration, because

25

they are all the same thing, of eight G's.

We have to

And that speed comes very

I would be going from a forward velocity of 35, and I

We went from 35 to zero in five

That means that the
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driver's body would weigh eight times what that person normally
weighs.

Tremendous forces when those things happen.

Q.

Eight times the force of gravity?

A.

Well, eight times the person's weight.

the force of gravity.

Eight times

I have one G of gravity, but the weight

is 250 pounds.
Q.

What type of G's would be involved in this accident

that we are seeing between the Taurus and the Explorer?
MR. KING:

Same objection, your Honor, inadequate

foundation.
THE COURT:
A.

Overruled.

I think that in this case you are probably in the

range of about one G, if that high.

G.

Q.

What is the significance of that?

A.

The significance'is that I stand up, I am moving one

There is no injury causation in these low levels of change

of velocity.

As I sit —

make sure where my chair is —

sit, that might be three G's.

as I

The force is such that my weight

and my velocity really makes me heavier, and without that
"change of velocity," you donft get injury.

So when we get

down into these low levels of change of velocity, it is dealing
with what we do every day.
G.

Every time you stand up, you go one

Every time you step off a step, you may have gone two G ! s.

A runner, not a jogger, but a runner, may hit at three G ! s,
because every time he hits, that foot is coming down.

So what
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you see here is levels of forces that we encounter in everyday
life,
Q.

In your evaluation of this accident, were you able to

form any conclusions with regards to the mechanics of injury?
A.

I did.

Q.

Tell us what you found.

A.

Going back to the other exhibit, if I may, I looked

to see the mechanics of injury to see what happens to the body.
The most protected place that you can put a body if you want to
change its velocity is against something that is both cushioned
and supportive.

If, for example, I wanted to be shot into

space, one of the best ways is that you are prone, with your
back supported against something that's cushioned, because that
accepts part of the force as it goes in, because force
diminishes as it goes.

The force from the Taurus to the

Explorer diminishes all the way to the driver.
So then you look to see, well, where are those places
that I am going to get this change of velocity?

The best

protection that a driver can have is to have a headrest in
proper position, and a cushioned seat to cushion the lower
back, because then what you are doing is you are spreading that
force, just like I am going to sit down.

It is much more

comfortable for me to sit across my whole buttocks than to have
a sharp object there, I guess is the best example, because I
plop, but I am supported against that whole area, so the best

32

00070T

thing you can have is always have support across everything
that has the potential for a change of velocity.
Q.

Mr. Knight, a moment ago I asked you what direction

the driver of the Taurus would travel after impact, and you
have indicated forward.
A.

Absolutely.

Q.

What about the direction of the driver of the

Explorer when she is hit from behind?

What direction would her

body go?
A.

Technically, she doesn't move.

from under her.

The car moves out

But in our mind she is propelled forward.

Actually, she is sitting still, and the car wants to go
through.
Q.

Backwards?

A.

We think she is propelled backwards.

In reality,

that isn't quite true, when you look at the physics of it, but
that's t**e feeling we get.
Q.

The two drivers in this accident, would they have had

equal protection as you were kind of describing it?
A.

Heavens no.

Q.

I think you have kind of explained that.

A.

The lady in the Taurus, first of all, if she is

looking away, she has a side coming into a more rigid thing,
which is the steering wheel.

Compare the rigidity of the

steering wheel with the cushion of the seat.
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MR. KING:

Object, there is no testimony that she was

not in her seat belt, which would keep her from her steering
wheel•
THE COURT:

The Court recalls the testimony was that

she reached to the passenger seat to snap in a seat belt, and
when she did that, the car moved forward.
MR. KING:

There is no testimony she released her

seat belt, which would keep her from the steering wheel.
Q.

Let me ask this.

You own a Taurus; is that correct?

A.

I do.

Q.

If you have your seat belt still on, would you be

able to reach all the way over to the far end of the Taurus to
buckle in a passenger's seat belt?
A.

No.

Even if I did, the seat belt isn't going to

restrain me at these low speeds.

The seat belt doesn't kick in

and lock until you get speeds over this.
Q.

The seat belt isn't a factor?

A.

No.

The factor is the potential for her body's

movement, and if she is protected in the Taurus, as the lady in
the Explorer, and the answer is no, she isn't nearly as
protected.
Q.

Who is most vulnerable?

A.

The lady in the Taurus.

Q.

And the lady in the Explorer?

A.

Well, she is protected by a higher-backed seat, a
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cushioned seat, and she is in better position for injury
mechanisms.
Q.

She is better protected.

In accident reconstruction have you reviewed

authoritative literature dealing with injury from low-impact
accidents?
A.

I have.

Q.

Are you aware of any literature dealing with the

potential, whether or not it exists, for low back injury in a
low-speed accident?
A.

Yes.

Lots of material has been produced even for CBS

60 Minutes, dealing with low-speed crashes.
Q.

Have you studied that material?

A.

I have.

Showing that in those accidents, where you

have the low range of rear-end collisions, and side collisions,
you don't have +' ** injury mechanism there that exceeds what we
go through in daily life.
Q.

Let me just ar'„ you just a couple more questions,

Mr. Knight.

You have reviewed Mrs. Astillfs testimony about

what she saw in the rear view mirror; is that correct?
A.

I did.

Q.

Do you recall what she stated the speed was that she

saw the other vehicle traveling?
A.

Her deposition testimony was 15 to 25, and I am told

that her trial testimony was 15.
Q.

Did she indicate also as to how far away the vehicle
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was when she first saw it?
A.

I think —

lookinging for it.

she did, but I don't remember it.

I am

I think she said it was a car length.

Ten

to fifteen feet is what she said in her deposition.
Q.

Mr. Knight, is it mathematically possible, based on

the laws of physics, for a vehicle to be 10 to 15 feet away,
traveling 15 to 25 miles per hour, and have impact a second or
two later?
A.

No.

Q.

That can't add up?

A.

Well, in the context that we have now, sure.

I can

be traveling 15 to 25 and have it occur later.
Q.

But not within —

I mean —

well

—

A.

But you can't have the end result as this.

You have

to put it in balance, and say if I was going 25 miles an hour,
10 to 15 feet away, what would the end result be?
know collision happened.

Because we

You again go back to look at the

objective data, and you just don't have those things that match
up.
Q.

If the vehicle was traveling 15 to 25 miles per hour,

and the vehicle was only 10 to 15 feet away, the length of time
before collision would be far less than a second; isn't that
right?
A.

Yeah.

If you are 25, that's 37 feet per second.

If

you are 15 feet, that would be a half a second, you are talking
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parts of seconds for this to occur.
Q.

Based on accident reconstruction, then, do you have

an opinion whether the plaintiff could be accurate in her
recollection as to what she saw in that rear view mirror?
A.

I have an opinion.

Q.

What is your opinion?

A.

It could not be, because the end result doesn't match

with all of this, because neither one of them talk about skid
marks.

Mrs. —

looking away.
am stopped."

get the name right —

Clark says, "I was

I didn't ever skid, because I am pulled up and I
When you put it into balance, it does not balance

out that you have these speeds.
Q.
today.

Mr. Knight, you have given a number of opinions here
How confident are you about your opinions in this case?

A.

Based on all of the data that you have, all of the

objective data you have, I am confident in -*v, because the data
just does not support that high a speed.
MR. HANSEN:

Nothing further.

THE COURT:

Cross-examination?

MR. KING:

Your Honor, my expert, Mr. Lord, is

sitting in the hall, because he was excluded.

I have got to

talk over some of the details of Mr. Knight's testimony with
him.

I know we want to move, but I have to do this.
THE COURT:
MR. KING:

Would you like a recess?
Yes, please.
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THE COURT:

Letfs take a recess.

That's a reasonable

request.
Ladies and gentlemen, the Court is going to be in
recess ten minutes.
given previously.

During the recess remember the admonition

Do not discuss the case among yourselves, do

not permit anyone to discuss the case in your presence, do not
form nor express an opinion in the case until it has been
submitted to you for your deliberation and your decision.

We

will be in recess about ten minutes.
(Court was in recess.)
THE COURT:

The record will reflect the jury is

present, counsel are present, the parties are present.

Are you

prepared to proceed with cross-examination?
MR. KING:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
You may.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. KING:
Q.

Mr. Knight, I understand you have testified that you

handle about 250 cases a year; is that correct?
A.

True•

Q.

I understand you testified that you charge $1,000 to

$1,500 per case; is that true?
A.

I have never said that.

I have never even implied

that.
Q.

What is your average charge per case?
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A.

No idea.

Q.

How long have you been in this business?

A.

30 years.

Q.

What is your average charge per case?

You have an

idea, I believe.
A.

I donft.

All the way from $200 to $3 ,000 or $4, 000,

probably.
Q.

Haven't you stated your average is $1 ,000 to $1, 500

when deposed under oath?
A.

There is no way I have said that.

It isn1 t true, so

1

I wouldn1 t have said it.
Q.

But your charges run from a few hundred to a few

1

thousand?
A.

True.

Q.

I believe you testified that the overwhelming

majority of your cases you represent the defendant?
A.

I didn't testify to that here, but that's true,

work more defense work than plaintiffs.
Q.

That's who hires me.

What speed does it take to deform the bumper braces

on the Explorer an inch?
A.

I don't know.

Q.

Do you know if it is more than two mi.les an hour?

A.

I don't know that.

Q.

Well, as part of your preparation for your testimony

today, wouldn't it have helped you to know how much speed it
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takes to bend those things?
A.

Well, I looked at that, for that specific purpose,

but I have no idea what it would take, because there is four of
them.
Q.

So you have no idea what speed it would take to do

A.

No.

Q.

So if it takes ten miles an hour to bend them, that

that?

means your formulas are worthless, and the car was going ten
miles an hour, doesn't it?
A*

No, that's not true, because for every force that

goes that way to bend them, the same has to come back, and we
don't have that balance in forces.
Q.

In deed.

Now, what impact absorption did the Taurus

A.

It has the foam, it has the egg crate, it has got the

have?

back bar, it has got all of that and, of course, it has the
plastic bumper.
Q.

What do you mean the plastic bumper?

A.

That's what that is.

That —

That is a plastic bumper.

as I showed the jury before, that thing that looks so

nice is nothing but plastic.
Q,

The structure of the bumper itself is what is the

source of the impact absorption for the Taurus; is that right?
A,

Well, the plastic cover, the styrofoam, the foam
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that ' s in it, the egg carton, and the support parts in there

I

are <
all part of the energy absorption system.
Q.

What do you mean the support parts?

A.

Well

Q.

You mean parts like this?

A.

No.

—

You don't put a piece of styrofoam wi*thout

some thing that sits behind it to support it.

J

So you have a

part that 's behind it, that's supported, to hold the styrofoam
that fits around it.
Q.

That bumper is designed, it works within a plastic

sheath?
A.

What?

Q.

The outside of the bumper is a plastic sheath with

soft material inside?
A.

That's what I just told you.

Q.

And the soft material rebounds to shape, unless the

sheath is cut?
A.
there.

It could.

There is always the resilience 1that's

That's true.

Q.

It is designed for that purpose, isn't it?

A.

That's part of its purpose.

It isn't designed for

that , but that's what happens.
Q.

And as you know, in this case, the ball on the

Expl(3rer bumper hit the license plate on the Taurus?
A.

True.
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Q.

So you didn't have a sharp object hitting the sheath,

you had the object hitting the license plate?
A.
Mr. King.

Well, in terms of magnitude, it is still pointed,
If I hit the license plate, and it is enough

velocity, and it is narrow enough, you still get the centered
impact.
Q.

In regard to that, the standard for a bumper is a

five-mile-per-hour barrier, isn't it, before a bumper is
damaged?
A.

I think it was changed in 1986.

the reg out.

I would have to get

I think it is down to three now.

Q,

You are not sure, are you?

A.

I would have to look and see what the date was.

But

it is a three-mile-an-hour bumper.
Q.

If you are not sure, why did you testify to three

without checking?
A.

I just told you it is . three-mile-per-hour bumper.

That's what that Ford Taurus is on actual tests.
Q.

On the year of the vehicle involved?

A.

On the year of the vehicle involved.

Q.

That's a barrier that it is striking?

A.

Absolutely.

That was my whole point to show if it is

the barrier versus the point, absolutely.
Q.

The three miles means that, what, that it will exceed

the impact of three miles an hour without damage to the bumper?
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A.

No.

You have got it backwards.

hour you should not

have

deformation

At three miles an

of the body.

I think you

said that backwards.
Q.

Deformation of what body?

The body of the vehicle or

the body of the bumper?
A.

The body of the vehicle.

Well, the body of the

vehicle includes the bumper and all of the support mechanisms.
Q.

What are the support mechanisms?

A.

Where are they?

Q.

What are they?

A.

Oh, no, not on the Taurus.

Are they like this?
They are softer.

The

Taurus doesn't have that,
Q,

What does it have?

A.

It has got supports.

Q.

Yeah.

A.

It has a support bracket.

Do you want me to draw it for

you?

The typical support, if we

were to look down like a bird is looking, the bumper wraps
around, then you have the
Q.
flat?

—

Would you mind making the front of that bumper more
It is not rounded like that.

Your own photograph shows

that.
MR. HANSEN:

I object.

I think he is arguing with

the witness.
THE COURT:

The Court will permit him to request how
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he wants it drawn.
MR. KING:

I will allow the jury to take a look at

the front of this bumper.
Q.

It curves on the side, and it is flat across the

front; isn't that correct?
A,

Let me see if I can get it a little bit better.

Q.

Why don't you draw it like so.
MR. HANSEN:

I object.

THE COURT:

Sustained.

A.

Is that any better?

Q.

Well

Counsel

—

MR. HANSEN:

Your Honor, I am going to object to

THE COURT:

Let Counsel draw it, and then we will

—

kind of skip all of the argument.
Q.

How about that?

A.

No.

and there.

Let's agree, Mr. King, someplace between there

How is that?

THE COURT:

Circle the one you are both going to

settle on, and let's move on.
Q.

We talk about the support structure behind the

bumper, that connects.
A.

Which one do you want me to use?

Q.

The lower one.

Let's be accurate.

Use the lower

one.
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A.

Let me change colors for just a second.

have black.

Now we have red.

We

Let's assume the red is

styrofoam, the plastic material.
the —

Okay.

Let's assume now that we have

an egg carton that comes behind it, or the crating, or

whatever you want to call it.

And this starts to build

support, because we agreed a minute ago that the outside is
plastic.
Q.

My question is, what is the structure that connects

the bumper onto the vehicle?
A.

Now, the structure that connects it, this side comes

back in and hooks onto the body.

This is the plastic cover.

And then you have a support mechanism that comes in, and this
now hooks to the "frame" of the vehicle.
really have a frame like we used to have.

The vehicle doesn't
But if the car were

to come back down like that, you h?^, a support mechanism that
goes between and holds it out like that.
sit here.

Your radiator would

That kind of orients us to where it is.

Q.

What kind of support mechanism is that?

A.

What do you mean?

Q.

Is it a piece like this?

A.

No.

Q.

What is it like?

A.

Well, it is metal.

I told you before it isn't like that.

Depending on the shape, it could

be shaped like a "U", like this, that's a beam that comes out.
It could have a flat plate on the back.

It could have a number
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of things on it.

You can't always predict what it is from a

•93 Ford.

Q.

Whatever it is, it is a solid piece of metal?

A.

No.

Solid piece of metal -- well, if it were as

thick as this, we could say, I guess, that's solid.

If it were

as thick as the cardboard on the box, I guess that's solid.
mean, it is a piece of metal.

I

I don't know how you could get

it better than a piece of metal.
Q.

It is not impact-absorbing without deformation?

A.

That's true.

Once you get so far back, you do not

have impact absorption without deformation.
MR. KING:

Mark this, please.

I will advise the

Court we have a rebuttal witness, we have given notice of,
Leonard Hartle, who is coming to court from out in West Valley.
He is the person we referred to earlier, who is the Taurus
mechanic.
Q.

There is the brace for the Taurus for that year.

Isn't it?
A.

It looks like it.

Q.

And it is impact-absorbing, isn't it?

A.

It looks like it is.

This one looks like it does

have an impact absorber in the back of this.
Q.

Several inches?

A.

Well, yeah, if it can go clear to here it would be

about two and a half inches.
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Q.

How much impact will that absorb?

A.

Should be three miles an hour.

Q.

Thatfs three miles an hour in addition to the bumper

absorbing three miles an hour, isnft it?

That makes a total of

six?
A.

No, no, no,

I wish that it were.

But this whole

thing is three miles an hour.
Q.

Try to move that as far as you could.

A.

I canft move it.

Q.

You didn't know what kind of structure it had until I

showed you?
A.

Not on that particular one you have there.

sure that is what was on it.

I am not

If you represent that's what it

was, thatf s f ine.
MR. KT;IG.
MR. HANSEN:

Offer Exhibit 15, your Honor.
No foundation, your Honor.

the basis of foundation.

Object on

r

'cher than Mr. King's testimony, we

don't have anything on that.
THE COURT:

Well, it is —

Counsel can argue it,

whether it is or not, and the jury will decide who to believe.
It is admitted.
Q.

Why didn't you tell the jury that you have that big

shock absorber, as well as the bumper, and that you have to
compress both of them before you have damage?
A.

I am not sure that's on there.

Why didn't I tell
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you?

Because I am not sure it is on there.
Q.

You don!t know that much about the car, do you?

A.

0h# yeah.

Q.

You don't know if it has a shock-absorbing front

bumper or not?
A.

I do.

There are some models that do, and some that

do not, and some are oil, and some are air.
Q.

Which kind was Mrs. Clark driving?

A.

I have no idea.

Q.

Why didn't you find that out before you gave this

testimony?
A.

Because I can't find the car.

If I could find the

exact car, I could probably do it.
Q.

It is not possibly because you charge 200 —

you do

250 of these cases a year, at $300 to several thousand dollars
a case?
MR. HANSEN:
THE COURT:
Q.

He is misrepresenting his testimony.
It is argument.

Sustained.

Are you giving this kind of testimony, those are your

figures, 250 cases a year, 300 to several thousand, right?
MR. HANSEN:

It mischaracterizes his testimony.

Mr. Knight has never testified that way.
THE COURT:
Q.

The question has been asked and answered.

There is a difference between a barrier test and a

vehicle test, isn't there?
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A,

True.

Q.

And you didn't explain to the jury that the three-

mile-an-hour minimum standard applies to hitting a rigid
barrier like a wall?
A.

I thought that's what I drew on that other exhibit.

I thought that's what it was stating, that's how they establish
those standards.
Q.

If you hit a vehicle that's going to move away from

you, then you can have a higher speed than three miles an hour,
because it is not like hitting a wall?
A.

Well, Mr. King, that is true if you have a case

different than this.

But in this case, if the lead vehicle

moved one foot, we still have to come back within those
parameters of everything we talked about.
Q.

But you are aware that mosL of Mrs. Astill's

estimates, you are absolutely right when you said that the
speed and the distance didn't work.
or something.

It had to be farther back

She was making her best approximations.

They

made no measurement on how far forward her car moved?
A.

That's true.

Q.

The only thing she knew was her head went back

sharply, and she felt pain in her low back.
MR. HANSEN:
THE COURT:

Counsel is testifying.
Overruled, if that's the basis of a

question.
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Q.

So you can't make your estimates based on her car

moving one foot, when everything she is doing is estimates that
are substantially subject to error.

She might have moved five

feet.
A.

Well, Mr. King, you still have to go back and put

everything in balance.

If you wanted to move five feet, you

still put everything in balance and say, where did it go?
Q.

Going back to the Ford Taurus, if we have a force

that fully compresses
THE COURT:

—
Counsel, if you are going to examine the

witness, I insist that you use the podium, and not be at the
jury box.
Q.

You are welcome to retrieve any of the exhibits, and

you can use them.
MR. KING:

All counsel must use that podium.
I started talking where they were.

My

apologies.
Q.

So, in addition, you acknowledge, unless the sheath

around the cosmetic part of the bumper is torn, that it will
return to its shape, right?
A.

It may.

We usually expect to have it come back in

low-speeders, that's true.
Q.

So not seeing damage, not having somebody observe

damage to the bumper does not mean it was fully compressed, as
long as it wasn't torn, and it wasn't, it would return to
shape?
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A.

You can't say that, Mr. King.

Q.

Okay.

And you also didn't tell the jury about the

impact-absorbing pieces on the Taurus that would add to the
amount of force it can absorb before you can have damage?
A.

Mr. King, that isn't right.

a part of the whole system.

They don't add.

It doesn't add.

That is

You don't say

this gives you three and this gives you three and this gives
you three, which gives you nine.

That isn't what happens.

Q.

You didn't even know

A.

The dealer told me there was no absorber on that car.

Q.

You mean you are quoting the hearsay testimony of a

—

deal.er, and you didn't tell the jury?
MR. HANSEN:

I am going to object.

THE COURT:
MR. KING:

He is arguing.

It is argumentative.
I will ask all testimony based on his

quotation of a dealer not present in court be stricken.

It is

based on hearsay, and I didn't know it.
MR. HANSEN:
THE COURT:
Q.

He is an expert witness.
Denied.

You also can't say how many miles per hour in speed

it takes to deform those bumper brackets on the Explorer, do
you7
A.

That's true.

Q.

And, also, when you did that example four miles an

hour of sitting down hard in that chair, may I ask if you have
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1

a good back or a bad back?

2

MR. HANSEN:

3

THE COURT:

4
5
6
7
8 I

A.

I mean I don't know if I have a good

I am 60 some odd years old.

Would you mind trying that same experiment again, but

going down that hard head first.
A.

9
10

Overruled.

I have no idea.

back or bad back.
Q.

Objection, relevance.

Sure.
THE COURT:

Q.

Yes.

Is that a question?

I asked him if he would be willing to do that,

11

and he said he would.

12

because the neck is not as strong as the behind.

13
14

MR. HANSEN:

17

This is not question and answer.

objected several times.

15
16

You see, there is a risk of injury,

THE COURT:

I have

He continues to do it.

It is argumentative.

Let's move on with

the questioning.
Q.

And you said the data you have looked at includes

18 I hundreds of accidents in which there was no vehicle damage, but
19

there was reports of injury?

20

A.

True.

21

Q.

You don't have any idea what effect a person with a

22

previously injured back, mostly recuperated, how their

23

susceptibility to injury would compare to the susceptibility of

24

another person?

25

A.

Not in comparison to another person.

I did not look
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at tnat.
Q.

That's crucial here, isn't it?
MR. HANSEN:

this point.

Objection.

That's medical testimony at

He has talked about mechanics of injury and

accident reconstruction.
THE COURT:
Q.

The Court will permit the question.

You made the comment which —

in your testimony you

said that with the least strength breaks first?
A.

Or bends.

That's true.

Q.

The Taurus, between the structure of the bumper

itself and the structure of its brackets, would absorb enough
impact, the brackets on the Explorer, or, comparatively, the
weakest thing, because those are the things that did deform?
A.
th<

You can't really draw that analogy, Mr. King, because

bumper on that vehicle has substantially less strength

than that bracket does, and the bumper, supposedly, wasn't
injured, and that bumper is probably an eighth of an inch
thick, and that's less strength than what this has got, and I
can never rectify that.

I can't understand how you can have

the mass of that bracket damaged, when the weakest part, which
is the bumper, didn't get damaged, and that's what the Taurus
hit.

They didn't hit the bracket directly.

They hit the

bumper.
Q.

Is that the thing that had you baffled in this case?

A.

Well, one of the number of things.
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1

Q.

Well, you have a straightforward impact across this

2

bumper, but toward the lower part of it.

3

pushed forward, by the whole bumper of the Taurus, as we have

4

it correctly drawn.

5

that bend.

6

A.

The whole bumper is

So the impact is absorbed by the brackets

What's hard about that?
Well, the thing that I touched had less strength.

7

The thing that hits it has less strength than what gets hit.

8

And then we bend a piece of steel that's behind a bumper, that

9

has less strength than the plastic that's here, and the bumper

10

that's here, and then we bend something that has that mass in

11

front of it, when that which we first touched was a bumper that

12

has less strength.

13

has the least strength, which is the bumper, how did that

14

strength transfer through and bend something that has that

15

mass, and there is four of those on the bumper?

16

know how that happened.

17

something sandwiched in between, that has less strength than

18

the bullet —

19

the bullet vehicle, and have that occur.

20

Q.

And I am saying, gee, if I hit that which

And I don't

I can't imagine how you can have

or the target vehicle, and greater strength than

Have you ever used a piece of wood over a nail to

21

drive the nail in, like when you are doing finish work, and you

22

don't want to leave a hammered dimple in the wood, so you use a

23

nail —

24

hit the wood, and drive the nail?

25

A.

you have a nail, have a piece of wood over it, and you

I haven't, but I know what you are describing.
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1

Q.

The piece of wood is softer than the nail, but the

2

nail moves.

3

A.

But the wood moves also, because you have the direct

4

and opposite force of the two.

Are you saying the nail doesn't

5

go into the piece of wood that I am hitting?

6 I

Q.

Would you consider that a fair analogy?

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

To the broad bumper matching the broad bumper?

9 1

A.

In conceptual terms, that's true.

In that case, if

10

we did that with the nail, then what you have got, if I take a

11

piece of wood, and I put it on, and I hit that, don't I get a

12

mark aaainst the wood?

13

same thing that we have happen here.

14

balsa wood to drive that nail, guess what?

15

the iaail driven, beer a^e that piece fails first.

16

Q.

And if that's the case, then that's the
And if I took a piece of
I will never get

If you take it to the extreme, of course, you are

17

correct.

18

contact with each other, the brackets are the appropriate thing

19

to fold.

20

designed.

21

k.

But if you have a broad bumper and a broad bumper, in

That is their function.

That's how they are

First of all, Mr. King, we don't have a broad bumper

22

agaihst a bumper, regardless of which way you have me draw it,

23

that thing has a bulge on the front of it.

24

out there is going to cause the leading edge to make contact

25

firsjt.

And that sticking

It isn't flat like you have on a Ford Taurus.

But
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1

whatever it is, we can have contact with it.

2 I

MR. KING:

Counsel, you have a number of photographs.

3

Do you have any photograph that better shows the configuration

4

of this bumper?

5

MR. HANSEN:

I will object to "better show."

6

we introduced three photographs.

7

one.

8

interested.

9

Exhibit Y?

12 I

Mr. Knight may have the third

I have some others back at my office, if you are

10
11

I think

But the same thing.

THE WITNESS:

Mr. King, do you want

How about AA?

AA, you can see the

curve.
Q.

Thank you.

But when that thing comes in for

an

inch

13

or two in the front, then it flattens out, because the curve

14

isn't very big.

15

MR. HANSEN:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. KING:

18
19
20
21

Hasn't this been asked and answered?
Sustained.
I pass that, your Honor,

I think I am

about through.
Q.

Do you recall testifying in the case of Beck vs.

Lassiter about a year and a half ago?
A.

I could probably refresh my memory, but you would

22 I have to do it.
23

Q.

Do you recall it was a rear-end collision in which

24

the struck vehicle had $2,000 damage, the rear axle was

25

displaced forward a few inches, and you testified that the
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1
2
3
4 I

impact was four miles an hour?
A.

I remember the case.

I don't think the facts were

quite what you stated, Mr. King.
Q.

5

I am asking if you agree or disagree.
MR. HANSEN:

I object.

Mr. King gave him certain

6

parameters, and Mr. Knight is saying those parameters are not

7

what he recalls.

8
9
10

THE COURT:

relationship between that case and the one today, the Court is
not going to permit the question.

11
12
13

MR. KING:
Q.

Withdraw the question.

miles per hour to bend brackets on the Explorer?
MR. HANSEN:

15

MR. KING:

16 I

THF COURT:

17

Ixd. KING:

18

THE COURT:

19

21 I

It is irrelevant.

Again, you don't know the force, the total force in

14

20

Unless there is some reasonable

Objection, asked and answered.
Okay.
It has been.

Sustained.

No more questions.
Redirect?
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. HANSEN:
Q.

Mr. Knight, after having responded to Mr. King's

22

questions, have you changed your opinion in any regard

23

concerning the speed of the vehicles in this accident?

24

A.

I have not.

25

Q.

What is your opinion —

have you changed as to your
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1

confidence in your opinions with regard to the speed of those

2

vehicles?

3

A.

I have not.

4

MR. HANSEN:

5

MR. KING:

6

THE COURT:

7

Nothing further.
Nothing further.
Is there any objection to the witness

being excused?

8

MR. KING:

9

MR. HANSEN:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. HANSEN:

12

THE COURT:

Not at all.
No objection.
You may be excused.

Thank you.

The defense rests.
The Court will speak with counsel for a

13

moment, on the record, out of the presence of the jury.

14

bailiff will take the jury into the jury room, and there is a

15

question to be resolved out of the presence of the jury.

16

(The jury left the courtroom.)

17

THE COURT:

So the

The record will reflect that the Court is

18

in session, out of the presence of the jury.

19

notified prior to the defense resting in this case that the

20

plaintiff intended to call a rebuttal witness to the accident

21

reconstruction witness called by the defendant.

22

Court the r€*asons why the witness that you seek to call now was

23

not included in your case in chief.

24
25

MR. KING:
of proof, your Honor.

The Court was

Explain to the

It is a matter of the shift of the burden
We had the burden of proving there was
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1

an accident, and resulting from the accident there was an

2

injury.

3

sufficiently low speed, that the injury would probably not have

4

occurred.

5

how our case went.

6

case on, we may or may not need the expense of a rebuttal

7

witness.

8

Court and of the jury with rebuttal witness until they have

9

carnied their burden of proof by showing they have a serious

The defense said they would prove that the impact was

They may not have put on that defense depending on
Depending on how effectively they put their

But we certainly don't need to take the time of the

10

challenge to our version of the facts.

11

the rebuttal witness, and that was what the rebuttal witness is

12

for, and this is the classic use of it.

13

At that point we called

If I could refer to the case they gave the Court of

14

Turner vs. Anderson.

15

THE C0TT2T:

16

MR. KING:

The Court has thet

case.

In my reading of it, the witness was

17

offered as a rebuttal witnt,£. . The problem, and the sole

18

problem in the case was the witness' name had not been given to

19

the other side in time for them to depose him or find out

20

anything about him.

21

rebutting witness, the Court had no complaint with that.

22

they complained about is that the need to call him could have

23

been anticipated earlier, and the other side given notice

24

earlier.

25

improper rebuttal witness.

The fact that he was offered as a

So inferentially —

or else —

What

also, he is an

They didn't say that.

They said
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you knew the issue.
put on.

You knew the rebuttal you were going to

And you didn't give them notice that you had a witness

to prove it.

The function of the rebuttal witness, our burden,

their burden, rebut, inferentially, it was entirely
appropriate.

So this case supports us, in view of the fact

they stipulate, gave full and timely notice that we would call,
possibly, Mr, Lord, a reconstruction expert, and, possibly,
mr. Hardle, who is a Taurus mechanic and repairman.
THE COURT:
MR. KING:

Did you depose Mr, Knight?
I did not, your Honor.

I have dealt with

him in court before.
THE COURT:

Were you aware of what he was going to

testify to?
MR. KING:

That he was going to put in the speed

around three to four miles an hour.
THE COURT:
MR. KING:

When did you know that?
I assumed that he was going to do that,

because it is what he customarily does.

It was confirmed when

I heard the opening statement.
THE COURT:

Prior to the jury being impaneled, what

date, in relation to the 6th of February of 1996, did you know
that Mr. Knight was going to testify for the defense, and when
his testimony would be?
MR. KING:

It would be around the 1st of January,

because our letter to them advised Mr. Lord would be our
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1

rebuttal witness is dated, I think, January 6.

2
3

MR. HANSEN:

designation of expert witnesses and identifying Newell Knight.

4 1

MR. KING:

5

MR. HANSEN:

6

MR. KING:

That was on January 2 he was formally

We, within four days, gave the response,

if Newell is going to be here, we are going to call Mr. Lord.

9 I
10

That sounds right.

identified.

7 1
8

We formally filed on January 2 a

THE COURT:

Is there some reason why you didn't call

him?|

11

MR. KING:

Mr. Lord is here.

12

testify as my rebuttal witness.

13

THE COURT:

He is waiting to

Let the Court reason outloud for a moment

14

on the record, and then I will invite both counsel to respond.

15

The Court has been cited by both cr

16

vs. "Nelson.

17

The holding in that case regarding the calling of rebuttal

18

witnesses centered on whether or not the evidence sought to be

19

rebutted could reasonably have been anticipated prior to trial.

20

If ilt could, then the witness should be called in the case in

21

chief.

22
23
24
25

nsel to the case of Turner

It is a Supreme Court case decided March of 1994.

MR. KING:

No, your Honor, it is not what the case

saidl
THE COURT:

Just a moment.

you are invited to argue.

Let me reason, and then

If the witness —

if the testimony
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that you are seeking to rebut could reasonably have been
anticipated before trial, put it in, in your case.

If you knew

that the defense in this case was going to be that the accident
was low speed, is nonimpacting, noninjury causing, it is your
responsibility, knowing that, to present evidence in your case
in chief to establish that it was a high accident, high impact,
and injury causing.

That's precisely what the sandwiching of

the defendant's case involves.

If you knew that that was going

to be an issue in this case, then it is your responsibility to
present that in your case in chief, not present half of your
case at the beginning, and the other half at the conclusion of
the defense case.
MR. KING:

The Court hasn't had a chance to study

Turner vs. Nelson in detail.
THE COURT:

That'r probably a true statement.

You

realize that you gave me this case while the Court was in
session, and I have glanced at it as we have ruled on
objections and listened to the testimony of the witness.

But

at least the paragraph clearly states that if you could
anticipate certain witnesses to —

I mean certain evidence to

be presented, then why didn't you present evidence to the
contrary in your case in chief?
MR. KING:

What the case turns on, your Honor, is not

whether he was rebuttal witness or a direct witness.

What the

case turned on was that he was a surprise witness.
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THE COURT:

No.

It was whether or not he was listed.

That was one of the questions, whether or not he had been
listed as a witness.
MR. KING:
THE COURT:
MR. KING:
paragraphs 3 and 4.

That was the sole ground for disposition.
Not so.

That clearly is not so.

Please take a look at page 1024,
"When the offering party contends that the

undisclosed witness is necessary to rebut, the issue hinges on
whether the evidence sought to be rebutted could have
reasonably been anticipated."
THE COURT:
MR. KING:

That•s the Court's point.
That doesn't put him into the case as a

witness in chief.
THE COURT:

Read the next paragraph.

paragraphs, as a matter of fact.

The next two

The trial court indicated

that the testimony regarding the obstructed stop sign was not
new.

The plaintiff had known for weeks and months that they

were contending

—

MR. KING:
THE COURT:
time to argue.

Indeed

—

Just a moment.

I will give you all the

You give me all the time to argue.

The trial

court said you have known from the get-go that there was going
to be a question about whether or not this stop sign was
obstructed.

Now, you can't, with that knowledge, wait until

the defense has presented their case, go out the night of
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1

trial, get a witness, and bring him in and say that the stop

2

sign was not obstructed.

3

an issue all along.

4

have said that you didn't even bother to depose the

5

reconstruction witness, because you knew he was going to

6

testify that the speed of impact was three to four miles an

7

hour.

8

witness1 testimony.

9

should properly prepare in your case in chief to deal with it.

10

You have known that was going to be

In this case, by your own admission, you

You can't claim that that was a surprise segment of this

MR. KING:

And if you have known that, then you

There isn't a single reference in this

11

opinion, Nelson vs. Turner to —

12

should have been in the case in chief or rebuttal.

13

not the issue.

14

side.

15
16

Speed is not a factor.

17

that speed is a biij factor.

19

That was

The issue was that he wasn't given to the other

Now, if I know —

18

whether the surprise witness

THE COURT:

J am going to put on my case.

They are going to put on their case
I rebut that by showing

—

Speed has been a factor from the outset

in this case.

20

MR. KING:

This is rebuttal by definition, and it is

21

the only place in the orderly sequence of the case it should be

22

put on.

23

put it on.

24
25

I don't have to anticipate their defense until they

THE COURT:

But it is part of the case in chief.

You

are going to show high impact, high speed, and resulting
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inj\iry, you have to prove it.

MR. KING:

That's one of the elements of

I never had to prove high speed.

prove a collision and an injury.

I had to

At any rate, if you will

please read the case again, it is solely because they didn't
give timely notice until the night of trial that they were
going *co call this witness, not that he was a rebuttal witness.
From the defense presented, they could have anticipated they
would have had to call a rebuttal witness, they did not give
notice they were going to call the rebuttal witness until the
start of trial.
witness.

There was no objection to him being a rebuttal

The objection was no notice, as the opinion says, so

he qpuldn't have been deposed or —

and so forth.

There is not

a word in the opinion calling him as a rebuttal witness was
wrorif.

You can anticipate a rebuttal witness is needed if the

othe|r side is going to put on a defense.
is for.

That's what rebuttal

What we have to do, if we know we are going to put a

rebuttal witness in, we have to give them time to prepare.
I try a case against General Motors, and I say the
fuel tank was defective.

Then they bring in a bunch of

witnesses that the fuel tank
THE COURT:
MR. KING:
approaches to it.

—

Was not defective?
They come up with new ideas, new

Until they have done that, their battery of

experts, I don't know exactly what to rebut.

What I do know is
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I have to rebut, and I give the name of the expert I am going
to call to rebut.
THE COURT:

What you do know is it is your

responsibility to prove a defective fuel tank.
right from the get-go.
chief.

You know that

So you have to prove it in your case in

You can't lay back in the bushes and wait until the

defense has presented its case, and then sandwich the defense
case in with what should have been presented in your case in
chief.

That's a time-honored principle of the orderly

presentation of the evidence.
MR. KING:

Okay.

When I tried a case of that kind,

the defense General Motors put in, Ford actually, was the
people would have died anyway, because the accident was severe.
They didn't worry about whether the tank was adequate or not.
When I realized they were coming into this new defense, because
of the character of the witnesses thev called, and associate
counsel who had worked with Ford be ove said these guys will
say these guys would have died anyway, then we put in our
rebuttal witnesses.

We didn't have to prove that in our case

in chief, but we did have to prove it in our rebuttal.
Rebuttal is a proper part of trial.
THE COURT:

It is if there is some element of

surprise.
MR. KING:
THE COURT:

It is not the element of surprise.
That is what this opinion says.

66

0 00?3f

MR. KING:

It doesn't.

It says the whole problem is

that she knew she needed a rebuttal witness, and so she should
have told them.

When she didn't tell them until the day of

tridl, she couldn't call the witness.
THE COURT:

Let's read the next paragraph.

The trial

court indicated that the testimony regarding the obstructed
sigri was not new.

It wasn't a surprise.

It wasn't something

that had been injected into the trial during the defense of the
case.

Everybody knew by the pleadings and by discovery and so

on tfiat that was challenged by the defense, that the sign was
obstructed.

It was not a new factor.

And the Court says,

"Therefore, Nelson's essential defense had always been that the
sign was obstructed, and although the trial court didn't
specifically say that Turner could reasonably have anticipated
that testimony, the tl *ust of the Court's ruling is clear.
Nelson's evidence was foreseeable."
that they were going to challenge
MR. KING:

And it is foreseeable here

—

But there is not a line in here that says

Nelson wouldn't have been an appropriate rebuttal witness.

The

thing is they didn't give notice of him at all until the third
day tof trial.

The proper sequence in the case is we put on

ours, they put on theirs, we rebut.

Just like debate.

Open,

respond, rebut.
THE COURT:

Perhaps the better analogy is you have

the burden of proof, and in your case in chief you are well
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advised to prove what you intend to prove.

In this particular

case, the Court understood that you were going to prove that
this accident was caused by a 10- to a 15-mile-an-hour impact
or 15- to 25-mile-an-hour impact, and, because of that, the
plaintiff sustained injury.
MR. KING:
was testified to.

You need to prove that.

I didn't have —

I didn't care what speed

When she talked about speed and measurements

and so forth, I said those are approximations.
acknowledged that.

She

She said it was at least ten miles an hour.

But ten miles was not vital to our case.
THE COURT:

It is three times the amount of the

anticipated testimony of the defense expert.

You said that you

have known all along he was going to estimate this speed at
three to four miles an hour, even if you went at ten miles an
hour.
MR. KING:

Supposing they decided not to call

Mr. Knight.
THE COURT:

It would have been a plus for you,

probably.
MR. KING:

Possibly.

But the thing is I don't have

to put on testimony that speed is a factor in the injury until
they put on testimony that it is not.
THE COURT:

I don't think —

operated on that basis.

this Court has never

Having tried over 200 jury trials in a

criminal arena, it would be highly imprudent for a prosecutor

$8
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to p'resent evidence that somebody was shot, and not put any
evidence in until the gun —

about the gun until rebuttal,

hoping that somebody is going to challenge the shooting.
MR. KING:

I agree with that entirely.

It is this is

a totally different concept.
THE COURT:
MR. KING:

It is, but the principle is the same.
It is not, because in a criminal defense

they don't have to put on a defense at all, and you are
obligated to advise them of everything you have.
THE COURT:
civil defense.

You don't have to put anything on in a

They could have rested at the conclusion of

your case, sent it to the jury, and let the jury do what they
want to.
MR. KING:

They might have come up with 15 other

th^oi ies.
THE COURT:

What they might have done and what they

in fact did \ are worlds apart, and the Court is of the
opinion that you simply cannot sandwich the defense with
testimony that you have known and anticipated right from the
beginning, and hope to maybe get the last word in.

I don't

know what it is,
MR. KING:

I didn't know what to have Mr. Lord say

until I heard exactly what Mr. Knight said and exactly the
bases that he used.
THE COURT:

I couldn't use Mr. Lord in advance.
Proffer what this witness is going to
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1

testify to.

2

MR. KING:

The essential thing I am going to have

3

Mr. Lord work on is something I couldn't anticipate Mr. Knight

4

would say.

5

striking car was less exposed to harm, or more exposed to harm,

6

than the body of the person in the struck car.

Mr. Knight said that the body of the woman in the

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. KING:

9

Do you want him to testify to that?
I didn't know he was —

Mr. Lord will

testify that when your head moves back a few inches, this can

10

cause substantial damage, based on a tremendous amount of

11

experience he has.

12

THE COURT:

If that's what you are going to call your

13

rebuttal witness for, I will permit you.

14

argument.

15

you couldn't reasonably anticipate that, because the driver of

16

the striking car was leaning into the passenger's seat, and,

17

therefore, was more vulnerable to injury than the driver of the

18

car that was struck, you can call the witness and testify to

19

that.

20

You have won the

If you are going to call this witness and say that

What else?
MR. KING:

Just on the same line, he said the person

21

in the car struck, being in the seat, would not be injured.

22

when I cover that topic, vulnerability to injury being struck.

23
24
25

MR. HANSEN:

So

I think that's going to open the whole

flood gates, if I may respond very briefly.
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

You had no opportunity.

Take
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what time you like and respond.
MR. HANSEN:
Turner vs. Nelson

Having been counsel for Plaintiff in

—

THE COURT:

Were you on the winning or losing side of

MR. HANSEN:

I was on the side that tried to present

thatj?

the new witness.

I was on the losing side.

before the Supreme Court.

We briefed this

So I well know the arguments and the

positions of the parties and the underlying facts.

Let me

indicate that I think the Court's reading of Turner vs. Nelson
is exactly correct, even though the Court hasn't had a lot of
time to look at that case.

And there are some similarities

that, are extremely striking here.
And one is the fact that as the Court has said, the
critical issue is whether or not they could reasonably
anticipate the issue to be raised at trial.

We tried to claim

surprise in Turner vs. Nelsc*. , saying there was certain
testimony that came out in opening statement, that we didn't
anticipate, so we went and found this new witness.
Court said, "Wait a minute.

And the

The issue of obstructed stop sign

was known from the time the complaint was answered, and it was
denied, and the time the defendant's deposition was taken."
Same thing in this case.

May of 1995.

Our defendant is

deposed, and she says, "This was a rolling accident.
not 4 high-speed collision."

This was

The dispute was before them.
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They never sent discovery requests to the defendant.
When we identified Newell Knight, they didn't ask, in formal
discovery, what will Mr. Newell Knight testify to?
asked to take his deposition.

They never

And in that Turner vs. Nelson

case, on page 1025, the Supreme Court chided Plaintiff's
counsel, stating that they did not take the depositions that
they properly should have taken.

In fact, the record suggests,

if Turner failed to appreciate the extent of Nelson's reliance
on this defense, it was probably because of Turner's earlier
failure to depose adequately several witnesses.

Nelson's

counsel had listed certain witnesses on their designation of
witnesses, cind had made them available for deposition.

Turner,

the plaintiff, took no attempt to depose the expert or, as far
as we can tell from the record, determine through written
interrogatories the content of that testimony.
That's what Plaintiff has done here, and I don't
think they should be allowed to now come in and put on their
prima facie case in rebuttal, when it could have been
reasonably anticipated, and should have been.
THE COURT:

Someplace in law school and thereafter

the Court learned that rebuttal testimony was testimony to
rebut a surprise witness, a surprise element of the case.
don't know if there is any sound argument to the contrary.

I
Why

would it be rebuttal if the element of surprise is not there,
if you can anticipate, reasonably anticipate, and in your case
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1

knoW for a certainty that the speed was going to be challenged

2

in this case, and that the resulting injury was going to be

3

challenged, why not present that in your case in chief?

4

can'lt think of one good reason why.

5
6

MR. KING:

Mr. Knight came up —

I just

Mr. Knight is not my

favorite.

7 I

THE COURT:

8

going to say.

9

anticipate.

10

Aside from that, you knew what he was

Or if you didn't, you reasonably could

MR. KING:

I made the comment for a reason, and the

11

reason is that I think Mr. Knight is one of these people, and

12

this is just my opinion of him, that will say what he has to

13

say in order to get where he wants to go.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. KING:

You are entitled to your opinion on that.
It makes it imj^nible for me to

16

anticipate what Newell is going to say until ho has said it,

17

because I haven't found he bases his testimony on scientific

18

data, but on what's going to work for a given problem.

19

not anticipate exactly what he is going to say until he said

20

it, even though I know the generalities of it.

21

also testified that the bumper would have been deformed if it

22

had t?een hit over a few miles an hour, and it would have been

23

tornj

24
25

I could

For example, he

Now, on the other witness we have, Mr. Hardle, that's
total surprise, is out in the hall with the Taurus bumper
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that's not damaged a bit, and it was in a much higher speed
impact, which would show that Mr. Knight's testimony on that
area is in error, and that was total surprise we couldn't
anticipate.
rebuttal.

Again, surprise is not the element of purpose of
Purpose of rebuttal is we put on our case in chief,

they put on their case, then we rebut their case.

Supprise is

not a factor.
THE COURT:

Are you saying that everything that they

have testified to in the defense you have the right to rebut?
MR. KING:
THE COURT:
MR. KING:
THE COURT:

I wouldn't

—

Then where does surrebuttal come in?
On occasion it comes up.
Where does the process start and end?

And in this case, if the Court was of the opinion that this
witness caught you off guard, that this witness said something
that you totally had not expected he was going to say, or that
just came out of the blue, the proverbial blue, and struck you,
a rebuttal witness is appropriate.

But you have represented to

the Court that you knew exactly he was going to testify to a
low-impact collision, very low speed, and, in his opinion,
there would not be any significant injury.
MR. KING:

Right.

He did testify in those areas.

When he went further and said, had there been any more speed,
the Taurus bumper would be permanently deformed, and when he
said the position plaintiff was in, in her vehicle, she would
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not be hurt, because she was protected, these were new areas we
didn't anticipate.

Mr. Lord can handle the injury and

Mr. Hardle can handle the bumper.
THE COURT:
MR. HANSEN:
THE COURT:

Anything further?
We will submit it.
The Court finds and rules as follows:

The plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known and
anticipated that the defense was going to challenge the
testimony of the plaintiff.

The knowledge is based on the

photographs of both vehicles, the back bumper of the
plaintifffs vehicle, the front bumper of the defendant's
vehicle.
marks —

The photograph is based on the absence of skid
or the findings, rather, are based on the absence of

skid marks, the findings are based on the absence of any
significant movement of the plaintiff's vehicle after ^he
striking, and the findings are based on the lack of any injury
to the driver of the striking car.
It defies reason that any of that testimony would
come as a surprise to the plaintiff.
reasonably could have been known.
not a surprise.

It was known or

It was anticipated.

It was

And it is a requirement that the burden of

proof be met showing that the accident, as it was alleged by
the plaintiff, occurred from a high-speed collision, that is 10
or 15 or 20 miles an hour, that substantial damage would have
been caused, and that resulting injury could have occurred.
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And the Court finds that it is not appropriate, when those
matters are part of the plaintiff's case in chief, and do not
come as a surprise in any way, to the plaintiff, that it is
inappropriate to sandwich the defendant's case with the
plaintiff's case on matters that could and should have been
presented in the case in chief.
Therefore, based on the proffers made by Plaintiff's
counsel, on what rebuttal witnesses will testify to, if called,
the motion to deny those witnesses testifying as rebuttal
witnesses is granted.
MR. KING:

Your Honor, I understand the ruling in

general, but the surprise elements that Mr. Knight said the
bumper would deform, that we could not anticipate, and Mr.
Hardle is here with the bumper.
specific point?

May I call him on that

I can call Mr. Lord on the specific point of

where you are in the passenger seat, as the car gains momentum
underneath you, it exaggerates the motion to the head, and this
makes you very prone to injury.
MR. HANSEN:

I think Plaintiff is trying to reargue

his motion.
THE COURT:

Counsel for the defendant will prepare

very specific findings on this motion in limine, and an
accompanying order, and at some time in the next two to three
weeks submit the findings to opposing counsel for approval as
to form, and the findings and the order to the Court for
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1

signature, so the record is clear.

2

challenge the Court's finding, that's why we have an appellate

3

court.

4 1

MR. KING:

And if somebody wants to

If the record may show ray exceptions to

5

the ruling of the Court, with the -- we have no rebuttal.

6

Defendant rested?

7 1

MR. FELT:

8 I

THE COURT:

9

Has

Yes.
Yes, the defense rested, and that's when

the Court excused the jury, and then we had the motion in

10 I limine.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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C E R T I F I C A T E
I, BRAD

J. YOUNG, hereby certify that I attended and

reported, as official court reporter, the proceedings in the
above-entitled and numbered matter before the Honorable Pat B.
Brian and that the foregoing is a true and correct transcription
of my stenographic notes thereof.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 29th day of March, 1996.

£>u^v

BRAD J. Y0JNC
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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